Opinion
2020–04436 Index No. 5467/17
04-19-2023
In the Matter of Mohammad M. KHAN, petitioner, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, respondent.
Cartier, Bernstein, Auerbach & Steinberg, P.C., Patchogue, NY (Robert G. Steinberg of counsel), for petitioner. Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, NY (Judith N. Vale and Amit R. Vora of counsel), for respondent.
Cartier, Bernstein, Auerbach & Steinberg, P.C., Patchogue, NY (Robert G. Steinberg of counsel), for petitioner.
Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, NY (Judith N. Vale and Amit R. Vora of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JANICE A. TAYLOR, JJ.
DECISION & JUDGMENT Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board dated September 25, 2017, affirming a determination of an administrative law judge dated April 27, 2017, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600(1)(a) by leaving the scene of an incident without reporting and revoked his driver license.
ADJUDGED that the determination dated September 25, 2017, is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
In order to annul an administrative determination made after a hearing, a court must conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination (see Matter of Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d 32, 38, 724 N.Y.S.2d 680, 747 N.E.2d 1280 ; Matter of Mannino v. Department of Motor Vehs. of State of N.Y.-Traffic Violations Div., 101 A.D.3d 880, 956 N.Y.S.2d 120 ). Substantial evidence is "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" ( 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180, 408 N.Y.S.2d 54, 379 N.E.2d 1183 ). It is "less than a preponderance of the evidence" and "demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable" ( Matter of Haug v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 32 N.Y.3d 1044, 1045–1046, 87 N.Y.S.3d 146, 112 N.E.3d 323 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Noonan v. Chong, 186 A.D.3d 713, 714, 127 N.Y.S.3d 305 ). " ‘The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [an administrative agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists’ " ( Matter of Berenhaus v. Ward, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 444, 522 N.Y.S.2d 478, 517 N.E.2d 193, quoting Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 267, 26 N.E.2d 247 ; see Matter of Hildreth v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 83 A.D.3d 838, 839, 921 N.Y.S.2d 137 ).
Here, the determination that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600(1)(a) by leaving the scene of an incident without reporting is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ. of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 N.Y.2d 222, 231–232, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 ). Hearsay evidence, such as the testimony of the police officer in this case who issued the simplified information/complaint to the petitioner, can be the basis of an administrative determination (see Matter of Gray v. Adduci, 73 N.Y.2d 741, 742, 536 N.Y.S.2d 40, 532 N.E.2d 1268 ; Matter of Andresen v. State of N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehs., 227 A.D.2d 617, 618, 643 N.Y.S.2d 598 ; Matter of Butler v. Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn., 175 A.D.2d 159, 161, 572 N.Y.S.2d 50 ).
The petitioner's remaining contentions are not properly before this Court, as they were not raised in the administrative hearing (see Matter of Gonzalez v. State Liq. Auth., 30 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 331 N.Y.S.2d 6, 282 N.E.2d 101 ; Matter of Mannino v. Department of Motor Vehs. of State of N.Y.-Traffic Violations Div., 101 A.D.3d at 881–882, 956 N.Y.S.2d 120 ).
RIVERA, J.P., MILLER, CHRISTOPHER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.