However, on many occasions the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have addressed the merits of a case, notwithstanding the fact that such a notation was appended to the order. We believe that the better rule is stated in Kirn v Ioor, 266 Mich. 335, 336-338; 253 N.W. 318 (1934), in which this Court explained: When the case was finally submitted, after argument, the presiding judge announced briefly his findings and decision from the bench, requesting plaintiff's attorney to draw decree and order as orally declared.

or even "approved as to substance and form" does not alone constitute assent to be bound by the terms of the decree. ( Harter v. King County, 11 Wn.2d 583 [ 119 P.2d 919]; Allen Reed, Inc. v. Investments, Inc., (R.I.) 182 A. 3; State v. Trotter, 214 Ind. 68 [ 14 N.E.2d 550]; Bank of Gauley v. Osenton, 92 W. Va. 1 [114 S.E. 435]; Kirn v. Ioor, 266 Mich. 335 [ 253 N.W. 318].) Finally, respondent's acceptance of benefits under the interlocutory decree cannot be held to estop him from seeking a reduction of alimony.

(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hasso (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1181 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 919] [declining to find an attorney's approval "as to form" a condition precedent to enforceability of an agreement]; Ahrenberg Mech. Contractor v. Howlett (1996) 451 Mich. 74 [ 545 N.W.2d 4, 5-6], citing Kirn v. Ioor (1934) 266 Mich. 335 [ 253 N.W. 318] [finding approval as to form and content of a court order insufficient to establish a consent judgment]; First American Title Ins. Co. v. Adams (Tex.App. 1992) 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 [determining that an attorney's approval as to form and substance does not establish a consent judgment or relinquish a party's right to appeal]; CIC Prop. Owners v. Marsh USA, Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 460 F.3d 670, 672-673 [agreement stating it was "`reviewed by counsel for the parties and approved as to form and content'" indicates that parties were separately advised by counsel].)

However, on many occasions the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have addressed the merits of a case, notwithstanding the fact that such a notation was appended to the order. We believe that the better rule is stated in Kirn v Ioor, 266 Mich 335, 336-338; 253 NW 318 (1934), in which this Court explained: "When the case was finally submitted, after argument, the presiding judge announced briefly his findings and decision from the bench, requesting plaintiff s attorney to draw decree and order as orally declared.

Rather, we find that plaintiffs should be held to the settlement agreed to in open court and on the record, Kruger v Martin, 96 Mich. App. 660; 293 N.W.2d 667 (1980), and that the ruling of the lower court be affirmed. Kirn v Ioor, 266 Mich. 335, 338; 253 N.W. 318 (1934). Costs to appellee.

We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default. We approved in Crew v. Zabowsky, 357 Mich. 606, 610, the language in Kirn v. Ioor, 266 Mich. 335, 338: "It is long-settled textbook law, sustained by abundant decisions in this Court and elsewhere that, in cases within jurisdiction of the trial court, its ruling on application for an order setting aside a judgment or decree is strictly discretionary and will not be disturbed by an appellate court, unless a clear instance of abuse of discretion is shown."

This constituted a waiver of notice. Kirn v. Ioor, 266 Mich. 335, 337. The second question raised is whether or not the circuit judge erred in refusing to set aside the default and default decree against Flann, Inc. Following entry of the order of default against both defendants, a motion was made by Max Chomsky, who indicated that he was appearing for both defendants, to set aside the default.

It is also apparent that representatives of Chrysler's legal department notified plaintiff's original attorney that the error had been made and that reliance was made upon the telephone conversation and letter with reference to the error and the offer to file an amended disclosure if needed. This Court in the case of Kirn v. Ioor, 266 Mich. 335, 338, said: "It is long-settled textbook law, sustained by abundant decisions in this Court and elsewhere that, in cases within jurisdiction of the trial court, its ruling on application for an order setting aside a judgment or decree is strictly discretionary and will not be disturbed by an appellate court, unless a clear instance of abuse of discretion is shown."

The consent foreclosure decree was a true consent decree. It was approved as to form and substance by intervenors' attorneys, was labeled as such and was considered and referred to as such by all parties. Most important it was apparently the result of "preliminary discussion or negotiations between attorneys looking to the compromise or surrender" of the rights of the parties as stated in Kirn v. Ioor, 266 Mich. 335, 337. The record before us does not indicate otherwise.

It bears the indorsement: "O.K. as to form and substance: Robert C. Baldwin, attorney for plaintiff and appellee." However, see Kirn v. Ioor, 266 Mich. 335. As hereinbefore noted, this decree was entered after the case by stipulation of counsel for the respective parties was remanded from this Court to the circuit court; and evidently it was drafted in the particulars now in controversy in accord with what all, or at least some, of the parties thought was the controlling law. The following facts are essential to a more complete understanding of the circumstances giving rise to this litigation and the present appeal. At the time defendant city was incorporated there were outstanding two groups of special assessment bonds, and there were also certain outstanding general obligations of the township.