Kirke v. Texas Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Finley v. Marathon Oil Co.

    75 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1996)   Cited 179 times
    Affirming exclusion of rebuttal expert evidence disclosed only a few days before trial

    We shall see in a moment that Marathon's incentive to avoid drainage may have been impaired. But the Finleys neither remark this nor presented at trial any evidence that Marathon was acting deliberately rather than mistakenly, or indeed that it had committed any wrong more serious than a garden-variety breach of contract; for an oil and gas contract does not make the lessee the fiduciary of the lessor in the absence of special circumstances not shown here. O'Donnell v. Showden McSweeney Co., 149 N.E. 253, 255 (Ill. 1925); Kirke v. Texas Co., 186 F.2d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 1951) (applying Illinois law); Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 1994). So they could not have obtained punitive damages, Mijatovitch v. Columbia Savings Loan Ass'n, 522 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Ill.App. 1988); Naiditch v. Shaf Home Builders, Inc., 512 N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ill.App. 1987); Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander, supra, 622 S.W.2d at 571, which was the main reason they had for dressing their claim in fiduciary-duty breeches.

  2. Sterling v. Village of Maywood

    579 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1978)   Cited 29 times
    Finding no protected contractual interest because plaintiff had no contractual relationship with water department and โ€œplaintiff makes no claim that a de facto understanding existed between her and the Village. Thus, there was no implied property right.โ€

    In addition, our factual inquiry is limited to those facts alleged in the complaint, and therefore, we cannot consider the various depositions included by both parties in the record on appeal. Kirke v. Texas Co., 186 F.2d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 1951). Count II of plaintiff's complaint was a claim under 42 U.S.C. ยง 1985(3) alleging a conspiracy between her landlords and the Village to deprive her of her rights. That claim also was dismissed by the district court.

  3. McNaughton v. New York Central Railroad Co.

    220 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1955)   Cited 26 times
    In McNaughton v. New York Cent. Rd., 220 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1955), the court held that a new party who is a proper party on a counterclaim must independently satisfy the federal jurisdictional requirements although the counterclaim is compulsory so far as the original plaintiff is concerned.

    However unlikely it may have seemed that defendant could sustain its defense, it, nevertheless, was entitled to an opportunity to prove it. Ibid; Kirke v. Texas Company, 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 643, 647; Chicago N.W.R. Co. v. Chicago Packaged Fuel Co., 7 Cir., 183 F.2d 630; Asher v. Ruppa, 7 Cir., 173 F.2d 10, 12. If plaintiff has made a full settlement of his claim with his employer under the Indiana Compensation Act as averred in the proposed amended answer, he can not recover against defendant.

  4. Kingwood Oil Co. v. Bell

    204 F.2d 8 (7th Cir. 1953)   Cited 13 times
    In Kingwood, we stated, page 13, `No matter how likely it may seem that a plaintiff may be unable to prove his case, he is entitled, upon averring a claim, to an opportunity to prove it.

    The amended complaint herein should not have been dismissed unless it appeared to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claims. No matter how likely it may seem that a plaintiff may be unable to prove his case, he is entitled, upon averring a claim, to an opportunity to prove it. Peterson Steels, Inc., v. Seidmon, 7 Cir., 188 F.2d 193, 195; Kirke v. Texas Co., 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 643, 647; Chicago N.W.R. Co. v. Chicago Packaged Fuel Co., 7 Cir., 183 F.2d 630; Carroll v. Morrison Hotel Corp., 7 Cir., 149 F.2d 404, 406. In Publicity Building Realty Corp. v. Hannegan, 8 Cir., 139 F.2d 583, the court said at pages 586-587: "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C.A.] do not sanction the disposition of doubtful issues of fact or law upon motions to dismiss for insufficiency of pleadings."

  5. Peterson Steels v. Seidmon

    188 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1951)   Cited 39 times

    No matter how likely it may seem that a plaintiff may be unable to prove his case, he is entitled, upon averring a claim, to an opportunity to prove it. Kirke v. Texas Co., 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 643, 647; Chicago N.W.R. Co. v. Chicago Packaged Fuel Co., 7 Cir., 183 F.2d 630; Asher v. Ruppa, supra, 173 F.2d at page 12; Carroll v. Morrison Hotel Corp., 7 Cir., 149 F.2d 404, 406. The district court interpreted the contract to provide that the steel to be fabricated was to be delivered within 8 to 10 weeks of the date of the order, and that any later oral agreement which varied such delivery date was void under the Statute of Frauds.

  6. Roberts Ranch Company v. Exxon Corp.

    43 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1997)   Cited 22 times

    " Kuntz, Oil and Gas, Vol. 5, ยง 59.3 (citations omitted). The latter treatise, however, cites no Oklahoma cases in support of this proposition, citing instead Chapman v. Texas Co., 80 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.Ill. 1948) (applying Illinois law, holding lessee does not become trustee for lessors); and Kirke v. Texas Co., 186 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1951) (under Illinois law, no relationship of special trust and confidence is created between lessor and lessee, and lease is subject to same rules of construction as any other contract). Exxon contends that the various Oklahoma state and federal courts have merely used the term "fiduciary" broadly in those cases describing the relationship between lessees and lessors, and that the "prudent operator" standard is the proper measure by which a lessee/operator's performance is to be judged.

  7. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Chandris America Lines, Inc.

    321 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)   Cited 6 times

    We likewise see no merit in the contention that the advertisement violated the anti-dilution statute, cf. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Allstate Driving School, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 4, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). In considering whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we must, of course, be chary of precluding a party from producing evidence or vindicating genuine wrongs, Kirke v. Texas Co., 186 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1951). However, the extreme liberality with which a complaint must be read, taking all the factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss, does not mean that no case may be dismissed for failure to state a claim, Rennie Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1957).

  8. Kingwood Oil Company v. Bell

    136 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Ill. 1955)   Cited 4 times

    These agreements, like oil and gas leases, are subject to the same rules of construction as any other contracts. Kirke v. Texas Co., 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 643, 648. It was not necessary for the agreements "to state specifically all details in regard to the matter concerning which the parties are contracting."