Opinion
NO. 03-16-00127-CV
11-10-2016
Keystone RV Company, Appellant v. Texas Department of Motor Vehicles, Appellee
DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION OF THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We previously abated this cause on the parties' agreed motion pending our disposition of Cause No. 03-15-00644-CV, Keystone RV Company v. Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (Keystone I). Today we have decided Keystone I, and we lift the abatement. And Keystone I dictates our disposition of the present cause.
See Keystone RV Co. v. Texas Dep't of Motor Vehicles, No. 03-16-00127-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 4951 (Tex. App.—Austin May 11, 2016, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam).
See Keystone RV Co. v. Texas Dep't of Motor Vehicles, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 03-15-00644-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10, 2016, no. pet. h.).
Both proceedings are direct appeals brought under color of Occupations Code Section 2301.751(a). In both, Keystone RV Company has attempted to challenge certain requirements imposed by the Department in an order dismissing a "Lemon Law" complaint. In Keystone I, we have concluded that we lack jurisdiction to review the dismissal order under the current version of Section 2301.751(a) and, accordingly, have dismissed Keystone's appeal. Our holdings in Keystone I similarly foreclose Keystone's attempt to invoke our jurisdiction here, and indeed the parties have previously stipulated that the present cause is "factually and legally identical" to Keystone I so as to be squarely controlled by that decision.
See id., slip op. at 20-25.
In fact, Keystone's attempt to invoke our jurisdiction here is more tenuous than in Keystone I because the final order in this case was signed by a subordinate hearing examiner. In Keystone I, the linchpin of Keystone's jurisdictional theory was that the order in that case had been signed by the Department's Chief Hearing Examiner, who in Keystone's view qualified as a "director" of a Department "division" with delegated final-order authority under Occupations Code Section 2301.154(c), thereby making the order one "of the board" and subject to review under Section 2301.751(a). See id. at 18-25. Keystone did not appear to question that an order signed by a mere subordinate hearing officer would not ordinarily be subject to review under Section 2301.751(a). See id. at 20-21 ("As Keystone seems to acknowledge, the Legislature . . . has not seen fit to deem final orders issued by Lemon Law hearings examiners under color of amended Section 2301.704 alone to be "of the board" or to otherwise provide for their review through Section 2301.751(a)."). --------
We grant the Department's motion and dismiss Keystone's petition for want of jurisdiction.
/s/_________
Bob Pemberton, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton, and Field Dismissed for Want of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Filed: November 10, 2016