Summary
In Keystone Lead Company v. Frechie, 94 Pa. Super. 395, under circumstances quite similar to the one we are considering, we held that the matter of defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence were questions of fact for the jury.
Summary of this case from Fry v. DeritoOpinion
October 9, 1928.
November 21, 1928.
Negligence — Automobiles — Collision — Right angle street intersection — Evidence — Case for jury.
In an action of trespass to recover damages resulting from a collision between two automobiles at a right angle street intersection, the evidence disclosed that the collision occurred late at night. When plaintiff's driver reached the curb line of the intersecting street he saw defendant's automobile approaching on his right about eighty to a hundred feet away. He continued to cross the intersection at about 15 miles an hour and was struck by defendant's car before he had completed the crossing. A disinterested witness, called by plaintiff, fixed the speed of defendant's car at 40 to 45 miles an hour.
Under such circumstances the case was for the jury and a verdict for the plaintiff will be sustained.
Defendant's car being visible only by its lights, its speed was not so apparent to plaintiff's driver as to require the court to hold, as a matter of law, that he was guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to cross a street 20 or 22 feet wide in front of a car 80 or 100 feet away; and when once committed to the crossing he could not be held negligent, as a matter of law, for proceeding ahead.
Appeal No. 125, October T., 1928, by defendant from judgment of M.C., Philadelphia County, February T., 1927, No. 1170, in the case of Keystone Lead Company, a corporation, v. M.J. Frechie.
Before PORTER, P.J., HENDERSON, TREXLER, KELLER, LINN, GAWTHROP and CUNNINGHAM, JJ. Affirmed.
Trespass for damages to an automobile. Before GLASS, P.J., and KNOWLES, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.
Verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $107.75 and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned was the refusal of defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.
Louis Wagner, and with him Richard A. Smith, for appellant.
Victor H. Blanc, for appellee.
Argued October 9, 1928.
Action in trespass for damages to automobile in collision with another automobile at intersecting streets.
The jury found for the plaintiff. Hence in passing on this appeal we must consider the evidence in the case on both sides, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Doing so, we think the case was for the jury.
Plaintiff's driver was coming south on York Road, approaching Roosevelt Boulevard. Roosevelt Boulevard at this point is divided into three drives separated by grass plots. At the intersection with York Road, the north drive is called Cayuga Street, then comes a grass plot 15 feet wide; then the middle drive, twenty or twenty-two feet wide; then another grass plot; and then the south drive. As he came to the north drive, or Cayuga Street, he stopped to let a car go by westward, then traveling in second gear he crossed Cayuga Street, and when the front of his car was at the north curb line of the middle drive, looked in both directions and saw defendant's car approaching from the west, on the middle drive, about 80 to 100 feet away. Still traveling in second gear, at about 15 miles an hour, he proceeded to cross the middle drive and when he was nearly across, and his front wheels were on a line with the south curb line, was struck in the right rear by defendant's car traveling rapidly eastward. Plaintiff's driver did not state how fast defendant was traveling. A disinterested witness called by the plaintiff fixed the speed at forty or forty-five miles an hour. The defendant and his father said they were traveling about fifteen miles an hour. It was late at night and difficult, in consequence, to judge of the speed of an approaching car visible only by its lights. Its speed was not so apparent to plaintiff's driver as to require the court to hold as a matter of law that he was guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to cross a street twenty or twenty-two feet wide in front of a car eighty to a hundred feet away; and when once committed to the crossing, he could not be held negligent as a matter of law for proceeding ahead. To stop in the middle of the drive would have resulted in certain injury. The defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence were questions of fact for the jury.
Appellant's only complaint is the court's refusal to give binding instructions in his favor or enter judgment for him non obstante veredicto.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.