Generally, acts of sexual abuse involve acts of touching, and hence are battery actions. See id.; K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo. banc 1996). In this case, the petition itself and the recitation in plaintiff's brief show that, as far as the claims of sexual abuse, we are dealing with battery claims.

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress as alleged in Count III should be dismissed as Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the elements necessary to state such a cause of action. In particular, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the necessary element that Captain Mitchell's actions were initiated with the sole intent of causing her emotional harm. Doc. 19, Mem. at 12 (citing K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795, 799-800 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). Further, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress must fail because this allegation is wholly dependent on her underlying sexual assault allegation.

For intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress, if based on conduct independent of the battery claim, the statute of limitations is five years. See sections 516.120(4), RSMo Supp. 1999; K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795, 799-800 (Mo.banc 1996). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress are dependent upon the same conduct as the battery claim.

For intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress, if based on conduct independent of the battery claim, the statute of limitations is five years. See section 516.120(4), RSMo Supp. 1999; K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795, 799-800 (Mo.banc 1996). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress are dependent upon the same conduct as the battery claim.

However, the allegations do not support a claim that Father Brewer acted negligently. This issue is strikingly similar to that presented in K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. banc 1996). In that case, the plaintiff argued,inter alia, that she alleged a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on her allegations that the defendant engaged in offensive sexual contact by manipulating her genitals with his mouth and fingers.

a plaintiff must plead extreme and outrageous conduct by a defendant who intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress that results in bodily harm. K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. banc 1996). The conduct must have been "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

However, the Missouri courts have explained that this element applies “where one's conduct amounts to the commission of a traditional tort [.]” Diehl v. Fred Weber, Inc., 309 S.W.3d 309, 322 (Mo.Ct.App.2010) (emphasis added) (citing K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo.1996) (en banc)). In such a scenario, if the alleged conduct “was not intended only to cause extreme emotional distress to the victim, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress will not lie and recovery must be had under the appropriate traditional tort action.”

"A petition's mere mention of the word, 'negligence,' does not trigger a duty to defend where the factual allegations forming the 'negligence' claim demonstrate intentional conduct." Brand, 414 S.W.3d at 553; see also K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). It does not matter that the Does allege Nelson was also somehow negligent in "providing Jane Doe with items in exchange for her trust."

"A petition's mere mention of the word, 'negligence,' does not trigger a duty to defend where the factual allegations forming the 'negligence' claim demonstrate intentional conduct." Brand, 414 S.W.3d at 553; see also K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). The allegations supporting Count V - including the Common Facts - "'contradict any possibility that [Nelson's] conduct was mere negligence.'"

"Where a defendant's conduct amounts to the commission of one of the traditional torts, such as battery, and the conduct was not intended only to cause extreme emotional distress to the victim, the tort of intentional emotional distress will not lie, and recovery must be had under the appropriate traditional common law action." K.G. v. R.T.R., 918 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). "The rationale for this rule is that the tort (intentional infliction of emotional distress) was `intended to supplement existing forms of recovery, not swallow them.'"