Opinion
B225423
09-09-2011
CELIA KOMATHY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Stone Busailah, Michael P. Stone, Muna Busailah, Michael D. Williamson and Melanie C. Smith for Plaintiff and Appellant. Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Claudia McGee Henry, Senior Assistant City Attorney, and Brian I. Cheng, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS118949)
APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. David P. Yaffe, Judge. Affirmed.
Stone Busailah, Michael P. Stone, Muna Busailah, Michael D. Williamson and Melanie C. Smith for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Claudia McGee Henry, Senior Assistant City Attorney, and Brian I. Cheng, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied appellant's petition for a writ of mandate on the ground that substantial evidence supported the finding of the Los Angeles Police Department Board of Rights that appellant, a police officer, was guilty of one count of misconduct for making misleading statements during an official investigation. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because this appeal concerns only count 3 on which appellant was found guilty, we do not summarize the facts pertaining to the other two counts, except to the extent they are pertinent to our discussion.
Plaintiff and appellant Celia Komathy began her career with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in 1990. Her present rank is P3 and she is assigned to the LAPD Training Division as a Spanish language instructor. In 2006, Komathy was injured on the job in a car accident. She was placed on long-term "Injured On Duty" (IOD) leave to recover from neck and back injuries, which required surgery.
Sometime in early 2007, while still out on leave, Komathy learned of the existence of a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of LAPD officers for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, including claims that officers had not been properly compensated for overtime and missed break periods. On June 26, 2007, Komathy called Laura Rangel, a supervisor in the Training Division. She told Rangel she was considering joining the lawsuit and wanted to review her sign-in/sign-out time sheets to see if there were any shifts where she might be eligible for compensation for missed or interrupted break periods, specifically break periods referred to in the LAPD as "Code Seven" breaks. Depending on the nature of the employee's duties, a Code Seven break of either 30 or 45 minutes is mandatory for every eight-hour shift worked. (LAPD Manual, vol. 3, § 702.20.)
Rangel expressed surprise at Komathy's request and inquired if Komathy had ever written down that she had taken Code Seven breaks when she had not actually done so. Komathy responded that she just wanted to view the time sheets because sometimes her Code Seven breaks were interrupted and she wanted to see what she had reported. Rangel then told Komathy that it sounded like she was admitting to having falsified her time sheets. Rangel told Komathy she would have to verify if Komathy was entitled to view the records and would get back to her, but she needed to "terminate" their conversation.
Komathy was concerned Rangel had misunderstood her and erroneously believed she had falsified her time sheets. She called another officer with whom she worked, Enrique Ceja, to talk about it. She relayed the nature of the conversation to Ceja and expressed her concern about Rangel's falsification accusation. They discussed whether Rangel may have just misunderstood or misinterpreted Komathy's words, although Ceja believed that Komathy essentially admitted to him that she had confessed to Rangel that she had filled out her time sheets improperly. Ceja said he would talk to Rangel and try to find out how she perceived the telephone conversation with Komathy.
Komathy also made a phone call to a civilian coworker and friend, Edward Osipian, who also worked in the LAPD Training Division. She expressed similar concerns to him about Rangel's comments to her. According to Osipian, Komathy seemed "frantic" and "panicky" during their conversation.
In the meantime, Rangel, upon hanging up with Komathy, phoned her lieutenant, Brian Ravish, and left a message about how she should proceed in light of Komathy's potential misconduct. The following day, both Ceja and Osipian spoke with Rangel and relayed their respective conversations with Komathy and her concern that Rangel had misunderstood her. Ceja also advised of a second conversation with Komathy in which he said Komathy had basically threatened him and Osipian with being implicated in misconduct if they failed to help her with Rangel. An internal personnel investigation was subsequently initiated into whether or not Komathy had falsified her time sheets.
The Interview
Komathy was interviewed by Sergeant Michelle Lemons as part of the LAPD's official investigation by the Internal Affairs Group into the misconduct allegations lodged against Komathy. In October 2007, Lemons initially contacted Komathy about scheduling an interview. Because Komathy indicated the desire to obtain counsel and had both a planned surgery and a family vacation scheduled, it was agreed the formal interview would not take place until November 30, 2007.
Two days before the scheduled interview, Komathy's counsel faxed a letter to Lemons stating the interview could not proceed as Komathy was still under a doctor's care, on IOD leave, and taking medications that could affect her ability to competently sit for an interview. Letters from two of Komathy's doctors were attached, attesting to Komathy's disability and opining that a two- to three-month delay would be appropriate. A follow-up letter from Komathy's counsel on December 6, 2007, also indicated that an approximate two-month postponement of any interview was necessary to allow for Komathy to complete her recovery.
In response, the Internal Affairs Group agreed to postpone the interview, unilaterally rescheduling it for February 6, 2008, with the time of day to be mutually decided by the parties. The letter advising Komathy of the rescheduled date also advised the February 6 date was "not tentative" or dependent on Komathy being back on active duty or through taking any prescribed medications. Komathy was ordered to submit to the interview at that time and advised that if she failed to appear, she would be deemed "an insubordinate and the investigation will be submitted without your statement."
Lemons's interview of Komathy took place on February 6, 2008. Komathy was represented by counsel and an officer representative. During the interview, Komathy stated that her understanding of what constituted a proper Code Seven break changed over time, and included, at one point, her belief that so long as she had at least something to eat she had had a Code Seven break, even if it was interrupted. Lemons then asked a series of questions to elicit what Komathy's definition of a Code Seven break had been at various times and whether she believed she ever wrote down on a time sheet that she had taken her break when she had not. Komathy answered: "I believe what I did was proper due to my training experience to write down a Code [Seven] because I was directed to do so by supervisors."
Lemons attempted to proceed with follow-up questions, which resulted in numerous objections and exchanges with Komathy's counsel and officer representative. At one point during this exchange, Komathy reiterated her belief that she had filled out her time sheets correctly based on her training and experience and how she had been directed to do so by supervisors. The following questions and answers then ensued:
"Sgt. Lemons: Okay. I think I understand what you are saying now. You are saying when you signed in and out on these sign in and out sheets that you took your Code [Seven] you believed you were taking your Code [Seven], as far as free time or eating or whatever it was through just training and experience that's what your Code [Seven] was —
"Sgt. Williamson: And direction from supervision —
"Officer Komathy: Direction, yes.
"By Sgt. Lemons:
"Q. Okay. What direction did these supervisors give you?
"A. That the log should be completely filled out including Code [Seven] time. You need time on there.
"Q. Okay. Did that mean whether you took it or not or were they saying that you need to take a Code [Seven]?
"A. Repeat the question. . . .
"Ms. Klaus: Break the question up . . . . That was compound. I think that's the source of her confusion.
"Sgt. Lemons: Okay. You said that the supervisors, and we'll get into which supervisors whatever, but supervisors told you that the sign in and out sheet needs to be completely filled out, including a Code [Seven], were they saying whether you took it or not, we want you to put [it] on [there].
"Ms. Klaus: Can you hold the question there for her.
"Officer Komathy: Yes.
"By Sgt. Lemons:
"Q. Okay. And who told you that, all these supervisors that you named or can you name one specific —
"A. Yes, supervisors.
"Q. So to make sure I didn't misunderstand Lieutenant Olvera, Lieutenant Zingo, Laura Rangel and I forget the first name Rosalyn —
"A. And I have one more name, and that's Gerald Hallanger. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶]
"Q. Okay. All of these supervisors at one point in time advised you to fill in the sign in and out sheet with a Code [Seven] whether you took a Code [Seven] or not?
"A. Yes."
In additional questioning, Komathy denied falsifying her time sheets or threatening her coworkers. As part of her investigation, Sergeant Lemons interviewed the supervisors that Komathy identified as having advised her to complete her time sheets with a Code Seven break filled in even if she had not been able to take or complete that break.
In June 2008, three administrative charges of misconduct were formally filed against Komathy. Count 1 alleged that Komathy, while on duty between the periods of September 2003 and June 2006, falsified official department records (time sheets) to indicate that a Code Seven break had been taken even when the break had not been taken. Count 2 alleged that Komathy threatened coworkers Ceja and Osipian by stating she would implicate them in misconduct if they did not dissuade supervisor Rangel from initiating a personnel complaint against her. Count 3 alleged that Komathy, while on duty, made misleading statements to investigators during her interview of February 6, 2008.
The Board of Rights Hearing
In September 2008, the LAPD's administrative tribunal, the Board of Rights (the Board), convened to hear testimony on the three charges against Komathy. Komathy pled not guilty to all three charges. Several days of testimony and argument took place, including testimony by Komathy, Rangel, Ceja, Osipian and Lemons. During Komathy's testimony, the following colloquy, regarding some of her responses in the February 6, 2008 interview, occurred:
"Q During your interview with Sergeant Lemons, were you asked if supervisors at one point had told you to complete the sign-in/sign-out sheet and write a Code [Seven] regardless of whether you had taken the Code [Seven] or not?
"A Yes, she did ask me that question.
"Q And what was your response?
"A My response was yes.
"Q Now, I believe earlier you testified that no one had told you to complete the sign-in/sign-out sheet no matter what; is that correct?
"A Right.
"Q Now, as you sit here today, were there supervisors that told you to complete the sign-in/sign-out sheet indicating that you had taken Code [Seven] regardless of whether you had taken Code [Seven] or not?
"A No, they did not say it that way, no.
"Q Okay. How did they say it?
"A They just said you needed — they wanted logs to be completely filled out. To me, that meant filling them out.
"Q Does that mean filling them regardless of when you had taken Code [Seven] or not?
"A No, that's not what I meant.
"Q Can you explain, then, your affirmative, your yes response to Sergeant [Lemons's] question, 'a supervisor at one point in time advised you to fill in a sign-in/sign-out sheet with a Code [Seven] whether you took Code [Seven] or not?'
"A I don't think I clarified myself stating that, at the point I answered yes, that it was for — to have the Code [Seven's] filled out to have the logs filled out completely, that was what I was trying to get across, that they did not tell me that I had to write that. They did not make the
statement to me, no. All they wanted — supervisors were always saying just, you know, make sure you complete your — make sure you complete the sign-in/sign-out log sheets. That's what I meant by make sure you complete it or not, that if you leave something out you have to go back and try to correct that.
"Q During your interview did Sergeant Lemons ask you this question about supervisors directing you to complete the sign-in/sign-out sheet regardless of whether you took a Code [Seven] on more than one occasion?
"A She did ask me a couple times, yes.
"Q And did you respond in the affirmative both times she asked you that question?
"A I believe I did. Again, I needed to clarify, which I didn't at that time, that what I was wanting to say is that they wanted me to complete the logs, not to write something that shouldn't be there."
Komathy further testified that Ceja's, Osipian's and Rangel's testimony as to what she said during the June 2007 phone calls with them was inaccurate and that they must have misunderstood her. She also consistently denied threatening her coworkers or intentionally falsifying her time sheets.
At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Board found Komathy not guilty on count 1 (falsifying records), but guilty on counts 2 (threatening coworkers) and 3 (misleading investigators). The Board unanimously recommended to the Chief of Police a penalty of 15 days' suspension without pay. In December 2008, the penalty was adopted without change and imposed against Komathy.
The Petition for Writ of Mandate
Komathy filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court against defendants and respondents City of Los Angeles and William J. Bratton, Chief of Police, challenging the Board's findings and the imposition of the suspension. The court issued its decision on February 24, 2010, granting the petition as to count 2, finding no substantial evidence Komathy threatened either of her coworkers. The court denied the petition as to count 3, finding there was sufficient evidence supporting the determination that Komathy made misleading statements on February 6, 2008, during the investigation of the charges against her and then altered those statements during her testimony before the Board in September 2008. The court thereafter entered judgment and issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding defendants to vacate the decision in "In the Matter of Celia Komathy, #27791," including the suspension of Komathy for 15 working days without pay, and ordering reconsideration of an appropriate penalty in light of the court's judgment reversing one of the counts. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We are called upon to determine whether the trial court's denial of Komathy's petition for a writ of mandate reversing the guilty finding on count 3 is supported by substantial evidence. We conclude it is.
1. Standard of Review.
Komathy filed her writ petition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, contending the Board's findings are not supported by the evidence and the Board abused its discretion in imposing the 15-day suspension. The Board's decision, and the penalty imposed, affects Komathy's fundamental vested right in her employment; therefore, the trial court correctly exercised its independent judgment in reviewing the administrative record and rendering judgment on the petition. (Davis v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. Personnel Com. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130 (Davis)[agency decision impacting employee's fundamental vested right in his or her job requires exercise of trial court's independent review].)
The independent judgment test required the trial court to not only examine the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence in a limited trial de novo. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143 (Bixby).) The trial court was permitted to draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868 (Morrison).) At the same time, it had to afford a strong presumption of correctness to the administrative findings and require the challenging party to demonstrate that such findings were contrary to the weight of the evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.)
Our task is to review the record and determine whether the trial court's findings (not the administrative agency findings) are supported by substantial evidence. (Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 143, fn. 10; accord, Davis, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1130-1131; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52 [where superior court required to exercise independent review of administrative record, "the scope of review on appeal is limited"].) We resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all legitimate, reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's decision. (Valiyee v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031.) "Where the evidence supports more than one reasonable inference, we are not at liberty to substitute our deductions for those of the trial court." (Morrison, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.)
2. There Is Substantial Evidence Supporting the Court's Decision.
Komathy makes a two-pronged argument in support of her contention that insufficient evidence supports the guilty finding on count 3: (1) the February 6, 2008 interview at which Komathy allegedly made misleading statements was not conducted at a reasonable time; and (2) there is no material evidence Komathy intentionally gave misleading answers to any question. Neither argument is persuasive.
First, the interview was not held at an unreasonable time. The Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (the Act) (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.) provides for certain basic rights that law enforcement agencies must provide to their officers. Specifically, in connection with an officer under investigation, minimum procedural standards are imposed. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 3303.) "By devoting a substantial portion of the Act to internal affairs investigations, the Legislature has implicitly recognized the importance of such investigations." (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 569 (Pasadena Police Officers).)
As our Supreme Court has explained, the Act promotes fundamental fairness for peace officers under investigation but also reflects "the Legislature's recognition of the necessity for internal affairs investigations to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the police force serving the community." (Pasadena Police Officers, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 572.) In order to "maintain the public's confidence in its police force, a law enforcement agency must promptly, thoroughly, and fairly investigate allegations of officer misconduct; if warranted, it must institute disciplinary proceedings." (Ibid., italics added.)
The Act provides that any interrogation of an officer under investigation "shall be conducted at a reasonable hour, preferably at a time when the public safety officer is on duty, or during the normal waking hours for the public safety officer, unless the seriousness of the investigation requires otherwise." (Gov. Code, § 3303, subd. (a).) Here, the record shows that Komathy was initially contacted by Sergeant Lemons regarding the need for her interview sometime in October 2007. Because Komathy was still in the process of obtaining counsel and had another surgery and a family vacation planned, it was agreed the interview would not be conducted until November 30, 2007.
Then, at Komathy's request, the November 30 interview date was rescheduled in light of the fact she was still off duty recovering from her injuries and resulting surgeries and taking prescribed medications. The requested period of postponement set forth in Komathy's November 28 and December 6, 2007 letter requests to the Internal Affairs Group was two to three months. The interview was therefore rescheduled and took place on February 6, 2008, just a couple of weeks shy of the date Komathy returned to full active duty at the LAPD.
Komathy's somewhat ambiguous argument appears to be that the interview was conducted at an unreasonable time because it took place while she was still on medication and not back on active duty, and therefore, any statements she made are not reliable evidence to be used against her. But the record plainly shows the interview was rescheduled to accommodate Komathy. Some four months passed from the time Sergeant Lemons first asked to interview Komathy and the interview being conducted. Moreover, Komathy made no objection on the record at the interview that she was unable to provide competent testimony due to any medical condition, being on medications, or otherwise. There is no evidence Komathy was provided anything other than reasonable accommodation in the scheduling of the interview within the meaning and spirit of the Act.
The mere fact Komathy was ordered to appear at the rescheduled February 6 interview date or risk being deemed an insubordinate was not unreasonable or coercive. She had already been accommodated with a postponement of several months. Nor is it material that Komathy had offered to waive the statute of limitations. "[O]ur Supreme Court has emphasized the need for prompt investigations of allegations of officer misconduct." (Upland Police Officers Assn. v. City of Upland (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1305 [officer not entitled to indefinitely delay interrogation by insisting on choice of counsel who is unavailable].) The competing interest in timely resolving claims of officer misconduct was entitled to due consideration in the setting of the interview and avoiding continued delay.
Finally, a review of the record evinces ample evidence in support of the trial court's determination as to count 3. " 'Substantial evidence has been defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate support for a conclusion. [Citation.]' " (Bhatt v. State Dept. of Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 923, 928.) A cold review of Komathy's answers in the February 6 interview and her attempt to explain those responses before the Board reasonably supports a finding of guilt on count 3. There is no obvious ambiguity in Komathy's responses during the interview, nor any generalized incoherence on her part. She provided, at several different points during the interview, a clear, voluntary response that she filled out her time sheets according to direction from various supervisors, including the notation of a Code Seven break whether or not a break had been taken.
The trial court had discretion to make credibility determinations and was entitled to reject Komathy's attempt to explain away those responses before the Board. (Morrison, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.) Komathy also testified that Rangel, Ceja and Osipian, all of whom testified consistently, incorrectly reported statements she had made to each of them. In explanation, Komathy was only able to surmise that her coworkers had each misunderstood her. The trial court was entitled to give whatever weight it found appropriate to such conflicting testimony and could well have concluded Komathy made several misleading statements during the official investigation. Our standard of review does not allow us to reweigh the credibility determinations of the trial court. (Id. at p. 868.) Komathy has failed to show the trial court's decision lacks substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
GRIMES, J. WE CONCUR:
RUBIN, Acting P. J.
FLIER, J.