Opinion
Submitted October 11, 2000.
November 6, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for injury to property, the plaintiff appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Martin, J.), entered September 14, 1999, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
Gennet, Kallmann, Antin Robinson, P.C., New York, N.Y. (William G. Hanft of counsel), for appellant.
Kelley Drye Warren, LLP, New York, N.Y. (James V. O'Gara and Nicholas J. Panarella of counsel), for respondent.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, HOWARD MILLER, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the limitations period contained in the parties' contract. It is well settled that parties to a contract may agree that a lawsuit must be commenced within a shorter period than that prescribed by law (see, CPLR 201; Blitman v. Constr. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 66 N.Y.2d 820; John J. Kassner Co. v. City of New York, 46 N.Y.2d 544). In addition, a party who signs a written contract "is conclusively presumed to know its contents and to assent to them" (Metzger v. Aetna Ins. Co., 227 N.Y. 411, 416), and the signer is bound by its terms unless there is a showing of fraud, duress, or some other wrongful act on the part of any party to the contract (see, Barclays Bank of N.Y. v. Sokol, 128 A.D.2d 492). The plaintiff concedes that the action was not commenced within the one year limitation period provided by the contract, and we reject its argument that the provision was unconscionable because it was hidden within the body of the contract.