Although none of our decisions has squarely addressed the question whether our state constitutional right to privacy may be enforced against private parties (we had no occasion to decide the issue in Schmidt v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 370, 389, fn. 14 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 750, 769 P.2d 932]), the Courts of Appeal have consistently answered in the affirmative. (See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1040-1044 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 194] [hereafter Wilkinson]; Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1489-1493 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 668, 69 A.L.R.4th 1027]; Cutter v. Brownbridge (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 836, 841-843 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 545]; Kinsey v. Macur (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 265 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 608]; Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 829-830 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 839] [hereafter Porten]; see also Chico Fem. Women's Health Cr. v. ButteGlen Med. S. (E.D.Cal. 1983) 557 F. Supp. 1190, 1201-1203.)

Both defamation and false light claims involve intentional publication of statements of fact. See Price, 620 F.3d at 998; Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265, 270 (1980). Here, Plaintiff has brought defamation and false light claims based on the statements that Foster made on July 1, 2012, when she reported the alleged incidents to the Auxiliary members and Coast Guard Officers. Conversely, Plaintiff's contention that Foster was acting outside the scope of her employment, is based on the alleged incidents and not the reports that Foster made about the incidents.

See id.Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).See, e.g., Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207 (Cal. 2007); Shulman v. Gp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998); Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Diaz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 767-68.

Rest. 2d Torts, § 652D, Comment a. "[E]xcept in cases involving physical intrusion, the tort [of public disclosure of private facts] must be accompanied by publicity in the sense of communication to the public in general or to a large number of persons as distinguished by one individual or a few." Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265, 270 (1980).

[N]o California case has defined the number of people necessary to justify a finding of publicity" for purposes of a claim of public disclosure of private facts. Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265, 271, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). As noted by that court, "[t]he claim is not so much one of total secrecy as it is the right to define one's circle of intimacy . . . ." 107 Cal. App. 3d at 272 (citing Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 4 Cal.3d 529, 534, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 (1971), italics in original).

An essential element is that there be "sufficient publicity" — "communication to the public in general or to a large number of persons as distinguished from one individual or a few." Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal.App.3d 265, 165 Cal.Rptr. 608, 611 (1980). The determination of sufficient publicity does not depend exclusively on the number of people with whom defendants communicate, but also on the relative interests involved.

(Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. a, p. 384; see generally Elder, Privacy Torts (2002) § 3:3, pp. 3-16 to 3-21 [criticizing stringent application of Restatement standard].) In Kinsey v. Macur (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 265, 270 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 608], the court stated "the tort must be accompanied by publicity in the sense of communication to the public in general or to a large number of persons as distinguished from one individual or a few." Kinsey held a jilted lover's act of mailing letters to "`perhaps twenty [people] at most'" to "`tell the whole world what a bastard [plaintiff] is'" constituted the requisite publicity.

Appellate courts have repeatedly held that the right to privacy is an inalienable right which no one may violate. ( Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., supra, at pp. 1041-1043 [private potential employer]; Porten v. University of San Francisco, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 829 [private university]; see Semore v. Pool (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1093-1094 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 280] [private employer; allegation of state action not required to overcome demurrer to cause of action based on constitutional right to privacy]; Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 816, 851 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 813] [dicta], app. dism. 459 U.S. 1192 [ 75 L.Ed.2d 422, 103 S.Ct. 1170]; Kinsey v. Macur (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 265, 272 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 608] [individual]; see also Annenberg v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 637, 645-646 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 519] [labor union].) Commentators have also espoused this view.

Speaking of the right to privacy generally, however, there is both Supreme Court and appellate authority to the effect that state action is not required to create a violation of the California Constitutional right of privacy. ( White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 773-776 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222]; Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 816 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 813], conc. opn. by Kaufman, J., p. 859; Kinsey v. Macur (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 265, 272 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 608]; Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 829 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 839].) We do not need to go so far, however, because there is abundant state action present in the case here.

As to Snipes's possible public disclosure of private acts claim, this too fails because disclosure to two persons, her mother and father, does not constitute disclosure to the public. Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265, 270 (1980) ("[E]xcept in cases involving physical intrusion, the tort [of public disclosure of private facts] must be accompanied by publicity in the sense of communication to the public in general or to a large number of persons as distinguished by one individual or a few."). Accordingly, Snipes has not alleged a claim for the invasion of privacy.