Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-04511-TMC-JDA
03-06-2023
Gary Rowland Knight, Plaintiff, v. Rick Clark, Sheriff; Drew Cisco, LT, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Gary Rowland Knight (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is presently incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Pickens County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form, which was entered on December 14, 2022. [Doc. 1.] The undersigned entered an Order dated December 15, 2022, directing Plaintiff to bring the case into proper form by paying the filing fee and submitting properly completed service documents. [Doc. 7.] Plaintiff subsequently complied with the Court's Order, and Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 13], which was granted on February 2, 2023 [Docs. 15 at 1; 16].
By Order dated February 2, 2023, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in that Order. [Doc. 17.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff may be able to cure the pleading deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend his Complaint. [Id. at 9.] Further, Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified in [the Court's] Order, this action will be recommended for summary dismissal.[Id. at 9-10 (emphasis omitted).] Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, and he has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, he has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with an Order of this Court. As Plaintiff has already ignored this Court's Order and deadlines, sanctions less drastic than dismissal would not be effective. Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff sues two Defendants in this action-the Pickens County Sheriff Rick Clark and Drew Cisco-purportedly for deliberate indifference, gross negligence, and medical malpractice. [Doc. 1 at 2-4.] Specifically, Plaintiff contends that “[t]hey” deliberately denied him of his eye glasses, which “they” knew he needed, thus disregarding an “excessive risk to [his] personal health and safety.” [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff contends that this occurred at the Pickens County Detention Center from July 2021 until the present. [Id. at 5.] According to Plaintiff, he has put in requests for his eye glasses over the past 2 years, but his requests have been “denied by all nurses who answer to Drew Cisco and Rick Clark.” [Id.] Plaintiff explains that Rick Clark is the Sheriff and Drew Cisco is “his head [Lieutenant t]hat runs the jail for him.” [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff has not identified any injury in the “Injuries” section of the complaint form. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff asserts the following:
I need the court to have them get me my glasses or the medical treatment that I need. I can barely see how to write this. That[']s why I have made no amendments or filed appeals to this case. We are also being denied access to a law library or any legal information.[Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, for the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
First, both Defendants named in this action are subject to summary dismissal. As an initial mater, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff makes no allegations about the direct, personal involvement of either Defendant in the events underlying Plaintiff's claims. Instead, Plaintiff merely names both Defendants in the caption and he makes only general, vague allegations about being denied eyeglasses by nurses. However, “such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against the named Defendants, they are both entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Cir. Ct. of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Additionally, Defendants are both subject to dismissal to the extent that Plaintiff's claims against them are based on supervisory liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994).
Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against Defendants to demonstrate that they were aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts against Defendants to state a claim for relief because the Complaint has not alleged facts showing their personal involvement in any constitutional violation or that they are subject to supervisory liability.
Failure to State a Claim
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is cognizable under § 1983. To the extent Plaintiff asserts state law claims for medical malpractice, personal injury, and negligence, his claims are not cognizable. This is so because the law is well settled that state law tort claims are not actionable under § 1983. See, e.g., Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[N]egligent deprivations of life, liberty, or property are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Mere negligent conduct . . . does not constitute a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”). “A state law tort is not actionable as a claim under § 1983 on its own.” Warthen v. Midgett, No. 2:16-cv-00931-DCN-MGB, 2017 WL 9250328, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1190869 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2017). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's claims arise under a theory of negligence or other state tort, his claims fail to state a claim under § 1983 as a matter of law.
Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a plausible federal law claim for Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) he was deprived of an objectively serious medical need by a state actor and (2) the state actor knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference “is a higher standard for culpability than mere negligence or even civil recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that would constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178. Absent exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff cannot establish a cognizable deliberate indifference claim when there exists a mere disagreement between the plaintiff and the state official over the proper medical care. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985).
A pretrial detainee's deliberate indifference claim arises under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments provides the framework for analyzing such a claim. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that any specific individual knew of and disregarded a serious medical need and its associated risks. Instead, Plaintiff simply alleges that he has not been given his glasses despite his requests. But Plaintiff does not identify any defendant responsible for the denial of his glasses. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Langford v. Joyner, No. 21-7737, 2023 WL 2335957, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (affirming dismissal of a complaint that made “only collective allegations against all ‘Defendants,' without identifying how each individual Defendant personally interacted with [the plaintiff] or was responsible for the denial of his Eighth Amendment rights”).
As the Fourth Circuit has noted:
To state a claim under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them.Depaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated February 2, 2023. [Doc. 17.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in his original pleading. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).