Summary
holding that hotel parking lot was a public place because public had access to drive through lot
Summary of this case from Gonzalez v. StateOpinion
No. 05-01-01818-CR
Opinion Filed November 18, 2003 DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 5, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MB-00-35210-F AFFIRM
Before Justices MORRIS, FITZGERALD, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Robert Andrew Kindle appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated. He raises three issues for our review, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, and both the legal and the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding that he was driving while intoxicated in a "public place." For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
The parties do not dispute the fundamental facts. Irving police officer Steve Plaster was patrolling the parking lot of the Budget Suites Hotel during the early morning of September_29, 2000. At approximately 12:40 a.m., Plaster observed a black truck, driven by Kindle, coming towards him at a high rate of speed. Although no speed limit was posted in the lot, Plaster testified the truck was traveling at a speed unsafe for the surrounding area. The parking lot contained many parked cars and "potential pedestrians." Plaster turned on his spotlight to signal the driver of the truck to slow down, but he did not. The truck passed Plaster, rounded the corner of the motel, and pulled into a parking stall at a high rate of speed. Plaster observed the truck's front wheels jump the curb which caused the truck to bounce; the truck went into reverse, then went back over the curb, shaking the truck; the truck pulled forward again, striking the curb and causing the truck to bounce around until it came to a stop. At that point, without activating any emergency lights, Plaster pulled his patrol car behind the truck so it could not leave. Kindle exited the truck (in which a male passenger rode) in a hurried fashion, shut the door and walked toward the back of the truck in the direction of the officer. He stumbled slightly and placed his hand on the truck to maintain his balance. As Kindle walked toward the back of his truck, the officer asked him if there was any problem that evening, to which Kindle responded that he had "no damn problem." The officer asked if he had been drinking that evening. Kindle replied that he had drunk a few beers, and that he was under twenty-one. (Kindle volunteered his age without being asked.) Plaster smelled a moderate odor of alcohol on Kindle's breath and observed that Kindle's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Plaster performed field sobriety tests on Kindle, determined he was intoxicated, and arrested him for driving while intoxicated.The Motion to Suppress
Kindle moved to suppress evidence of his intoxication, arguing that the evidence was gained as a result of an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion, citing the community caretaking doctrine as the basis for its decision. Kindle argues in his first issue that the State failed to prove both (a) that the officer's action in detaining Kindle was primarily motivated by the community caretaking function, and (b) the standards for establishing a legal justification for detaining Kindle under that function. The State argues the pre-arrest exchange between Plaster and Kindle was merely a consensual encounter, with no Fourth Amendment implications. In the alternative, the State argues a warrantless detention was justified on any of three grounds: the community caretaking function, a traffic violation, and reasonable suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Because the facts are undisputed, we review the denial of the motion de novo. See Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Stewart v. State, 22 S.W.3d 646, 648 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). As an appellate court, we must uphold the trial court's decision if it was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court gave an incorrect reason for its decision. See generally Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); see also Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (upholding denial of motion to suppress on alternative ground offered by State). Plaster testified that Kindle drove through the parking lot at a speed greater speed than was reasonable and prudent under the existing circumstances. In addition to observing the unsafe speed with which Kindle traversed the lot, Plaster also observed Kindle drive his truck across a wheel stop, forward and backward, causing the truck to bounce in a manner that "appeared unusual" and was "not normal practice." This conduct, taken together, amounted to the traffic violation of reckless driving. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §_545.401 (Vernon 1999); see Blount v. State, 965 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd) (probable cause for violation of statute included speeding in mall parking lot and jumping curbs). An officer may lawfully stop and detain a person when he witnesses a traffic violation. McVickers v. State, 874 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Finally, the entire circumstance of Kindle's driving that night also sufficed to give Plaster reasonable suspicion that Kindle was driving while intoxicated. An officer may detain a driver based on such reasonable suspicion. See Townsend v. State, 813 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet ref'd.). If we assume — without deciding — that the exchange between Kindle and Plaster amounted to a detention and not a mere consensual encounter, we nevertheless conclude that Kindle was lawfully detained. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Kindle's motion to suppress, and we decide Kindle's first issue against him.Sufficiency of the Evidence
A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if he operates a vehicle while intoxicated in a public place. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 49.04 (Vernon Supp. 2003). In his second and third issues, Kindle complains the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because the parking lot of the Budget Suites Hotel was not a "public place" within the meaning of the statute. In addressing a claim of legal insufficiency, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we neutrally analyze all of the evidence without the prism of in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We reverse only if we determine the proof of guilt is so weak or the contrary proof so overwhelming that it renders the guilty verdict clearly wrong and unjust. Id. The penal code defines "public place" to mean:any place to which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and [it] includes, but is not limited to, streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops.Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §_1.07(40) (Vernon 2003). Officer Plaster testified that the parking lot was a public place in his opinion because the public has full access to drive through the lot. He further testified that the lot has three separate entrances, and none of them was gated or otherwise constructed to keep someone out. Generally, according to Plaster, anyone could drive in and out of the parking lot at their will. Kindle called Edward Hardy, the general manager of the Budget Suites Hotel at issue, to testify. Hardy testified his "main duty is overseeing the hotel and making sure that the rooms are ready for the public to stay." (Emphasis added.) Hardy confirmed that the hotel parking lot was private property and agreed that anyone could come on the property, although "legally . . . access is denied to people that are not there for being a guest or a guest of a guest." Indeed, Hardy testified that part of the security performed by the Irving police on the hotel property was to keep the general public out. Nevertheless, Hardy agreed there was no gate to keep the public from getting into the hotel lot, and no one had to ask permission to drive through the lot. Finally, Hardy was read the legal definition of a public place: he agreed that the parking lot of the hotel was a common area, but thought the lot did not meet the legal definition because it was considered private property. We reject Kindle's reliance on the "private character of the property." The issue before us is not whether a non-guest could lawfully operate a vehicle in the parking lot in question. Nor is the fact the parking lot was privately owned dispositive. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 1.07(40) ("public place" includes common areas of apartments, office buildings, and shops). Rather, the only question is whether the parking lot was a place where the public or a substantial group of the public had access. See id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found the parking lot was a public place beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, having neutrally analyzed all the evidence, we conclude the proof of guilt is not so obviously weak nor the contrary proof so overwhelming that it renders the guilty verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Thus, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support Kindle's conviction. We decide his second and third issues against him.