Opinion
No. 2020-C-01153
12-22-2020
Linda KOCHER v. TRUTH IN POLITICS, INC., and Causeway Connection PAC
PER CURIAM
Three days prior to the 2019 gubernatorial election, Plaintiff sought to enjoin Defendants from running allegedly false political campaign advertisements. Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order, the ads stopped, and the election occurred. Prior to the preliminary injunction hearing, Defendants filed an exception of no cause of action based on the completion of the election and the mootness of the petition. The lower courts denied the exception.
We reverse. Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1463 allows an affected voter or candidate to obtain an injunction to stop the dissemination of false information in order to maintain fairness and integrity in an election. The statute does not contemplate damages. See Badeaux v. Sw. Computer Bureau, Inc., 05-0612 (La. 3/17/06), 929 So. 2d 1211. Thus, the only available remedy under Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:1463 is an injunction. In Verdun v. Scallon Brothers Contractors, Inc., 263 La. 1073, 270 So.2d 512, 513 (1972), the supreme court explained that in cases of injunctive relief, it is clear that when the activity which a plaintiff seeks to enjoin has already occurred during the pendency of the suit, the matter is moot as courts "will not review a case where only injunctive relief is sought when the need for that relief has ceased to be a justiciable issue." Here, the advertisements ceased upon the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the occurrence of the election. Thus, there is no justiciable issue.
Pursuant to the statute, attorney fees are available if the petitioner is successful in obtaining a permanent injunction. Plaintiff argues she is entitled to recoup the attorney fees she accrued in seeking to enjoin Defendants’ conduct and should be allowed to proceed to a preliminary and permanent injunction hearing. However, there is no on-going activity to enjoin. If the legislature intended to make attorney fees available upon the procurement of a temporary restraining order, it could have done so. The three stages of the injunctive process are readily known and the legislature is presumed to know the law. State ex rel. Varnado v. Louisiana Highway Commission , 177 La. 1, 147 So. 361, 362 (1933). Further, "[t]he legislature is presumed to have acted with deliberation and to have enacted a statute in light of the preceding statutes involving the same subject matter." Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc. , 06-582, p. 10 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037, 1045.)
Plaintiff also suggests the governor may run again in the future and could be subjected to the same false ads. She contends the statute enjoins "future" conduct; thus, there remains a cause of action. However, it is well settled that "courts should not decide abstract, hypothetical or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies." CITGO Petroleum Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Com'n, 04-0914 (La. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 291.
Because the injunctive relief sought has been rendered moot and the only remaining remedy under the statute (attorney fees) is conditioned upon the success of a now unavailable remedy (permanent injunction), the lower courts erred in denying the exception of no cause of action.