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noting that the court assumed the doctrine of unique circumstances to still be applicable to avoid a statute of limitations bar but declining to determine the current contours of the doctrine because the facts of the case precluded its use
Summary of this case from Dartez v. PetersOpinion
111,552.
11-26-2014
David R. KNITTEL, Appellant, v. KANSAS PRISONER REVIEW BOARD, et al., Appellees.
Michael G. Highland, of Bonner Springs, for appellant. Whitney L. Casement, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellees.
Michael G. Highland, of Bonner Springs, for appellant.
Whitney L. Casement, assistant attorney general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellees.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and BURGESS, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
David R. Knittel appeals the ruling of the Leavenworth County District Court dismissing his habeas corpus petition that challenged the Prisoner Review Board's decision to deny him parole. The district court found the petition to be time-barred, a defect it considered jurisdictional. Although we disagree with the district court's treatment of the issue as jurisdictional, the petition was untimely, and Knittel has offered no legally sufficient circumstances to excuse his late filing. We, therefore, affirm the district court.
Given the disposition we reach, the details of Knittel's underlying crimes and the particulars of his complaints about the review board are legally immaterial. A spare account, however, provides some context. In 1973, Knittel was convicted of aggravated robbery and received a sentence of 5 years to life in prison. Four years later, he was convicted of rape and received a sentence of 15 years to life. Knittel was eligible for parole in early 2013. The review board denied Knittel parole on June 6, 2013, and cited numerous grounds for the decision, including the seriousness of his offenses, his disciplinary violations while in prison, and his high risk of reoffending. The review board scheduled Knittel for another parole hearing in 2017. On June 26, Knittel signed off on an “action notice” and thus acknowledged receipt of a written copy of the review board's decision. In his habeas corpus petition, Knittel contends the review board acted arbitrarily and capriciously and effectively extended his sentences unlawfully.
We lay out with greater particularity the chronology of Knittel's efforts to upend the review board's decision. That timeline bears directly on the efficacy of his habeas corpus petition. After Knittel received the notice denying him parole, he sent a letter to the review board on July 18, 2013, asking that it reconsider its decision. On July 29, the review board responded in writing and informed Knittel it would not change its determination.
On September 3, Knittel filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court, as provided in K.S.A. 60–1501, contending the review board's actions impermissibly continued his detention and, thus, inflicted a constitutional injury on him. Knittel drafted and filed the 60–1501 petition without a lawyer. In the petition, Knittel stated he received the response from the review board denying reconsideration on August 1. The petition and its attachments also show that Knittel placed the 60–1501 petition in the mail to his designated agent on August 28 and his agent received the document 3 days later.
The district court directed the Kansas Department of Corrections to respond to Knitters petition. In a responsive pleading, the Kansas Attorney General's Office argued the petition should be dismissed as untimely. On January 31, 2014, the district court entered a written order denying the petition as untimely. Relying on Corter v. Cline, 42 Kan.App.2d 721, 724, 217 P.3d 991 (2009), the district court found the time-bar to be jurisdictional. Knittel has appealed.
Under K.S.A. 60–1501(b), a petition for habeas corpus relief directed to the Secretary of Corrections must be filed within 30 days of the act causing the constitutional deprivation. The statute also provides that the 30–day limit will be “extended” while the petitioner attempts to exhaust any applicable administrative remedies. Important here, a prisoner need not ask the review board to reconsider a denial of early release as a prerequisite to filing a habeas corpus petition challenging his or her continued incarceration. Holt v. Saiya, 28 Kan.App.2d 356, 360, 17 P.3d 368 (2000) (“request for reconsideration ... permissible under the K.A.R., such recourse was not a necessary requisite ... to seek judicial review” through habeas corpus). In other words, a request for reconsideration is not required to exhaust administrative remedies. Acknowledging that authority, Knittel concedes he did not file his 60–1501 petition within the 30–day statutory limitation but argues his failure should be excused.[*]
[*]The Holt court considered K.A.R. 45–4–6. That administrative regulation has since been replaced with K.A.R. 45–200–2. In pertinent part, however, the two regulations are legally indistinguishable. Knittel does not dispute the constitutional adequacy of the 30–day limit itself.
The material facts related to the timeliness of Knittel's petition are undisputed. To the extent there may be any disputes or ambiguities, we take the facts to be as Knittel has represented them. Ultimately, the issue here turns on how the statutory time limit for filing 60–1501 petitions should be construed. Given the issue and our treatment of the underlying facts, the question before us is a legal one, so we owe no deference to the district court's determination. See Chesbro v. Board of Douglas County Comm'rs, 39 Kan.App.2d 954, 960, 186 P.3d 829, rev. denied 286 Kan. 1176 (2008).
Although Corter held the 30–day limitation in K.S.A. 60–1507 to be jurisdictional, it did so without explanation and cited only Laubach v. Roberts, 32 Kan.App.2d 863, 869–70, 90 P.3d 961 (2004), and State v. Verge, 272 Kan. 501, 521, 34 P.3d 449 (2001). Corter, 42 Kan.App.2d at 724. In turn, Laubach, also a 60–1501 action, cited only Verge as supporting authority. But Verge deals with the deadline for filing a direct appeal from a criminal conviction. The courts have long recognized the time limits for filing direct appeals to be jurisdictional. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs v. City of Park City, 293 Kan. 107, 111–12, 260 P.3d 387 (2011) (civil appeals); State v. Gill, 287 Kan. 289, 294, 196 P.3d 369 (2008) (criminal appeals).
Knitters habeas corpus petition is not analogous to a direct appeal. The 60–1501 petition is an independent legal action, not an extension of the Prisoner Review Board's decisionmaking in denying Knittel parole. Knittel has asserted a constitutional harm—the deprivation of his liberty—caused by the purportedly improper decision of the review board. Such a constitutional injury is a distinct wrong apart from a simple legal error of the sort that might prompt the reversal of a civil or criminal judgment on direct appeal. To be sure, the grounds for Knitters habeas corpus petition arise from the review board's action, and the petition should be considered a collateral attack on that action. But that is not enough to treat the 30–day limitation as a jurisdictional bar comparable to the failure to file a timely direct appeal.
Since the 30–day period actually imposes a time bar on an independent legal action, it is more analogous to a statute of limitations. Other decisions of the Kansas appellate courts have viewed K.S.A. 60–1501(b) as a statute of limitations for habeas corpus petitions. See Battrick v. State, 267 Kan. 389, 401, 985 P.2d 707 (1999) (characterizing 30–day period in K.S.A. 60–1501 as statute of limitations); Taylor v. McCune, 25 Kan.App.2d 283, 286, 962 P.2d 566 (1998). Typically, a statutory deadline or time limit for taking action will not be treated as creating a jurisdictional bar to judicial review unless the statute itself clearly reflects such a legislative intent. See Chelf v. State, 46 Kan.App.2d 522, 530–33, 263 P.3d 852 (2011). The language in K .S.A. 60–1501(b) setting out the 30–day period for filing contains nothing indicative of a jurisdictional limitation. The omission of jurisdictional indicators bolsters our conclusion that K.S.A. 60–1501(b) is a statute of limitations.
Statutes of limitations do not impose jurisdictional bars and may be waived. See Diversified Financial Planners, Inc. v. Maderak, 248 Kan. 946, 948, 811 P.2d 1237 (1991). They are also subject to equitable exceptions. See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002) ( “hornbook law” that limitations periods subject to equitable tolling); Dunn v. Dunn, 47 Kan.App.2d 619, 639, 281 P.3d 540 (2012) (party may be equitably estopped from asserting statute of limitations defense).
Knittel attempts to assert exceptions of that type to escape his failure to meet the 30–day time limitation. First, he contends his breach of the deadline amounts to excusable neglect because as a nonlawyer he failed to understand that he didn't have to file a request for reconsideration with the review board before filing a 60–1501 petition. Knittel relies on caselaw recognizing that courts should give a generous or liberal construction to petitions or other papers filed by nonlawyers representing themselves. State v. Kelly, 291 Kan. 563, 565, 244 P.3d 639 (2011) ; Bank of America v.. Inda, 48 Kan.App.2d 658, 662, 303 P.3d 696 (2013). But that undeniably beneficial rule does not extend to compliance with substantive law or rules governing procedure or evidence. O'Neill v. Herrington, 49 Kan.App.2d 896, 906, 317 P.3d 139 (2014) ; Mangiaracina v. Gutierrez, 11 Kan.App.2d 594, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 730 P.2d 1109 (1986). For example, nonlawyer litigants still must prove all of the elements of their claims and cannot rely on inadmissible hearsay to do so. Nor are they excused if they come close to filing within the appropriate statute of limitations. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.2006) (self-represented litigant not excused from complying with time limitation for filing federal habeas corpus petition); Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 170–71 (5th Cir.2000) (same). Accordingly, Knittel cannot plead ignorance of the law as a valid reason for filing his petition late. Knittel's asserted misunderstanding also runs counter to Holt, 28 Kan.App.2d at 361, a published appellate decision recognizing that a prisoner need not seek reconsideration of a parole denial before filing a 60–1501 action. Self-represented parties are expected to know both statutory law and case authority as they bear on making timely court filings. See Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230–32, 124 S.Ct. 2441, 159 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants” and, thus, to explain the impact case authority or statutory law may have on their claims.); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir.1999) (failure of self-represented litigant to understand exhaustion requirements does not permit filing of federal habeas corpus action when state proceedings have not been completed).
Knittel cannot show that he should be allowed to file an otherwise untimely 60–1501 petition because he did not understand the law governing exhaustion of administrative remedies applicable to the review board's decisions.
Knittel next argues his late filing should be excused under the unique circumstances doctrine. We assume the doctrine to be applicable to avoid a statute of limitations bar. See Mangus v. Stump, 45 Kan.App.2d 987, 998–99, 260 P.3d 1210 (2011) (Although noting uncertainty about the scope of the doctrine, the court finds it viable to prevent dismissal of an action filed after the statute of limitations had run.); but see City of Park City, 293 Kan. 107, Syl. ¶ 3 (doctrine cannot confer jurisdiction on appellate court in face of party's failure to file timely notice of appeal). The doctrine essentially provides that a party equitably may be excused from a time bar if the party has been affirmatively misled about the applicable law in a ruling by a court or an administrative agency or by the actions of a related state actor such as a court clerk. 293 Kan. at 113–15 (tracing development of unique circumstances doctrine). The doctrine, however, cannot negate jurisdictional time bars. 293 Kan. at 119.
We need not determine the current contours of the doctrine because the undisputed facts preclude its use here. Knittel concedes neither the review board nor any agent of the Department of Corrections affirmatively misstated the law or otherwise misled him about how the time deadlines for filing a 60–1501 petition should be construed. Rather, he says the review board or department had a legal obligation to explain to him how he should go about preparing and filing his petition so it would be timely. There isn't any such duty. More to the point here, however, nobody associated with the parole process or the judicial system misled Knittel about the limitations period. So there were no actions even arguably triggering the unique circumstances doctrine. Knittel cannot benefit from a factually inapplicable equitable rule.
For his final point, Knittel contends the review board's decision to deny him parole amounts to a continuing violation of his constitutional rights, since he remains incarcerated. If there were a continuing violation, each day Knittel spends in custody would be an independent violation of his rights, meaning the 30–day limitation period in K.S.A. 60–1501(b) would run anew daily. Here, however, any conceivable violation occurred when the review board's denial of parole became official—a date that would be no later than Knittel's acknowledgment on the action notice. Knittel's ongoing incarceration was a continuing effect of the review board's decision and of any legal defect in that decision rather than a continuing constitutional violation. The 60–1501 petition rests on the theory that the fact of Knittel's incarceration was wrongful, not that the conditions of his incarceration were. In short, the cause of Knittel's continued detention was the review board's discrete act in denying parole.
Where a claimed legal injury results directly from a distinct act, the courts typically do not find a continuing violation based on the effects of the act. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258–59, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) ; Eidson v. State of TN Dept. of Children's Services, 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir.2007) (continuing violation “ ‘occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effect from an original violation’ ”) (quoting Tolbert v. State of Ohio Dept. of Transp., 172 F.3d 934, 940 [6th Cir.1999] ); McClain v. Roberts, No. 109,288, 2013 WL 3970215, at *2 (Kan.App.2013) (unpublished opinion). This is such a case. Knittel's complaint about the review board's decision does not create a continuing violation. Knittel cites Tonge v. Simmons, 27 Kan.App.2d 1048, 1050, 11 P.3d 77, rev. denied 270 Kan. 904 (2000), to support his continuing violation theory, but the case is factually inapposite. In Tonge, several inmates challenged the ongoing conditions of their confinement as constitutionally deficient because they were continually denied necessities for their basic health and personal hygiene. Those inmates attacked the conditions under which they were incarcerated rather than the reasons they were incarcerated. Knittel makes no claim of that sort.
Affirmed.