For purposes of the statute of limitations, a cause of action against the United States accrues "when all events have occurred which fix the government's liability." Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Oceanic Steamship Co. v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 217, 225 (1964)) (determining liability in a breach of contract claim); see also SeldoviaNative Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.3d 769, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (determining liability in a takings claim). In challenging the dismissal of their complaint, appellants make three arguments.

A claim accrues "when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action." Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Oceanic S.S. Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 217, 225 (1964)). Claims for breach of contract generally accrue at the time of the breach.

A claim first accrues and the six year statute of limitations begins to run ( 28 U.S.C. § 2501), "when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action." Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Oceanic Steamship Co. v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 217, 225 (1964)). Persons retiring from the military after the effective date of the SBP are automatically enrolled in the plan.

A cause of action against the United States accrues when all events have occurred which fix the government's liability. Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Oceanic Steamship Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 217, 225 (1964)) (determining liability in a breach of contract claim); Seldovia Native Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.3d 769, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (determining liability in a taking claim). In Franconia, the Court held that "ELIHPA effected a repudiation of the FmHA loan contracts, not an immediate breach."

The Government argues that any repudiation here was not wholly anticipatory because Appellants allege that the Government breached multiple provisions of the contract, and therefore the statute of limitations should have started running immediately upon the Government’s first breach of the MEPP, which took place in 1996 or 1997. Appellee Br. at 36–40 (citing Kinsey v. United States , 852 F.2d 556, 558 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ). The Government then cites to specific facts in the amended complaint (e.g. , that the Government refused to allow Appellants to withdraw their pensions, in violation of MEPP Article 26 and federal statute) that Appellants could have cited in support of an allegation that the Government breached the MEPP.

The accrual of a claim against the United States is suspended, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2501, until the claimant knew or should have known that the claim existed (“the accrual suspension rule”). Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2000) (finding that, when determining when a taking claim accrues, “the key issue is whether the permanent nature of the taking was evident such that the landowner should have known that the land had suffered erosion damage”); Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1988); Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 n. * (Fed.Cir.1988) (“A claim does not accrue unless the claimant knew or should have known that the claim existed.”); see also Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1322 n. 15 (Fed.Cir.2011). For the accrual suspension rule to apply, the claimant “must either show that the defendant has concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff was unaware of their existence or it must show that its injury was ‘inherently unknowable’ at the accrual date.”

FloorPro's cause of action accrued when the government breached Modification P00001 by making payment directly to GM & W, rather than sending a two-party check to FloorPro as the modification required. See Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 141, 122 S.Ct. 1993, 153 L.Ed.2d 132 (2002) (explaining that claims seeking damages for breach of contract generally accrue at the time of the breach); Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed.Cir.1988) (emphasizing that a cause of action for breach of a government contract generally accrues when payment is due but wrongfully withheld). FloorPro became aware of the breach no later than August 9, 2002, when the Navy informed FloorPro that: (1) it had paid GM & W directly for the floor-coating work; (2) it believed that it had fulfilled the extent of its contract obligations; and (3) FloorPro's only recourse was to seek payment “from GM & W through the civil court system.”

"[A] claim against the United States first accrues on the date when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action." Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Oceanic Steamship Co. v. United States, 165 Ct.Cl. 217, 225 (1964)). In this case, that was the date on which the United States misappropriated Mr. Hyde's invention.

It is sometimes stated that accrual of a claim against the United States will be suspended until the claimant "knew or should have known" that the claim existed. See Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 n. * (Fed. Cir. 1988). That articulation of the rule is not meant to set forth a different test, as the two standards have been used interchangeably.

" A "claim against [the] United States first accrues `on the date when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action.'" Chandler v. U.S. Air Force, 255 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kinsey v. United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also Victor Foods, Inc. v. Crossroads Econ. Dev. of St. Charles County, Inc., 977 F.2d 1224, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("A cause of action accrues when there are facts enabling one party to maintain an action against another."). Thus, a plaintiffs claim "accrues" for purposes of § 2401(a) when the plaintiff "either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that [he or she] had a claim."