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denying Kindred's requests for preliminary injunctive relief against individuals not before the district court because the district court could not provide relief against such individuals
Summary of this case from Jones v. ParamoOpinion
No. 17-17431
06-20-2018
RICHARD SCOTT KINDRED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARISA BIGOT; KENNETH BELL, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01652-AWI-MJS MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding Before: RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
California civil detainee Richard Scott Kindred appeals pro se from the district court's order denying his motions for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion. Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology Int'l, Inc. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kindred's requests for preliminary injunctive relief against Bell because Kindred failed to demonstrate that he would likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief. See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction); Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are "substantially identical"); Goldie's Bookstore v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury."); see also Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) ("In general, injunctive relief is to be used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kindred's requests for preliminary injunctive relief against individuals not before the district court because the district court could not provide relief against such individuals. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (federal courts "may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court").
We reject as unsupported by the record Kindred's contentions that defendants did not serve Kindred copies of defendants' motions to strike and that the district court failed to recognize Kindred is a civil detainee.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.