Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-03173-TMC-JDA
10-18-2022
Gary Rowland Knight, Plaintiff, v. Pickens County Detention Center, Ms. Makayla, Head Nurse, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Gary Rowland Knight (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is presently incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Pickens County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form, which was entered on September 19, 2022. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated September 20, 2022, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in that Order. [Doc. 10.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff may be able to cure the pleading deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend his Complaint. [ Id. at 9-10.] Further, Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified in [the Court's] Order, this action will be recommended for summary dismissal.[Id. at 11.] Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, and he has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, he has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with an Order of this Court. Because Plaintiff has already ignored this Court's Order and deadlines, sanctions less drastic than dismissal would not be effective. Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff sues two Defendants in this action-the Pickens County Detention Center (“PCDC”) and its Head Nurse, Ms. Makayla (“Makayla”)-purportedly for “gross negligence.” [Doc. 1 at 2-4.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends he was subjected to gross negligence due to the denial of his eye glasses, which endangers his life and well being and denies him a basic necessity that he needs to survive in jail. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff contends that, beginning in October 2020, and continuing to the present, he has asked for his eye glasses, but his requests have been denied. [Id. at 5.] He contends that his family would pay for the eye glasses. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he fell in March of 2022 because he could not see properly and that he has made numerous requests to medical and filed grievances about needing his glasses to see. [Id. at 6.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that he fell in the recreation yard because he was unable to see and that he hurt his right arm, for which he received medical attention for cuts, bleeding, and bruises. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that he has been trying to get his glasses for the past two years and that he cannot see without them, he cannot read or watch TV, and he is afraid that he is going to fall again and get hurt. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks for his glasses, noting that he is “practically blind without them.” [Id.] Plaintiff also seeks $500,000 for pain and suffering due to the “gross negligence.” [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, for the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
First, both Defendants named in this action are subject to summary dismissal. As an initial mater, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff makes no allegations about the direct, personal involvement of either Defendant in the events underlying Plaintiff's claims. Instead, Plaintiff merely names both Defendants in the caption and he makes only general, vague allegations about the injuries he allegedly suffered. However, “such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against the named Defendants, they are both entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Cir. Ct. of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Additionally, Defendant Makayla is subject to dismissal to the extent that Plaintiff's claims against her are based on supervisory liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against Defendant Makayla, who is simply identified as the “Head Nurse,” to demonstrate that she was aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff. [Doc. 1 at 2-3.] As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts against Defendant Makayla to state a claim for relief because the Complaint has not alleged facts showing her personal involvement in any constitutional violation or that she is subject to supervisory liability.
Finally, Defendant PCDC is entitled to summary dismissal because it is not a proper party. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). PCDC is a facility or building and, as such, is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See e.g., Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”); Morrison v. Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Departments, buildings, and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178 (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Accordingly, PCDC is not a proper party to this action under § 1983 and should be dismissed.
Failure to State a Claim
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is cognizable under § 1983. To the extent Plaintiff asserts state law claims for medical malpractice, personal injury, and negligence, his claims are not cognizable. This is so because the law is well settled that state law tort claims are not actionable under § 1983. See, e.g., Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[N]egligent deprivations of life, liberty, or property are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Mere negligent conduct . . . does not constitute a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”). “A state law tort is not actionable as a claim under § 1983 on its own.” Warthen v. Midgett, No. 2:16-cv-00931-DCN-MGB, 2017 WL 9250328, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1190869 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2017). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's claims arise under a theory of negligence or other state tort, his claims fail to state a claim under § 1983 as a matter of law.
Nevertheless, although Plaintiff asserts claims for “gross negligence,” the undersigned notes that the Complaint, liberally construed, may be asserting claims for deliberate indifference. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a plausible federal law claim for Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A pretrial detainee's deliberate indifference claim arises under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments provides the framework for analyzing such a claim. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988).
To establish a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) he was deprived of an objectively serious medical need by a state actor and (2) the state actor knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference “is a higher standard for culpability than mere negligence or even civil recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that would constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. Absent exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable deliberate indifference claim when there exists a mere disagreement between the plaintiff and the state official over the proper medical care. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any specific Defendant knew of and disregarded a serious medical need and its associated risks. Instead, Plaintiff simply alleges that he has not been given his glasses despite his requests. But Plaintiff does not identify any defendant responsible for the denial of his glasses. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims are subject to dismissal.
As the Fourth Circuit has noted:
To state a claim under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them.Depaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a cognizable constitutional claim, and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal on this basis in addition to the other reasons stated above.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated September 20, 2022. [Doc. 10.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in his original filings. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).