Opinion
No. 05-16-00249-CR
05-05-2017
JULIUS ERICK KNIGHT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MA-1651546-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
The sole issue in this assault case is whether appellant suffered some harm from a jury charge that erroneously failed to limit the definition of the terms "knowingly," "intentionally," and "recklessly" to the result of appellant's conduct. We conclude that appellant was not harmed because the charge as a whole, the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the remainder of the record reflect that the jury was not misled about the application of the mental state to the result of appellant's conduct. We thus affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. Background
Royce Barnes, the complainant, earns a living doing odd jobs for hire. On the night the assault happened, appellant asked Barnes to arrange for a ride to an ATM machine. Barnes was paid $5 for her services, and accompanied appellant, the driver, and two other people on the ride. After appellant got his money, he kept picking on Barnes, so she got out of the car.
Appellant got out of the car too, and followed Barnes, so she threw down the money in her hand and walked away. Appellant approached her from behind and raised a beer bottle in his hand. When Barnes raised her hand defensively, appellant struck her and cut her little finger with the bottle. He then threw her to the ground, pulled her hair out by the roots, and hit and kicked her while saying, "I'm going to kill you bitch."
Appellant finally left the scene, but he dropped his wallet which contained his credit card and identification. Barnes put it in her pocket and went home to call 911.
When the officer responding to the 911 call arrived, Barnes was hysterical, upset, and crying. Barnes identified appellant as her assailant, and gave the officer appellant's wallet. Barnes's hand had already been wrapped, and she told the officer that the back of her head and her hand hurt.
As the officer left the apartment complex, he saw appellant standing by the exit gate urinating on the sidewalk. When the officer asked appellant what he was doing, he replied that he was looking for his wallet. After appellant identified himself, the officer and his partner attempted to arrest appellant on an outstanding warrant. Appellant tried to flee but he was apprehended and taken into custody.
Appellant was charged by information with intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing bodily injury by striking or forcing Barnes to the ground with his hand, and by striking and cutting Barnes with a bottle, and by kicking Barnes.
The case was tried before a jury. The abstract portion of the jury charge gave the statutory mental states for result of conduct, nature of conduct, and circumstances surrounding the conduct type offenses. The application paragraph, however, instructed the jury about appellant's mental state only as to the result of his conduct.
During the charge conference, appellant's counsel objected that the charge failed to limit the culpable mental states to the result of conduct. The trial court overruled that objection.
The jury found appellant guilty of assault, and the trial court assessed punishment at ninety days confinement in the Dallas County Jail.
The State concedes on appeal that the charge's abstract paragraphs contain erroneous instructions but argues that appellant suffered no resulting harm.
II. Analysis
In a single issue, appellant argues that he was harmed by the erroneous jury instruction. As discussed below, we disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Appellate review of jury charge error is a two-step process. Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We first determine if the jury charge was erroneous. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If error exists, we then determine whether the error caused sufficient harm to warrant reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
If, as here, an appellant lodges a timely objection to the instruction in the trial court, then to obtain a reversal the record need only show that he suffered some harm as a result of the error. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.19; Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g), superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in Rodriguez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). This standard requires us to find that the defendant "suffered some actual, rather than merely theoretical, harm from the error." Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In evaluating whether there was some harm, we consider "the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole." Barron v. State, 353 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).
Penal code § 6.03 provides three "conduct elements" that can be involved in an offense: (1) the nature of the conduct, (2) the result of the conduct, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the conduct. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03; McQueen v. State, 781 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). A trial court errs by failing to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states to the conduct element or elements of the offense to which they apply. See Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
A person commits assault if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person's spouse. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1). An offense defined by causing bodily injury—such as assault causing bodily injury—is a result-of-conduct offense. See Garfias v. State, 424 S.W.3d 54, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This means that a defendant must possess the requisite culpable mental state relative to the result of his conduct. See Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Here, the mental state definitions in the charge's abstract paragraphs were not limited to the result of conduct element; they also included the other two conduct elements— the nature and circumstances of the conduct. Accordingly the charge contains error.
B. Was appellant harmed by the erroneous charge?
The State concedes that there was charge error because the culpable mental state definitions in the abstract paragraphs were not limited to the results of appellant's conduct. We agree. Thus, question is whether appellant suffered some harm as a result of the erroneous definitions.
Considering the charge as a whole, we note that the charge instructed that assault is committed if a person "intentionally or knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." In the application paragraph, the terms intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly directly modify the phrase "causes bodily injury." Specifically, that paragraph provides:
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant . . . did unlawfully then and there intentionally or knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury to another, namely [Complainant] . . . by, STRIKING OR FORCING COMPLAINANT TO OR AGAINST THE GROUND WITH A HAND OR BY STRIKING OR BY CUTTING COMPLAINANT WITH A BOTTLE OR BY KICKING COMPLAINANT, as charged in the Information herein, you will find the Defendant "Guilty" of the offense of assault.Thus, the facts, as applied to the law in the application paragraph pointed the jury to the appropriate part of the definitions. Moreover, the application paragraph did not discuss the mental state elements with reference to the circumstances or the nature of appellant's conduct. See Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Regarding closing argument, the State emphasized the result of appellant's conduct, inflicting bodily injury on Barnes. Photographs of Barnes's injuries focused the jury's attention on the result of appellant's conduct. And the State made no argument concerning the "nature of the conduct" or the "circumstances surrounding the conduct" (the two erroneous components of the mental state definitions). We find no other relevant information in the record.
Appellant contends that there is no evidence of his mental state vis-à-vis the result of his conduct. But a culpable mental state is almost always proven by circumstantial evidence. Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The jury could infer the requisite mental state from appellant's conduct itself, from his threat to kill Barnes while he was beating and kicking her, from Barnes's injuries, and from the fact that Barnes felt pain. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as acts, word, and conduct of the accused); Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (intent may be inferred from acts, words, and conduct, as well as the method of committing the crime and the nature of the wounds inflicted).
In view of the foregoing, based on the entire record, the jury charge as a whole, and the arguments of counsel, we conclude that including the erroneous instruction in the jury charge's abstract portion did not harm appellant. We overrule appellant's sole issue and affirm the trial court's judgment.
/Bill Whitehill/
BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
160249F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MA-1651546-A.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Francis and Lang-Miers participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered May 5, 2017.