Opinion
C. A 2:24-1966-CMC-SVH
07-26-2024
Audrey L. Kimner, Plaintiff, v. The State of South Carolina; Berkeley County South Carolina; and William J. Wylie, Jr., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Audrey L. Kimner (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint against the State of South Carolina, Berkeley County, and William J. Wylie, Jr. (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff's complaint is difficult to follow, as she asserts allegations from 2008, but fails to tie those allegations to any recent allegations. She states she entered into a contract with Berkeley County and the State of South Carolina in January and June 2012. [ECF No. 1 at 4]. However, she attaches only the first page of an arbitrated Child Custody, Support, and Property Settlement Agreement she appears to have entered into with her ex-husband. [ECF No. 11]. Plaintiff sues defendant Wylie related to a court order he signed as a judge. [ECF No. 1 at 7-8]. She does not provide a date for the alleged court order nor its contents.
On May 29, 2024, the undersigned issued orders (1) directing Plaintiff to submit documents necessary to bring this case into proper form and (2) advising Plaintiff of the deficiencies of her complaint and permitting her until June 18, 2024, to file an amended complaint. [ECF Nos. 8, 9]. Plaintiff has filed no responses.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Vague Allegations
While “a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007) (noting that federal courts cannot serve as “mind readers” or “advocates” for pro se litigants). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Here, despite a lengthy complaint, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient factual allegations showing she is entitled to relief. For example, Plaintiff's complaint states:
This case is filed in the proper jurisdiction under ADA Rights II & III with no remedy to date with ongoing evidence, new evidence, new case law, remands in the South Carolina Federal courts under The CA Privacy ACT concerning invasion of privacy, including new legislation for coercive control of the plaintiffs awarded assets and withheld awarded assets against federal laws.
[ECF No. 1 at 5 (errors in original)]. Plaintiff fails to provide any factual background as to how Defendants violated the ADA or breached a contract with her. Therefore, the undersigned recommends the complaint be summarily dismissed.
2. Judicial Immunity
Judge Wylie should be dismissed based on judicial immunity. It is well-settled that judges have immunity from claims arising out of their judicial actions. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). Judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, and such immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith. See Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'”) (citation omitted). As Plaintiff's claims against Judge Wylie relate to his judicial actions, he is entitled to absolute immunity.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed without further leave for amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”