The County of Los Angeles, as real party in interest, entered a general demurrer to the petition for mandate; for our purposes, therefore, the facts alleged by petitioner are deemed to be true. ( Kleiner v. Garrison (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 445 [ 187 P.2d 57].) Those facts may be summarized as follows: petitioner filed the present action for personal injuries and property damage arising out of an automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligence of defendant Sylvia Bixby.

In other cases, which in the view of the majority opinion herein required the application of McDonough v. Goodcell, the distinction has been abandoned in favor of adherence to the logical implications of the rule of the Dare and Moran cases. ( Transportation Bldg. Corp. v. Daugherty, 74 Cal.App.2d 604, 616 [ 169 P.2d 470]; Kleiner v. Garrison, 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 446, 447 [ 187 P.2d 57].) The doctrine of McDonough v. Goodcell cannot be reconciled with the rationale of the Dare and Moran cases upon which it is purportedly based.

Specifically, documents in the administrative record are not considered in ruling on a demurrer unless they are "by appropriate reference made a part of the complaint or petition." ( Kleiner v. Garrison (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 445–446, 187 P.2d 57 ; see San Remo Hotel v. City And County of San Francisco (2002) 27 Cal.4th 643, 649, 653, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 41 P.3d 87 [where petition for writ of administrative mandate was pled as one cause of action in civil complaint and resolved on the merits, administrative record could not be considered in determining whether other causes of action were properly dismissed on demurrer].) By the same token, portions of the administrative record that the petition does not incorporate cannot be used to cure deficiencies in the petition.

In ruling on the demurrer, the trial court had to accept as true all material facts properly pleaded in plaintiff's petition, disregarding only conclusions of law and allegations contrary to judicially noticed facts. ( Stanton v. Dumke (1966) 64 Cal.2d 199, 201 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 380, 411 P.2d 108]; see also Kleiner v. Garrison (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 445, 447 [ 187 P.2d 57].) Applying these principles, the following material allegations appear in plaintiff's amended petition.

Plaintiff appeals from order of dismissal following sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. (1) The complaint, the allegations of which we accept as true for the purpose of this review ( O'Keefe v. Atascadero County Sanitation Dist., 21 Cal.App.3d 719, 730 [ 98 Cal.Rptr. 878]; Kleiner v. Garrison, 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 447 [ 187 P.2d 57]; Mackay v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 44, 55 [ 42 P.2d 341]), contains the following. On or about March 2, 1972, Stephen Sorenz presented to the Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) certain documents written entirely in German allegedly evidencing Sorenz' ownership of and legal title to a 1971 Mercedes Benz automobile; the documents were insufficient to show that the auto was legally owned by Sorenz and "did not reasonably evidence legal title" in him, and were such as to reasonably put the Department on notice that his title was in doubt, but the Department issued to Sorenz a certificate of ownership showing him to be legal and registered owner of the vehicle and in so doing the Department was negligent and careless, and negligently and carelessly failed to comply with section 4307, Vehicle Code, and negligently and carelessly failed to require Sorenz to file an undertaking or bond pursuant to Vehicle Code section 4157 Subsequently Sorenz "presented" the c

The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, and an order of dismissal was entered from which this appeal was taken. The allegations of the complaint, which we accept as true for the purpose of this proceeding ( Tringham v. State Board of Education, 137 Cal.App.2d 733, 735 [ 290 P.2d 890]; Kleiner v. Garrison, 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 445 [ 187 P.2d 57]), provide these material facts: On March 18, 1972, plaintiffs were injured when the vehicle in which they were riding collided at an intersection with one being driven by Juanita Cason; Juanita Cason died on March 24, 1972, and letters of administration for her estate were issued to defendant on June 14, 1972. Plaintiffs Genaro Zapata and Goglass filed claims for personal injury in the estate on August 16, 1972; Gonzalez and Rafael Zapata filed claims on August 24, 1972.

(4) However, in ruling on a demurrer the trial court is bound by the facts as alleged in the pleading against which the demurrer is directed, and it may not consider evidentiary facts presented to it through the medium of an affidavit. ( Kleiner v. Garrison (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 447 [ 187 P.2d 57]; Mackay v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co. (1935) 5 Cal.App.2d 44, 55 [ 42 P.2d 341].) Accordingly, we do not pass upon respondents' contention that the transfer of funds was a temporary one and that such a temporary transfer to another county fund is lawful, since it does not appear in the petition that the transfer was temporary.

[2] Demurrers reach only those defects appearing on the face of the complaint or judicially noticeable. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430, 433; Kleiner v. Garrison, 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 447 [ 187 P.2d 57]; Mackay v. Clark Rig Bldg. Co., 5 Cal.App.2d 44, 55 [ 42 P.2d 341]; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, p. 1185 and p. 1468.) Respondents cite Hill v. City of Santa Barbara, 196 Cal.App.2d 580 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 686], as support for the rule that if a pleaded contract shows no basis for a cause of action the complaint is demurrable.

Therefore in passing upon the demurrer the court had before it all facts revealed by that transcript. (See Sipper v. Urban, 22 Cal.2d 138, 140 [ 137 P.2d 425]; Kleiner v. Garrison, 82 Cal.App.2d 442, 446 [ 187 P.2d 57].) Petitioner claims that those facts do not support the court's ruling. Such claim is based upon his contentions (1) that he was not an employee of S Q Construction Company, and (2) that insurance written for S Q — Rayor partnership cannot be considered "controlled" insurance.

We will therefore examine the allegations of the petition and the demurrer thereto and test it under the general rules applicable, to see if the trial court was justified in sustaining it without leave to amend. ( Kleiner v. Garrison, 82 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 187 P.2d 57].) [2] The general rule is that in a hearing upon a verified petition which respondent has failed to answer, the truth of all the facts alleged must be conceded.