Opinion
No. CV 04 0198723
February 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, John Kijek, was employed by the defendant, Westmore Fuel Company, Inc., as a licensed service technician. On or about July 11, 2003, the plaintiff's employment was terminated. The plaintiff alleges that subsequent to his termination he delivered a check to the defendant for continuation of his health insurance. According to the complaint, the defendant failed and refused to apply the check as requested resulting in the cancellation of the plaintiff's health insurance.
The plaintiff subsequently commenced the present action in five counts. Counts one through four are for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, respectively. In count five of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the failure and refusal of the defendant to ensure the continuation of the plaintiff's group health insurance violated the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA). At the end of the complaint the plaintiff makes a four-part claim for relief requesting money damages, statutory interest, punitive or exemplary damages, and such other relief as the court may deem proper.
The defendant moves (#103) to dismiss count five of the complaint on the ground that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear the COBRA claim brought by the defendant. The plaintiff contends that the matter is properly before the Superior Court because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear such claims.
"[A] motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St George v. Gordon, CT Page 3544 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 153, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004). Thus, "whenever a court discovers that [it] has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case." Cardi Materials Corp. v. Connecticut Landscaping Bruzzi Corp., 77 Conn.App. 578, 580, 823 A.2d 1271 (2003). "In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 250, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004).
State courts and federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear civil actions brought by participants or beneficiaries of a health insurance plan covered by COBRA. 29 U.S.C. 1132(e). A state court's jurisdiction is limited, however, to civil actions "to recover benefits due [a participant or beneficiary] under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan . . ." . . ." 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).
The defendant argues that count five should be dismissed because the plaintiff has requested relief beyond that allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). In support of this argument the defendant calls the court's attention to Thompson v. Bridgeport Hospital in which the court held that a Connecticut state court "does not have concurrent jurisdiction over a [COBRA claim when] the plaintiff has alleged a cause of action that is not wholly within the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) and 1132(a)(1)(B)." Thompson v. Bridgeport Hospital, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 98 352686 (June 18, 2001, Moran, J.). In Thompson v. Bridgeport Hospital, the plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint that included an alleged violation of the notice requirements of COBRA. The court granted the defendant's motion to strike the COBRA claim because the relief requested by the plaintiff went beyond that authorized by § 1132(a)(1)(B). The plaintiff in Thompson specifically requested enforcement of the penalty, fine and damages provisions of COBRA. No such relief has been requested here. The plaintiff in the present case has merely requested relief in addition to recovery of benefits due under the plan, that is available for the other four counts contained in the complaint. The court is not aware of any provision of the Practice Book or General Statutes that requires a plaintiff to specify which prayer for relief corresponds to individual counts in a multi-count complaint. The fact that statutory interest and exemplary and punitive damages are available on the other counts in the complaint but not for the COBRA claim does not deprive this court of jurisdiction for the COBRA claim. The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied.
See McPhail v. City of Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. 054506 (February 25, 1999, Thompson, J.) (noting that each type of relief requested in a prayer for relief at the end of a complaint does not necessarily correspond to each individual count); Patron v. Konover, 35 Conn.App. 504, 517, 646 A.2d 901 (1994) (statutory interest is recoverable on a claim of breach of contract and accrues from the date the contract was breached); Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 811, 614 A.2d 414 (1992) (recognizing that an award of exemplary and punitive damages may properly be considered by a jury on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
So Ordered.
William B. Lewis, Judge.