Opinion
(4310)
The plaintiff, who, in 1970, had obtained approval from the Prospect planning and zoning commission to combine three previously approved building lots into a single lot, applied to that commission, in 1982, for a special zoning permit to allow him to deposit fill on the property in order to construct a residence there. The planning and zoning commission conditioned its approval of the plaintiff's application upon the approval of the defendant inland wetlands commission. After the inland wetlands commission denied his application, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which sustained his appeal upon determining that he was exempted from inland wetlands approval by the statute ( 22a-40[a][2]) which allows the residential use of property in wetlands and watercourses where, as here, subdivision approval has been obtained for that property prior to the effective date of the applicable municipal inland wetlands regulations. The inland wetlands commission appealed from that judgment claiming that the 22a-40 exemption did not extend to the plaintiff's proposed construction of a septic system. Held that the trial court did not err in sustaining the plaintiff's appeal; to interpret 22a-40 as not including the right to construct a septic system, without which the use of property for a residential purpose would be impossible, would render the statutory exemption meaningless.
Argued March 14, 1986 —
Decision released May 6, 1986
Appeal from the defendant's denial of the plaintiff's application for a special permit, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the court, Gill, J.; judgment sustaining the appeal, from which the defendant appealed to this court. No error.
Kevin M. Doyle, with whom, on the brief, was Winifred B. Elton, for the appellant (defendant).
Thomas W. Calkins, with whom, on the brief, was Nicholas W. Rosa, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant is appealing from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff's appeal from the denial of his application for a permit to deposit fill on his approved building lot.
The facts are not in dispute. On or about June 13, 1957, a plan of subdivision was filed with the town clerk of the town of Prospect. On September 18, 1969, the plaintiff, Richard Knapp, purchased a portion of the property included in the subdivision, which property included lots 47, 53 and 55 located on Sherwood Drive. The planning and zoning commission of the town approved the application of the plaintiff to combine lots 47, 53 and 55 into a single building lot on June 17, 1970. Subsequently, on October 6, 1982, the plaintiff applied to the planning and zoning commission for a special zoning permit to allow him to deposit fill on the property in order to construct a residence thereon. The planning and zoning commission conditioned its approval of the permit upon approval by the defendant inland and wetlands commission. The plaintiff's application was denied by the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court; General Statutes 22a-43; which sustained the appeal and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
On appeal to this court, the defendant claims the court erred in sustaining the plaintiff's appeal because the defendant had made findings of potential harm to wetlands and to the public health resulting from the construction of a septic system and residence on the property. The defendant also claims error in the court's decision that General Statutes 22a-40(a)(2), which specifically permits the construction of a residence on a lot for which subdivision approval was obtained prior to 1974, the effective date of the municipal inland wetlands regulations, would also permit the proposed construction on the property. We disagree.
General Statutes 22a-40 provides in pertinent part: "(a) The following operations and uses shall be permitted in wetlands and watercourses, as of right . . . (2) A residential home . . . (ii) on a subdivision lot, provided the permit has been issued or the subdivision has been approved by a municipal planning, zoning or planning and zoning commission as of the effective date of promulgation of the municipal [inland wetlands] regulations . . . ." (Emphasis added.) There is no question here that the plaintiff's lot, the subject of this appeal, was approved prior to the town of Prospect's adoption of inland wetlands regulations and, consequently, that the use of the lot is exempted from any regulation by the defendant. Further, the defendant's own regulations are identical in effect to General Statutes 22a-40, and adopt the same exemptions.
The defendant's attempt to clothe itself with jurisdiction by separating the construction of a septic system from the construction of a residence is unavailing. It cannot be denied that a septic system is an adjunct to a dwelling and that, in the absence of a municipal sewage system, as here, it would be impossible to maintain a residence without a septic system.
The defendant refuses to acknowledge the fact that the legislature, by express and unequivocal language, has exempted from regulation by the defendant the use of land which has received subdivision approval prior to the creation of the defendant agency. The use of the subject property for a residence would be impossible without a septic system.
We reject the defendant's argument that the exemption does not include the right to construct a septic system. Such an interpretation would render the exemption meaningless. Where legislation allows certain uses as a matter of right, the legislation should not be construed in a manner that would defeat that right. A statute should be construed so as to have meaning, so that the statute makes common sense, and so that there are no bizarre results. Eagle Hill Corporation v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 2 Conn. App. 68, 75, 477 A.2d 660 (1984). The statute here is unambiguous, but even if it were not, "[w]here a statute is open to two constructions, one of which would have an absurd consequence, a legislative intent to obtain a rational result may be assumed." Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission, 162 Conn. 89, 103, 291 A.2d 721 (1971). We hold that in order to give efficacy to the legislative intent to exempt preexisting approved subdivisions from the defendant's regulation, the plaintiff's right to construct a residential home includes the right to construct a septic system free from the necessity of approval by the defendant. The construction of the statute by the trial court was reasonable, correct and proper under the law.