Summary
granting release of person held under § 1226(c) pursuant to inherent authority under Mapp
Summary of this case from Rosemond v. DeckerOpinion
18 Civ. 1584 (AT)
03-02-2018
Ramatu KIADII, Petitioner, v. Thomas DECKER, in his official capacity as New York Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Thomas D. Homan in his official capacity as Deputy Director and Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Nathalie Asher, in her official capacity as Acting Assistant Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ; Kirstjen Nielsen, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; James McHenry, in his official capacity as Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review; Tracy Short in his official capacity as Principal Legal Advisor for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Jefferson Sessions III, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Respondents.
Gregory Paul Copeland, Jennifer Ann Williams, Perry McAninch, The Legal Aid Society (Manhattan), New York, NY, for Petitioner. Brandon Matthew Waterman, United States Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for Respondents.
Gregory Paul Copeland, Jennifer Ann Williams, Perry McAninch, The Legal Aid Society (Manhattan), New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Brandon Matthew Waterman, United States Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for Respondents.
ORDER
ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:
The law has long recognized that to be a citizen of the United States is to have "a right no less precious than life or liberty." Kungys v. United States , 485 U.S. 759, 784, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Klapprott v. United States , 335 U.S. 601, 616–17, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result)). Petitioner Ramatu Kiadii seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that she is a United States citizen who has been put into alien removal proceedings in violation of her most precious rights. Petition, ECF No. 1. She further requests to be released from detention pending the Court's resolution of her habeas petition. Id. at 14. The Government opposes her request. Gov't Letter, ECF No. 6. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner's request to be released pending the petition's resolution is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION
As the Government concedes, Gov't Letter, at 3, the Court's authority to release habeas corpus petitioners during the pendency of their petitions is governed by Mapp v. Reno , 241 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2001) ; see also Elkimya v. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 484 F.3d 151, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the REAL ID Act of 2005 "did not qualify our inherent authority to admit to bail petitioners in immigration cases"). Under Mapp , "a court considering a habeas petitioner's fitness for bail must inquire into whether ‘the habeas petition raises substantial claims and whether extraordinary circumstances exist that make the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.’ " Id. at 230 (alterations omitted) (quoting Iuteri v. Nardoza , 662 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1981) ).
For the purposes of a Mapp inquiry, "the Court considers three factors: (1) whether substantial claims are set forth in the habeas corpus petition; (2) whether the petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his or her petition; and (3) whether there are extraordinary circumstances attending the petitioner's situation which would require release on bail in order to make the writ of habeas corpus effective." Boddie v. New York State Div. of Parole , No. 08 Civ. 9287, 2009 WL 1531595, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2009).
First, there can be no question that the habeas petition raises "substantial claims." If Petitioner's claim that she is a United States citizen is true, then her detention by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is a clear deprivation of constitutional rights. As an agency dedicated to law enforcement against noncitizens, the law does not permit ICE to detain a citizen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (permitting the arrest and detention of "alien[s]"); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining "alien" as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States").
Second, Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. Petitioner argues that she obtained derative citizenship by operation of law under former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a), the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") in force at the time of Petitioner's birth in 1972. Under that provision, a minor child born abroad to noncitizen parents automatically becomes a citizen if (1) "the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents" naturalizes, and (2) "[s]uch child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent." 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3)-(5).
Petitioner supports her argument with a number of exhibits, establishing her parents' marriage in Liberia, see ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, her birth in Liberia, see ECF No. 1-6, her parents' separation, see ECF Nos. 1-2 & 1-3, her move from Liberia to live with her father in the United States, at age 10, see ECF Nos. 1-2 & 1-3, her father's naturalization, at age 14, see ECF No. 1-13, and her parents' remarriages to new spouses, ECF Nos. 1-17 & 8-2. The Government does not refute Petitioner's evidence, offer counter-evidence, or provide any explanation or analysis for its single, conclusory assertion that Petitioner's evidence is not "probative." Gov't Letter, at 4 ("ICE has reviewed the petitioner's citizenship claim and has determined that the petitioner has failed to state a probative claim to U.S. citizenship."). Whatever the Government's rationale, the Court disagrees, concluding that Petitioner has a high probability of success on the merits.
Third, "extraordinary circumstances" exist that render release necessary. Indeed, the Court wonders if the Mapp court could have imagined circumstances more extraordinary than the detention of a woman credibly claiming United States citizenship by none other than the immigration authorities. The Government's arguments that the habeas petition does not present an "extraordinary circumstance" or support it with evidence is so mystifying that it practically shocks the conscience. Gov't Letter, at 4.
Instead, the Government looks to other circuits to argue that courts generally consider only health complications, unusual delay, and the quickly-approaching end to a term of incarceration as "extraordinary circumstances." Gov't Letter, at 3–4. Even if "extraordinary circumstances" were so narrowly limited, the Government's argument still fails. Petitioner has presented evidence that her health has detoriorated while in ICE's custody. Medical Records, ECF No. 8-3. A lump in her breast that has been twice removed in the past has now "reformed," leading to "very severe pain," id. at 32, which has been treated only with ibuprofen, id. at 34. The fact of Petitioner's deteroriating health, therefore, supports her request for release.
The Court is mindful that the power to grant bail to habeas petitioners "is a limited one, to be exercised in special cases only." Mapp , 241 F.3d at 226. But Petitioner has presented such a case, amply demonstrating that release is necessary.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner's request is GRANTED. The Department of Justice and the Warden of the Hudson County Correctional Facility, 30-35 Hackensack Ave., Kearny, NJ 07032, are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner, Ramatu Kiadii (A number: 097 421 333), on her personal recognizance pending the Court's resolution of her habeas petition.
SO ORDERED.