Opinion
14-P-1102
05-14-2015
STEPHEN P. KNIGHT v. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES & BONDS & another.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Stephen Knight, appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court under G. L. c. 175, § 113P, affirming the decision of the defendant Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board) to uphold a surcharge imposed by Knight's insurer, codefendant Safety Insurance Company. He also appeals from the judge's order denying his motion for relief from judgment. The board denied Knight's appeal of the surcharge on the ground that he was more than fifty percent at fault in a motor vehicle accident, which is a "surchargeable incident" under G. L. c. 175, § 113B, as appearing in St. 2004, c. 213, § 1. Knight argues that the board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and that the Superior Court judge's failure to hold a hearing on his motion for relief from judgment violated his procedural due process rights. We affirm.
Substantial evidence claim. Our review of a Superior Court decision on an appeal of a decision of the board under G. L. c. 175, § 113P, is extremely limited. We conduct de novo review with respect to errors of law, but we do not examine the weight or sufficiency of the evidence before the board or the court "unless there is absolutely 'no basis in fact' to support the decision." Nercessian v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 775 (1999) (citation omitted).
Knight was involved in an accident when he attempted to make a left turn out of a restaurant parking lot. Knight's 2006 Chevrolet Impala struck a vehicle traveling southbound on Quincy Street in Brockton when Knight crossed the southbound lane to turn left into the northbound lane. Under 211 Code Mass. Regs. § 74.04(17) (1995), a driver exiting from a parked position, parking lot, alley, or driveway, who thereafter collides with another vehicle, is presumptively more than fifty percent at fault for the accident. After affording Knight a hearing on his appeal of the surcharge, the board found that Knight had not rebutted the presumption of fault.
The current version of the regulation, promulgated after both the accident and the board's decision, similarly provides. See 211 Code Mass. Regs. § 74.04(17) (2013).
The board's finding that Knight was at fault has a factual basis. By Knight's own admission, his "accelerator pedal stuck," and he was unable to stop as he turned left out of the parking lot, striking the other vehicle. Knight claimed that a mechanical defect in 2006 Impalas caused his gasoline pedal to stick, and that the other driver was at fault for not wearing corrective lenses and failing to avoid the accident. The hearing officer rejected these claims, finding that the other driver had the right of way, that Knight "bore the duty to ensure Quincy Street was clear prior to turning," and noting "the lack of information directly related to [Knight's] vehicle . . . to establish a defect or a mechanical problem actually existed with his 2006 Chevrolet Impala." Because Knight's disagreements with the hearing officer's conclusions "involve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis of which the board upheld his insurer's merit rating surcharge," they are "beyond the scope of our review" and we may not address them. Nercessian v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, supra at 776.
We discern no legal error in the hearing officer's application of the regulatory presumption. To the extent the hearing officer considered the hearsay statement of the other driver, contained in the police report, that "he was traveling on Quincy St when he was hit by Mr Knight out of no where [sic]," we likewise detect no error of law. While "so-called second level or totem pole hearsay[] would be inadmissible in a court of law," administrative agencies "need not observe the rules of evidence observed by courts" so long as "the hearsay carried with it certain indicia of reliability and probative value." Merisme v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 470, 473-475 (1989) (citations omitted). Here, the other driver's statement was "sufficiently corroborated by other evidence" and was thus reliable. Id. at 475.
Due process claim. The plaintiff argues that the denial of his request for a hearing on his motion for relief from the Superior Court judgment deprived him of due process of law. Under G. L. c. 175, § 113P, Knight was entitled to a "summary hearing" in the Superior Court. He was afforded this opportunity to be heard -- "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) -- at the hearing on his motion for judgment on the pleadings. By contrast, hearings are not ordinarily allowed on motions for relief from judgment. See Rule 9A(c)(3) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2014). As Knight alleged no new grounds for relief, no further hearing was required. See Commonwealth v. Cryer, 426 Mass. 562, 569-570 (1998) ("A motion judge has the discretion to act on a request for a rehearing without conducting a new hearing, if the [plaintiff] has raised no new issues and the relevant law has not changed").
Judgment affirmed.
Order denying motion for relief from judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Blake & Massing, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: May 14, 2015.