Code, § 158), and if they are living separate and apart they may provide for the support and maintenance of either of them and their children. (Civ. Code, § 159) [2] Moreover, as between the husband and wife, if the provisions for support and maintenance have been made an integral or inseverable part of the division of their property, and the court in a divorce action has approved the agreement, its provisions cannot thereafter be modified without the consent of both of the parties. ( Tuttle v. Tuttle, 38 Cal.2d 419, 420-422 [ 240 P.2d 587]; Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621, 625 [ 177 P.2d 265]; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 841-842 [ 136 P.2d 1]; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 175-178 [ 44 P.2d 540]; Sasanoff v. Sasanoff, 120 Cal.App.2d 120, 127 [ 260 P.2d 840]; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 299 [ 210 P.2d 750]; Alexander v. Alexander, 88 Cal.App.2d 724, 726-727 [ 199 P.2d 348]; Holloway v. Holloway, 79 Cal.App.2d 44, 46-47 [ 179 P.2d 22]; Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 540-541 [ 152 P.2d 494]; Landres v. Rosasco, 62 Cal.App.2d 99, 105-106 [ 144 P.2d 20]; Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal.App.2d 526, 530 [ 112 P.2d 780].) [3] It is clear that the parties executed such an agreement in this case.

Where, however, the question thereafter arises as to whether the payments ordered to be made are alimony subject to modification, the court is not confined to a consideration of the terms of the decree but, as the foregoing authorities declare, may receive extrinsic evidence designed to establish that the award for support was in fact predicated upon an agreement of the parties settling their property rights. And, as pointed out in Kohl v. Kohl, 1944, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 542, 152 P.2d 494, 497, if, from the evidence as to the agreement of the parties the court is warranted in concluding that 'the award was made as a part of the adjustment of the property rights of the parties and in accordance with their agreement 'no reason appears why the judgment, when it became final, did not also become unchangeable to the same extent as a final judgment in any other action.' Parker v. Parker, 1921, 55 Cal.App. 458, 460, 203 P. 420, 421.

[7] If it appears that it was the intention of the parties to definitely, fully and permanently adjust and settle their property rights, and the provision for support and maintenance constitutes an integral and important element in the amicable adjustment of the property rights of the parties, the court is without power to thereafter modify the decree. ( Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [ 177 P.2d 265]; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833 [ 136 P.2d 1]; Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733 [ 72 P.2d 868]; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 178 [ 44 P.2d 540]; Holloway v. Holloway, 79 Cal.App.2d 44, 46 [ 179 P.2d 22]; Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 541 [ 152 P.2d 494]; Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal.App.2d 526 [ 112 P.2d 780]; Wallace v. Wallace, 136 Cal.App. 488 [ 29 P.2d 314]; 3 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Community Property, § 155, p. 677; anno.: 166 A.L.R. 675; 109 A.L.R. 1068; 58 A.L.R. 639.) There is no essential difference between the agreement in the case at bar and those considered in Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833 [ 136 P.2d 1], Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172 [ 44 P.2d 540], Holloway v. Holloway, 79 Cal.App.2d 44 [ 179 P.2d 22], Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 152 P.2d 494], and Wallace v. Wallace, 136 Cal.App. 488 [ 29 P.2d 314], in which it was held that payments for the support of the wife in the property settlement agreements there considered were a part of a division of the property and not alimony.

( Jackson v. Jackson (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 1026, 1033 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 121].) Kohl v. Kohl (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 152 P.2d 494], is cited by wife. In that case the divorce decree had similarly contained an approval of support payments as provided in the agreement "until further order of the court."

[4] It has, of course, been repeatedly recognized that a court lacks jurisdiction to change the terms of an integrated property settlement agreement. ( Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 539-540 [1] [ 152 P.2d 494]; Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 126 Cal.App.2d 238, 243 [ 271 P.2d 910]; Helvern v. Helvern, 139 Cal.App.2d 819, 829, 830 [5] [ 294 P.2d 482]; Plumer v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 636 [5] [ 328 P.2d 193].) But this is not to say that modification cannot be had in accord with the express provisions of the merged agreement.

If it appears that it was the intention of the parties to definitely, fully, and permanently adjust and settle their property rights, and the provision for support and maintenance constitutes an integral and important element in the amicable adjustment of the property rights of the parties, the court is without power to thereafter modify the decree. ( Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [ 177 P.2d 265]; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833 [ 136 P.2d 1]; Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733 [ 72 P.2d 868]; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 178 [ 44 P.2d 540]; Holloway v. Holloway 79 Cal.App.2d 44, 46 [ 179 P.2d 22]; Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 541 [ 152 P.2d 494]; Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal.App.2d 526 [ 112 P.2d 780]; Wallace v. Wallace, 136 Cal.App. 488 [ 29 P.2d 314]; 3 Cal. Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Community Property, sec. 155, p. 677; anno.: 166 A.L.R. 675; 109 A.L.R. 1068; 58 A.L.R. 639.) "In view of what has been said, the court properly sustained objections to the introduction of evidence for the purpose of showing that the payments were alimony and not in lieu of a division of property.

t designated for that purpose; that defendant's estate is obligated to complete performance of the agreement in the event of defendant's death; that provision is made for payment of attorney's fees if suit is brought upon the agreement; that there is no provision for submitting the agreement to the court for approval; that plaintiff accepted the monthly payments and the other property in full for both her community interest and claim to alimony as a package settlement; and that the parties desired to settle all questions relative to their property rights, point unerringly to the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties to completely adjust and settle their property rights and that the provision for the monthly payments constituted an integral and important element in the amicable adjustment of the property rights of the parties. ( Puckett v. Puckett, supra; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, supra; Hamilton v. Hamilton, supra; Holloway v. Holloway, 79 Cal.App.2d 44, 46 [ 179 P.2d 22]; Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 541 [ 152 P.2d 494]; Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal.App.2d 526, 529 [ 112 P.2d 780]; Hodgson v. Hodgson, 6 Cal.App.2d 496, 498 [ 44 P.2d 544]; Wallace v. Wallace, 136 Cal.App. 488, 492 [ 29 P.2d 314].) The fact that the monthly payments ceased upon the remarriage of plaintiff is not persuasively significant since they are made a charge upon defendant's estate.

Analysis of the decree as a whole persuades us that the interpretation placed thereon by the court below was not only reasonable, but was more reasonable than that for which appellant contends. If, by the court's insertion, it had been intended to award the payments solely in settlement of property rights, such intention could have been readily manifested by simultaneously striking out the phrases, "as alimony and for the support and maintenance of plaintiff," and "or until the further order of this court." The latter phrases, while perhaps not decisive as to the nature of the payments ( cf., Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal.App.2d 526, 530 [ 112 P.2d 780]; Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 542 [ 152 P.2d 494]), are at least inconsistent with the theory that they are solely part of a property settlement. Similarly, the provision that the weekly payments were to continue until the death or remarriage of plaintiff rather than until a specific sum had been paid, does not preclude a holding that they are in lieu of specific property (see Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172 [ 44 P.2d 540]) although such provisions, without more, are generally regarded as indicative of alimony.

A judgment is conclusive only to the extent that it is made so by law, and the court has no power to give conclusive effect to a judgment which is declared by statute to be subject to modification, especially where it involves the interests of children and the state, which are superior to the rights of the parties litigant. Defendant relies upon the rule stated in Kohl v. Kohl (1944), 66 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 152 P.2d 494], and in the cases therein cited, that a decree of divorce which is based upon and gives effect to a property settlement agreement cannot be modified by the court without the consent of the parties. The rule is founded upon the right of the husband and wife to contract with each other with respect to their property and marital rights.

" The application of these principles to this case leads to the conclusion that since the monthly payments ordered by the decree are in effect and essence a phase of the property settlement rather than merely alimony the court had no power to reduce the amount of said payments, except by consent of the parties. ( Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, supra; Puckett v. Puckett, supra; Moran v. Moran (1935), 3 Cal.2d 342 [ 44 P.2d 546]; Kohl v. Kohl (1944), 66 Cal.App.2d 535 [ 152 P.2d 494].) Plaintiff relies on Plummer v. Superior Court (1942), 20 Cal.2d 158 [ 124 P.2d 5].