Opinion
Case No. 99 C 6215
November 30, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action brought against the Chicago Board of Education and the Chicago Board of Reform Trustees (collectively, the "Board") for sex and age discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) et. seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. Before the Court is defendant Board's motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 submissions. Barbara Koeing-Pfannkuche is a 65-year-old female, who has been employed with the Board as a certified teacher since 1971. She is certified to teach trade electronics and electrical engineering. Plaintiff has held numerous positions at various schools controlled by the Board, including a position teaching computer repair at the Chicago Vocational High School ("CVS"). Koeing-Pfannkuche's position at CVS was closed in October 1995 due to duplication with a subject taught by another teacher, Earnest Picket, as well as for declining enrollment. Her position was combined into one job and given to Picket who had slightly greater seniority. Koeing-Pfannkuche was eventually placed at the Board Industrial Skills Center to teach electronics.
However, in 1997, the Industrial Skills Center closed and Koeing-Pfannkuche was classified as a "reassigned" teacher. According to Board Policy, a reassigned teacher receives full pay without any work for the first thirty days while she searches for a full-time position. If she does not find another position after the first thirty-days, the teacher is then required to do part time substitute teaching while searching for a position.
Meanwhile, in March 1998, Picket at CVS retired and a vacancy opened in electronics. The Board advertised the opening in August 1998, and Koeing-Pfannkuche applied for the position. At the time Koeing-Pfannkuche applied for the position, she was substitute teaching for the Board. There is disagreement between the parties as to whether the pay that Koeing-Pfannkuche received as a substitute teacher was the same as she would have received if she had been hired for the CVS position.
Koeing-Pfannkuche was scheduled for an interview for the CVS position with Betty Despenza-Green, the principal of CVS. According to Board policy, a "reassigned" teacher with the qualifying certification must be interviewed for an open position unless the position is filled. When Koeing-Pfannkuche arrived for her scheduled interview in August 1998, however, Despenza-Green informed her that the position had already been filled. According to Despenza-Green, she offered the position to Willie Gaines some time prior to Koeing-Pfannkuche's interview. Gaines had been certified to teach both physics and electronics since 1989 and was, until August 1998, teaching physics at CVS. Gaines' physics position was closed in August due to declining enrollment. Despenza-Green maintains that it is her discretion to fill vacant positions as she saw fit. Koeing-Pfannkuche, however, insists that Gaines was chosen over her for the CVS opening because of his gender and younger age.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the properly supported evidence of the non-movant must be believed, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Seventh Circuit has cautioned courts to be especially mindful of the summary judgment standard in employment discrimination cases where "motive, intent and credibility are crucial issues." Grim v. Board off Educ. of Cairo Sch. Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 1998). Of course, even in an employment case, a party seeking to show the existence of a material issue of fact cannot rest on mere allegations of a factual dispute. See Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2000). A genuine issue of fact is found only when the party opposing summary judgment demonstrates support from the record. Id.
Here, plaintiff complains of disparate treatment in hiring by the Board because of her sex and age. To succeed on a claim for age or gender discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate, either through direct or circumstantial evidence, discriminatory intent. Senner v. NorthCentral Technical College, 113 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1997). Since Koeing-Pfannkuche offers no direct evidence of discrimination, she must establish intentional discrimination by means of the indirect burden-shifting method established under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A prima facie case of gender or age discrimination in hiring is established if the plaintiff shows: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she applied and is qualified for the job; and (3) that another, outside the protected class, was hired instead. Bruno v. City of Crown Point, Indiana, 950 F.2d 355, 363 (7th Cir. 1992) (sex discrimination in hiring); Kralman v. Ilinois Department of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 153 (7th Cir. 1994) (age discrimination in hiring). If a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Senner, 113 F.3d at 755 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If such a nondiscriminatory reason is offered, the plaintiff will prevail only if she proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Id.
Here, the record contains sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of discrimination. Koeing-Pfannkuche applied for a position for which she was qualified, but the position was given to a male, fifteen-years her junior. Bruno, 950 F.2d at 363; Kralman, 23 F.3d at 156. The Board lamely suggests that because the position was offered to Gaines prior to Koeing-Pfannukuche's interview, that her claims are somehow moot. The argument may have had merit if the CVS position was filled prior to Koeing-Pfankuche's application, since then it would have been impossible for Despenza-Green to have made the hiring decision on the basis of Koeing-Pfannkuche's sex or age. But the present record supports the inference that Despenza-Green was aware of Koeing-Pfannckuche's application for the position prior to her offer to Gaines. Furthermore, Despenza-Green knew Koeing-Pfannkuche personally, since she admits that Koeing-Pfannkuche worked under her at CVS from 1994 to 1995. (Def. Ex. G, ¶ 4.) Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the defendant had notice of Koeing-Pfannkuche's sex, age, and interest in the position prior to hiring Gaines. Under such circumstances, the Court cannot agree that offering the position to Gaines prior to Koeing-Pfannkuche's interview could neutralize the inference of discriminatory intent that rises from the establishment of a prima facie case.
The Board also contends that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring Gaines and that Koeing-Pfannkuche cannot demonstrate that the reason is pretextual. But all that the defendant offers as rationale for hiring Gaines over Koeing-Pfannkuche is that Despenza-Green, in accordance with the Board's Reassigned Teachers Policy, has near unfettered discretion to hire anyone she pleased, without regard to seniority or relative qualifications. (Def. Mem. at 8-10.) The defendant also makes much of the fact that the Board's Reassigned Teachers Policy has been upheld as lawful in this Circuit.
However, in so arguing, the Board misses the point of the defendants' burden of production in the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary scheme. The Board's evidence goes only to support the conclusion that Despenza-Green possessed the authority to hire Gaines. The fact that Despenza-Green had such authority, however, does not enlighten anyone as to the actual motivations for the decision. Whatever the extent of Despenza-Green's discretion or the scope of the Board's policy on reassigned teachers, neither can serve to justify discriminatory employment practices. Ultimately, claiming that Despenza-Green had the discretion to make the decision cannot serve to allay concerns about the possibility that the discretion was exercised in an unlawful manner. Accordingly, summary judgment as to Koeing-Pfannkuche's sex and age discrimination claims must be denied.
Finally, the Board seeks summary judgement as to compensatory damages. The Board contends that Koeing-Pfannkuche lost no wages or benefits as a result of not being appointed to the CVS position since she continued to substitute-teach for the Board until 1999 when she was finally appointed to a full-time position at the Board's York Alternative School. Koeing-Pfannkuche admits that the rate of pay as a substitute teacher is the same as that of a full-time teacher, but asserts that she could not work as many hours as a full-time teacher. In support of her damages claim, Koeing-Pfannkuche also submits W-2 forms issued by the Board that appear to show a difference in yearly earnings between 1998, when she was substitute teaching, and other years when she was teaching full-time. While Koeing-Pfannkuche's deposition testimony as to her earnings is less than a model of clarity, any benefit of the doubt at this stage of the proceedings still goes to the plaintiff. Therefore, the Court must await trial to sort out the extent of any damages.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant' for Summary Judgment is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.