Opinion
B300550
03-26-2021
XU YANG KO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HOU YOU LIANG et al., Defendants and Appellants.
WHGC and Michael G. York for Defendants and Appellants. DiJulio Law Group, R. David DiJulio and Tiffany Krog for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC596209) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark V. Mooney, Judge. Affirmed. WHGC and Michael G. York for Defendants and Appellants. DiJulio Law Group, R. David DiJulio and Tiffany Krog for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The Ko family and the Liang family have been warring over a house in Walnut, California since 2005. In this chapter of the litigation saga, the Liangs appeal the attorney fees awarded to Ko in an action filed in 2015. We affirm.
I
The factual and procedural background of this matter is lengthy and complex, but largely irrelevant to the narrow issue presented here. We recount the pertinent facts.
In 2005, the Liangs agreed to sell a property in Walnut, California to the Ko family: both sides signed a real estate purchase agreement about the deal. The purchase agreement contains a provision allowing the prevailing party in an action on the contract to obtain attorney fees. But the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees only if it mediates before filing suit.
The Liangs tried to back out of the sale, which prompted Kuo Feng Ko to sue them. Kuo Feng Ko won in 2008, including an award of attorney fees. Kuo Feng Ko was displeased with the size of the judgment and appealed; the Liangs did not. Kuo Feng Ko lost his appeal: the Court of Appeal in 2011 affirmed the 2008 judgment in its entirety. (Ko v. Liang (Feb. 14, 2011, B214160) [nonpub. opn.].) The award of attorney fees was not raised or addressed on appeal.
Kuo Feng Ko assigned his interest in this 2008 judgment to his son, Xu Yang Ko.
In 2015, Xu Yang Ko filed a new suit against the Liangs to enforce the 2008 judgment. The Liangs sought bankruptcy protection, but the bankruptcy court rejected their efforts, and in 2017, the civil court issued another judgment against the Liangs. This judgment again ordered the Liangs to convey the property in Walnut. The trial court later heard and granted Ko's motion for interest on the 2008 judgment.
The Liangs appealed both the 2017 judgment and the order granting interest on the 2008 judgment. We consolidated the appeals and in 2019 affirmed in all respects. (See Ko v. Liang (June 20, 2019, B286234/B288069) [nonpub. opn.].) We decided nothing about attorney fees in this 2019 opinion, which was entirely in Xu Yang Ko's favor. We decided the case on other issues.
The Kos and the Liangs returned to the trial court, where Xu Yang Ko moved for attorney fees based on the fee provision in the 2005 purchase agreement. The Liangs opposed the motion.
The trial court held a hearing on Xu Yang Ko's motion for attorney fees and granted the motion in full. There were two parts of the dollar award: $524,149.50 for the nonbankruptcy services of the DiJulio Law Group, and $85,030.50 for the bankruptcy law services of the Salvato Law Offices.
The Liangs appealed both the $524,149.50 and the $85,030.50 fee awards.
II
The Liangs raise two challenges to the attorney fees awarded. We address these in turn.
A
The Liangs first argue Ko's failure to mediate before filing the 2015 lawsuit precludes any award of fees to him. The purchase contract entitles the prevailing party to attorney fees only if that party mediated before filing suit.
Here, the dispute under the contract began with the filing of the initial suit in 2005. The record does not reflect whether mediation took place before that suit, but the trial court did award attorney fees under the contract in the resulting 2008 judgment. If Ko lacked entitlement to attorney fees under the contract, the issue would have been raised at that time. Ko thus met this contractual requirement.
Because the mediation requirement was satisfied at the outset of this dispute, we reject the Liangs' contention the fee award should be reversed on that ground.
B
The Liangs next argue Ko did not meet his burden of proof as to the amount of the attorney fees. They restrict this argument to the bankruptcy fees.
The party seeking attorney fees has the burden to show the requested amount is reasonable. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) Once the trial court has awarded fees, however, the burden shifts to the objector to show the award was in error. (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488.)
The Liangs have not met their burden.
Abuse of discretion is the standard of review. (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751.)
Xu Yang Ko submitted detailed time records from his bankruptcy counsel. In opposition, counsel for the Liangs argued in a general way the billing records included entries related to other matters. At the hearing, counsel read out a few entries from the civil case he claimed were from a different case. The trial court reminded counsel the court had continued the hearing to allow the Liangs to brief specific bases for reducing the requested fees. The court had expected the Liangs to get specific and to be precise. The Liangs were not. The court noted reading a few entries aloud during the hearing was insufficient. It granted the motion.
The Liangs' appellate briefing includes asserted examples of inappropriate billing entries. This is too little too late. The Liangs forfeited these arguments by not raising them before the trial court. (Martinez v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1244.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Ko to recover costs.
WILEY, J. WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
STRATTON, J.