Opinion
1:99-CV-246 C
March 8, 2002
ORDER
On November 18, 1999, Plaintiff Gerald King, acting pro se, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID"), and several of its employees illegally seized and damaged some of his personal property, stole his property, denied him access to the courts, retaliated against him, and filed false disciplinary cases against him. Plaintiff requests that the Defendants be ordered to pay his court costs and filing fees, compensatory damages, damages for mental anguish and emotional distress, and punitive damages.
Plaintiffs complaint was transferred to the United States Magistrate Judge, who conducted an evidentiary hearing and judicial screening pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c) on March 7, 2000. Plaintiff appeared and testified under oath. See Eason v. Holt, 76 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that sworn testimony at a Spears hearing becomes part of the plaintiffs complaint). The TDCJ-ID furnished authenticated copies of Plaintiff's prison grievance, classification, property, and disciplinary records from the Middleton Unit. See Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Medical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate's allegations of deliberate indifference."). When Plaintiff failed to consent to having the Magistrate Judge hear his complaint, the case was transferred back to the docket of the District Court. The Defendants have not been served.
By Order dated December 8, 1999, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, "[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines" that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (stating that when a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or one of its employees, the court shall review the complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if the court finds the complaint frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(c) (West 1994 and Supp. 2000) (providing that a district court shall on its own motion or the motion of any party dismiss a complaint by a prisoner regarding prison conditions if the court is satisfied the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant).
A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, "such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). A claim has no arguable basis in fact if "after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless." Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
District courts must construe in forma pauperis complaints liberally, particularly in the rcontext of dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B), but are given broad discretion in determining when such complaints are frivolous. Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint may not be dismissed under § 1915(d)(2)(B) "simply because the court finds the plaintiffs allegations unlikely." Jolly v. Klein, 923 F. Supp. 931, 942-43 (S.D. Tex. 1996). A civil rights plaintiff must support his claim(s) with specific facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation and may not simply rely on conclusory allegations. Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir. 1995). See Wesson v. Ogleby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990) ("An IFP complaint that recites bare legal conclusions, with no suggestion of supporting facts, or that postulates facts of an entirely fanciful nature, is a prime candidate for dismissal under [§ 1915(d)(2)(B)]."). Nevertheless, a district court is bound by the allegations in a plaintiffs complaint and is "not free to speculate that the plaintiff `might' be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint." Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d at 97.
Plaintiff has named the following Defendants: the TDCJ-ID; Wayne Scott, Executive Director of the TDCJ-ID; Gary Johnson, Director of the TDCJ-ID; James M. Duke, Warden of the Middleton Unit; Craig A. Raines, Asst. Warden of the Middleton Unit; Galela Wofford, Property Officer at the Middleton Unit; Mark A. I'ves, Correctional Officer at the Middleton Unit; and Sherry Lefevre, Correctional Officer at the Middleton Unit.
To the extent that Plaintiff is requesting monetary damages from the TDCJ-ID and Defendants Scott, Johnson, Duke, Raines, Wofford, I'ves, and Lefevre in their official capacities as employees of the TDCJ-ID, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. "[A]bsent [a] waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). A suit against a defendant, in his official capacity, who is an employee or agent of the state is simply a suit against the state and is thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 166-67.
To the extent that Plaintiff has sued Defendants Scott, Johnson, Duke, and Raines in their individual capacities, he has failed to demonstrate these supervisory officials were personally involved in any of the alleged acts that resulted in constitutional deprivations. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Scott failed to order his employees to return his property; Defendant Johnson failed to use his authority to order his employees to return or repair his property; Defendant Duke failed to order his employees to repair or return the property; and Defendant Raines failed to order the TDCJ-ID employees in his control to return Plaintiff's property. A supervisory official may be held liable under § 1983 only if a complainant demonstrates the official affirmatively participated in the act or acts that caused the constitutional deprivation, or the official implemented unconstitutional policies that caused the complainant's injury. Mouille v. City of Live Oak Texas, 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). See Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that theories of vicarious liability do not apply to § 1983 claims) and Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action).
Plaintiff does argue that Defendants I'ves, Wofford, and Lefevre seized his property and failed to return it or returned it in a damaged condition; damaged his legal papers; and retaliated against him for filing grievances and complaints about his property.
As for Plaintiff's complaints about his damaged or stolen property, when an inmate alleges the negligent or even intentional loss of property and the state provides an adequate remedy, an inmate may not bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages for his loss. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981). Texas has a state remedy that satisfies the requirements of due process. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 543 (1984); Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint about his damaged or stolen property fails to state a claim which has any legal basis and should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Plaintiff claims that his property was damaged in retaliation, but he has failed to support his claim with facts showing a retaliatory motive on the part of the Defendants. To bring a claim for retaliation, a prisoner must demonstrate (1) the invocation of a constitutional right; (2) a defendant's intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his exercise of that right; (3) a retaliatory adverse act; and (4) causation; i.e., but for the retaliatory motive, the complained-of incident would not have occurred. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997). If the conduct claimed to constitute retaliation does not, by itself, raise an inference of retaliatory motivation, then the claim is conclusional unless the plaintiff makes other factual allegations showing a retaliatory motive. See Whittington v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 310 (holding that a prisoner must show more than his "personal belief" that he is a victim of retaliation). Plaintiff has offered no evidence to support his allegation of retaliation, other than his conclusory personal belief.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendant I'ves destroyed his legal papers and interfered with his constitutional right to have access to the courts. "It has long been recognized that prisoners generally enjoy the constitutional right of access to the court." Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1999). See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The right of access to the court is not unlimited, however, and includes "only a reasonable opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging [the prisoners'] convictions or conditions of confinement." Id. (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996)). Moreover, to prevail on an access-to-the-court claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that he has suffered "an actual injury" stemming from the alleged defendants' unconstitutional conduct. Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999); Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has neither demonstrated nor alleged that he suffered any injury from the destruction of his legal papers.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint and all claims alleged therein should be dismissed with prejudice for seeking monetary relief from immune defendants, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and as frivolous.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
All pending motions are hereby denied.
This dismissal shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996).
This dismissal does not release Plaintiff from the filing fee obligations previously imposed.
Plaintiff is advised that if he appeals this Order, he will be required to pay the appeal fee of $105.00 pursuant to the PLRA, and he must submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a 6-month Certificate of Inmate Trust Account at the same time he files his notice of appeal.
A copy of this Order shall be mailed to the Office of General Counsel, TDCJ-ID Litigation Support, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas 78711 and to TDCJ Local Funds Division, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville, Texas 77342-0629.