Opinion
No. 17-16988
05-23-2018
CHARLES G. KINNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01607-JST MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Charles G. Kinney appeals pro se from the district court's order dismissing sua sponte his action arising from state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1077 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissal on the basis of judicial immunity). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Kinney's claims for damages on the basis of judicial immunity and Kinney's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Kinney's claims amount to a forbidden "de facto appeal" of a prior state court judgment or are "inextricably intertwined" with that judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing factors relevant to whether an act is judicial in nature and subject to judicial immunity).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.