Opinion
J-S62029-15 No. 751 WDA 2015
11-16-2015
ELIZABETH S. KNAPPENBERGER Appellant v. NEXTIER BANK Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Dated April 23, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
Civil Division at No(s): A.D. NO. 13-11170
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Elizabeth S. Knappenberger ("Appellant") appeals from the order entered in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of NexTier Bank ("Appellee") and dismissed Appellant's age discrimination complaint against Appellee. We affirm.
On December 18, 2013, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee claiming wrongful termination under The Pennsylvania Human Rights Act ("PHRA") on the basis of hostile work environment and retaliation claims. Appellant averred Appellee hired her on May 7, 2012, that Appellant showed her manager her driver's license "evidencing her age" of 55 years old on June 6, 2012, and that Appellee terminated her employment on August 28, 2012 because of her age. Appellant's Complaint, filed December 18, 2013.
On August 22, 2013, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") closed Appellant's case because it was unable to conclude the information obtained established a statutory violation, but it advised Appellant of her right to pursue her complaint in the appropriate Court of Common Pleas.
Appellant later dropped the retaliation claim.
Appellant's date of birth is June 6, 1958, so she would have turned 54 in 2012.
On March 18, 2015, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment alleging Appellant had not made a prima facie showing of her discrimination claim, and even if she had, Appellee had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating her employment that Appellant failed to establish were pretexts for discriminatory motivation. On March 20, 2015, the trial court ordered both parties to file briefs. On April 14, 2015, Appellant filed a brief in opposition to Appellee's motion for summary judgment, and Appellee filed a reply brief on April 22, 2015. On April 24, 2015, the court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment.
On May 11, 2015, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On May 14, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and she timely complied on May 28, 2015.
On June 2, 2015, the trial court adopted its Opinion and Order of April 23, 2015, which granted Appellee's summary judgment motion, as its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT APPELLANT HAD FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICIENT RECORD EVIDENCE TO MEET HER BURDEN ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE APPELLEE'S PROFFERED REASON FOR HER TERMINATION WAS A PRETEXT FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION?Appellant's Brief at 3.
Our standard of review of an order granting or denying a summary judgment motion is well established:
We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court's order will be reversed only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.Kozel v. Kozel , 97 A.3d 767, 772 (Pa.Super.2014) (quoting Daley v. A.W. Chesterton , Inc., 37 A.3d 1175, 1179 (Pa.2012)).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Marilyn J. Horan, we conclude Appellant's issue merits no relief. The trial court's memorandum opinion, which grants Appellee's motion for summary judgment, comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 24, 2015, at 2-12) (finding: summary judgement was proper where Appellant established prima facie discrimination claim; Appellee articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Appellant's employment of poor job performance and complaint directed to bank president; Appellant failed to establish Appellee's reasons were pretexts for discriminatory motivation; and whether Appellant was rude to customers, whether other employees were rude to customers, and whether coworkers made ageist remarks were not issues of material fact because Appellee based termination decision on customer complaint, not truth of complaint, and coworkers who allegedly made ageist remarks were not part of the decision-making process regarding Appellant's termination). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
The opinion is dated April 23, 2015.
The trial court did not address Appellant's concern that Ms. Newell, one of the people who allegedly made ageist remarks, was a decision maker because she filled out Appellant's performance evaluation. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194, 179 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2011) ("We therefore hold that if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA."). In her response to Appellee's motion for summary judgment, Appellant states that Ms. Newell was born in 1965 and supervised two other tellers who both are more than one decade older than Appellant, yet Appellant does not allege Ms. Newell treated these tellers in a discriminatory manner or gave them negative performance reviews. Although Ms. Newell filled out Appellant's performance evaluation, the ultimate decision-maker was the bank's president, Margarete Irvine Weir. In an affidavit, she stated that she made the decision to fire Appellant based on her "terrible skills as a teller," which were largely brought to her attention by a customer, Rick, who said Appellant often got very confused during transactions. After one transaction took over 20 minutes, Rick told all of his employees not to go to Appellant, but to make sure to wait for another teller so that she would not make a mistake. Rick also told Weir that he would joke about how bad a teller Appellant was with other customers. As her reason for terminating Appellant's employment, Weir stated: "I felt that having the bank's customers actually avoiding being served by [Appellant] was embarrassing, and put the bank in danger of losing those customers." Affidavit of Margaret Irvine Weir, dated March 13, 2015. Appellant does not allege that Ms. Newell's alleged bias against Appellant influenced Ms. Weir's ultimate decision. To the contrary, the unrebutted evidence in Appellee's motion for summary judgment is that Ms. Newell played no part in the decision to terminate Appellant. Given this record, there is no basis on which a factfinder could conclude that Ms. Newell was a decision-maker for purposes of the PHRA.
Order affirmed Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/16/2015
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