ANN. § 9:2780(A).See, e. g., King v. I.E. Miller of Eunice, Inc., 07-167, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/21/07); 970 So.2d 703, 707. The majority-of-the-work test appears to apply to all contractual obligations, even though generally accepted choice-of-law principles recognize that differing law may apply to differing provisions of a contract.
February 22, 2008. Prior report: La.App., 970 So.2d 703. In re Grey Wolf Drilling Company L.P.; — Other; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Calcasieu, 14th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 2001-3459; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 07-167.
All...issues of conventional obligations [other than formal validity and capacity of the parties] and are governed by the law expressly chosen or clearly relied upon by the parties, except to the extent that law contravenes the public policy of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable under Article 3537. In King v. I.E. Miller of Eunice, Inc., 07-167 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/21/07), 970 So. 2d 703, writ denied , 07-2460 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So. 2d 1285, the Third Circuit respected the parties’ agreement selecting Texas law and upheld a Texas contractor's indemnity obligation to its Louisiana subcontractor for an injury to the contractor's employee in Louisiana. The injured employee was a Louisiana resident, and the injury resulted from the negligence of the subcontractor's employees.
In King v. I.E. Miller of Eunice, Inc., 970 So.2d 703 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/21/07), writ denied, 07-2460 (La. 2/22/08), 976 So.2d 1285, the Third Circuit respected the parties' agreement selecting Texas law and upheld a Texas contractor's indemnity obligation to its Louisiana subcontractor for an injury to the contractor's employee in Louisiana. The injured employee was a Louisiana resident, and the injury resulted from the negligence of the subcontractor's employees. The Third Circuit observed that the Texas policy of allowing freedom of contract (embodied in the TOAIA) conflicted with the LOAIA's policy of protecting oilfield contractors from adhesionary indemnity obligations to oil companies, and that indemnity obligations of contractors to subcontractors were beyond the ambit of the LOAIA's protection.
It cites a Louisiana court of appeals decision holding that the LOAIA did not apply to an injury and claim for indemnity in Louisiana because the contractor accepted a master services agreement containing a Texas choice of law provision. See King v. I.E. Miller of Eunice, Inc., 970 So.2d 703, 704 (La. App. 2007) (applying Louisiana choice of law rules). But nothing in the King opinion indicates the contract contained a special provision relating to indemnity under Louisiana law like the one in the MSSA in this case.
Id. at 430. Sonat also relies on King v. I.E. Miller of Eunice, Inc., 970 So.2d 703, 704 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2007) (referring to LOAIA as "affirmative defense"), and Duet v. Falgout Offshore, LLC, 757 F.Supp.2d 598, 607 (E.D.La. 2010) (LOAIA does not "automatically apply to invalidate the indemnity agreement" when parties contemplated subsequent trial as part of their settlement agreement to determine liability), in support of its position that the LOAIA is an affirmative defense. While none of these decisions hold that the LOAIA must be pled as an affirmative defense, the LOAIA is treated as an affirmative defense.