Opinion
Civil No. 9:97-CV-1906 (NAM/GLS)
September 3, 2002
MAURICE KINGWOOD, Collins, New York, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
HON. ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney General of the State of New York, SEAN M. SEELY, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General, Albany, New York, for Defendant.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter was referred to the undersigned for a Report-Recommendation by the Hon. Norman A. Mordue, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.3(c). The defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment, Dkt. Nos. 68-72, and pro se, plaintiff, Maurice Kingwood ("Kingwood") has failed to respond. Kingwood brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the defendant violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant counters that Kingwood's placement in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") did not implicate a liberty interest and indicates that he is entitled to qualified immunity. After reviewing Kingwood's claims and for the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
See Judge Mordue's order issued on March 8, 2002, requiring Kingwood to respond to the motion (Dkt. No. 74).
The court notes that Kingwood's Eighth Amendment claim has previously been dismissed (see Dkt. Nos. 43 53).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
With some necessary additions, the procedural history and facts that follow have been taken from this court's previous Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 49).
On December 31, 1997, Kingwood filed a complaint claiming that the defendant violated his due process rights during a Tier III disciplinary hearing (Dkt. No. 1). On April 15, 1998, after an extension, the defendant answered the complaint (Dkt. No. 14). Subsequently, on July 28, 1998, Kingwood filed his first motion to amend the complaint (Dkt. No. 21). Before the court could respond, Kingwood filed another motion to amend on November 5, 1998 (Dkt. No. 26). On January 15, 1999, Kingwood filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 32).
On February 16, 1999, the court granted Kingwood's first motion to amend the complaint (Dkt. No. 41). However, the court denied his second motion to amend because he made it after the October 19, 1998, deadline for filing non-dispositive motions. On October 11, 2000, Judge Mordue adopted this court's previous Report-Recommendation which recommended summary judgment in favor of Donald Selsky based on qualified immunity (Dkt. Nos. 49 53). As a result, Rourke is the only remaining defendant in the case.
III. FACTS
On April 27, 1996, after Kingwood was checked with a wand, the metal detector alarm sounded. After a strip frisk was performed, a razor type weapon was found on Kingwood's person. On May 1, 1996, a Tier III hearing was conducted before the defendant, the disciplinary hearing officer. Kingwood accuses the defendant of bias and pre-determining the hearing outcome. He also claims that his request to obtain the personnel file of the corrections officer who wrote his misbehavior report was denied without explanation. As a result of this hearing, Kingwood was sentenced to 455 days in the SHU. Subsequently, Donald Selsky reversed the determination because the entire hearing transcript could not be produced due to a taping error (Def.['s] Ex. I, Dkt. No. 72).
IV. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); accord F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . . an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]" Rexford Holdings, Inc. v. Biderman, 21 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1994) (alternation in original) (citation omitted). However, it is well settled that on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, in a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to "formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (a court is to read a pro se party's "supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest"). Indeed, the Second Circuit has stated that "[i]mplicit in the right to self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). Any ambiguities and inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1990); see LaFond v. General Physics Serv. Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1995).
This liberal standard, however, does not excuse a pro se litigant from following the procedural formalities of summary judgment. Showers v. Eastmond, 2001 WL 527484, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001). More specifically, Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) of this court specifically provides that "any facts set forth in the [moving party's] Statement of Material Facts shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing party." Local Rule 7.1(a)(3) further requires that the "non-movant shall file a Statement of Material Fact which mirrors the movant's statement in matching numbered paragraphs and which set forth a specific reference to the record where the material fact is alleged to arise." The courts of the Northern District have adhered to a strict application of Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)'s requirement on summary judgment motions. Giguere v. Racicot, 2002 WL 368534, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. March 1, 2002) (interalia citing Bundy Am. Corp. v. K-Z Rental Leasing, Inc., 2001 WL 237218, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2001)).
Furthermore, this Circuit adheres to the view that nothing in Rule 56 imposes an obligation on the court to conduct a search and independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute. Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 2002). As long as the local rules impose a requirement that parties provide specific record citations in support of their statement of material facts, the court may grant summary judgment on that basis. Id. at 470-71. With this standard in mind, the court now turns to the sufficiency of Kingwood's claims.
B. Due Process Claim
Kingwood claims that his due process rights were violated during a Tier III hearing where the defendant, his hearing officer, was biased. In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a § 1983 claim for denial of due process, he must establish: (1) that he possessed a liberty interest; and, (2) that the defendant(s) deprived him of that interest as a result of insufficient process." Giano v. Selsky, 238 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). To determine whether a liberty interest exists under state law, the court must analyze whether the restraint at issue "imposes an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)); see also, Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 392 (2d Cir. 1999). In other words, the "inquiry under Sandin [is] whether the duration of plaintiff's actual period of administrative or disciplinary confinement and the conditions thereof are so different from conditions manifest in both the general population of the prison and other segregative housing as to give rise to a liberty interest." Giano, 238 F.3d at 225 (citation omitted). Thus, a disciplinary sanction does not meet the Sandin "atypical and significant hardship" standard unless it is "onerous." Jenkins, 179 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 1999).
"The Second Circuit has rejected a `bright-line rule that confinement in normal SHU conditions of more than 180 days meets the Sandin standard,' . . . in favor of a "fact-intensive inquiry" into the duration and nature of a given SHU confinement." Espinal v. Goord, 180 F. Supp.2d 532, 537 n8. (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted). However, the Second Circuit has suggested that confinement for a period of less than 101 days would not constitute "an atypical and significant hardship." See Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231-32 (2d Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, the Second Circuit stated that "confinement in normal SHU conditions, 305 days [was] a sufficient departure from the ordinary incidents of prison life to require procedural due process protections under Sandin." Giano v. Selsky, 238 F.3d at 226 (citing Colon, 215 F.3d at 231 (2d Cir. 2000)); see e.g., Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 2000). Moreover, the Second Circuit "instructed the district courts to develop detailed factual records `in cases challenging SHU confinements of durations within the range bracketed by 101 days and 305 days.'" Sims, 230 F.3d at 23 (citing Colon, 215 F.3d at 232). The Second Circuit has emphasized that the Sandin analysis entails both a consideration of the duration of the challenged confinement as well as a fact-intensive examination of the conditions of that confinement. See Ayers v. Ryan, 152 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1998).
In Colon, the court discussed Sealey v. Giltner, 116 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997), in which confinement of 101 days was held not to have met the Sandin standard. Colon, 215 F.3d at 231-232. Judge Newman, expressing "only [his] own views on this issue and not those of the panel," advocated "a bright-line rule that confinement in normal SHU conditions of more than 180 days meets the Sandin standard." Id. at 232. Conversely, confinement of 180 days or less would not meet the Sandin standard. Among the other reasons for his belief that a bright-line rule would be appropriate in the context of Sandin claims, Judge Newman observed that "the district judges of this Circuit would significantly benefit from use of a standard that would permit prompt dismissal of many cases where the facts alleged in the complaint demonstrate that the duration and conditions of confinement do not exceed an announced standard." Id. at 233.
In this case, Kingwood alleges that his due process rights were violated because his hearing officer was biased. However, the defendant contends that 455 days spent in the SHU was not a significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. The defendant provides this court with specific information about SHU conditions at the Auburn Correctional Facility. He provides the court with the exact number of inmates in the SHU, general population, keeplock, and administrative segregation, including the average time that inmates spend in the SHU. He argues that SHU inmates were allowed one hour of exercise instead of two to three hours, which is normally permitted in general population. In addition, the SHU and general population inmates were allowed the same number of showers and had access to television and radio programs.
In viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Kingwood, the non-moving party, the court finds that 455 days in the SHU exceeds the amount of time that the Second Circuit has found to implicate a liberty interest. Despite the fact that the record is relatively silent regarding the conditions that Kingwood suffered in the SHU, the longest confinement in normal SHU that the Second Circuit has held to not meet the Sandin standard was 101 days. Even if the durational line was drawn at 305 days in the SHU, Kingwood would satisfy the Sandin standard. This court finds that Kingwood has made the requisite showing under Sandin, such that he was entitled to due process. Accordingly, this court recommends that the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on Kingwood's due process claim should be denied.
C. Qualified Immunity
As an alternative reason to grant dismissal, the defendant argues qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials who perform discretionary functions in the course of their employment. It shields them from liability for money damages where "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). It also protects officials from "the burdens of costly, but insubstantial, lawsuits." Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330, 332 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
The question of whether qualified immunity will protect a public official depends upon "`the objective legal reasonableness' of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the contours of the right violated must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official might understand that his actions violate that right. Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; Keane, 196 F.3d at 332. In other words, "in evaluating whether a right was clearly established at the time a § 1983 defendant acted: `(1) whether the right in question was defined with "reasonable specificity"; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and, (3) whether under pre-existing law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful.'" African Trade Information Center, Inc., v. Abromaitis, 294 F.3d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 2002). See also, Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350, 360 (2d Cir. 2000).
Additionally, the Second Circuit has held that a court may dismiss a claim based upon qualified immunity without first deciding the substantive claims therein. See Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 1999). Also within this decision, the Second Circuit suggested that the qualified immunity issue should be addressed before the substance of a claim. The court shall now consider the defendant's claim that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
In this case, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed was reasonable, and in accordance with sentences imposed on other inmates who were placed in the SHU. Conversely, Kingwood accuses the defendant of predetermining the hearing and being biased against him. It may well be that the sentence imposed was not significantly different than other inmates in the SHU. However, it is well established that inmates have a right to "be judged by a fair and impartial hearing officer." Simon v. Selsky, 2002 WL 1205737, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citation omitted). If the defendant was biased or he predetermined the hearing, it would not have been objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions did not violate such a right. Accordingly, this court recommends that the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity should be denied.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby RECOMMENDED, that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 68) be DENIED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation upon the parties by regular mail.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within TEN days. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).