However, a decree in divorce may be supported by the testimony of the plaintiff alone. Kett v. Kett, 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509. The plaintiff is a registered nurse and was employed as such prior to the marriage.

A decree in divorce may be supported by the testimony of the libellant alone. Kett v. Kett, 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509; Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 111 Pa. Super. 191, 169 A. 408. The master believed the testimony of the libellant to be true. Apparently, the court below agreed, and from a reading of the record we have no cause to doubt its veracity. In its opinion, the court below stated, ". . .

The evidence comes far short of establishing such a course of conduct by the wife as to render his condition intolerable and life burdensome. See Brown v. Brown, 124 Pa. Super. 237, 188 A. 389; Sharp v. Sharp, 106 Pa. Super. 33, 161 A. 453; Kett v. Kett, 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509. Not only so, but there was the testimony of the respondent and several witnesses to the effect that when the parties were living together the libellant was frequently intoxicated, and the wife attributed their troubles to that fact. Indignities provoked by the complaining party are no ground for divorce unless the retaliation is excessive: Richards v. Richards, 37 Pa. 225, 228; Kerr v. Kerr, 115 Pa. Super. 18, 22, 174 A. 820. The most that could be said for libellant's evidence was that it showed incompatibility between the parties, but that is not a ground for divorce in this Commonwealth.

By section II, paragraph (d) of the Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1237, a divorce from bed and board may be obtained by the wife whenever the husband has "offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable and life burdensome" — the same ground for which an absolute divorce may be granted to the injured or innocent spouse. The proof required in a divorce from bed and board must be as clearly established as in an application for absolute divorce. "Such indignities, we have frequently said, `may consist of vulgarity, unmerited reproach, habitual contumely, studied neglect, intentional incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, malignant ridicule, and every other plain manifestation of settled hate and estrangement; but slight or irregular acts of misconduct are not sufficient': Breene v. Breene, 76 Pa. Super. 568": Mathias v. Mathias, 114 Pa. Super. 444, 174 A. 821; Kett v. Kett, 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509. Upon our independent examination of the testimony, we conclude that the court below was correct in dismissing the libel, but we do not believe that the happiness of the parties will be promoted by detailing all of the testimony and shall, therefore, only mention what we regard as the high spots.

Libellant may not have been entirely free from blame, and his conduct may not always have been above reproach, but respondent's conduct was such that it constituted one of continued indignities, and we cannot conclude from the evidence that such conduct was provoked by libellant so as to defeat his right to a decree. See Andrew v. Andrew, 121 Pa. Super. 152, 182 A. 706; Brown v. Brown, 124 Pa. Super. 237, 188 A. 389; Kettv. Kett, 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509. The weight of the credible evidence is with libellant, as shown by the record. The evidence, however, does not establish or show actual personal violence or reasonable apprehension of it so that libellant's life was endangered and cohabitation rendered unsafe.

It is not with isolated occurrences that the law concerns itself in determining whether a divorce should be granted upon the ground of indignities, but of such a course of conduct, so repeated and so continuous, as to render the complaining party's condition intolerable and life burdensome: Esenwein v. Esenwein, 312 Pa. 77, 167 A. 350. "Such indignities, we have frequently said, `may consist of vulgarity, unmerited reproach, habitual contumely, studied neglect, intentional incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, malignant ridicule, and every other plain manifestation of settled hate and estrangement; but slight or irregular acts of misconduct are not sufficient': Breene v. Breene, 76 Pa. Super. 568 ": Mathias v. Mathias, 114 Pa. Super. 444, 174 A. 821; Kett v. Kett, 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509. "In considering whether there is that `clear and satisfactory evidence of the wrong which the law treats as justifying cause for a divorce . . . . . . the court must be informed what the respondent has done; not what witnesses may conclude, or what they may regard as the character of the conduct': . . . . . . General expressions `are of no value unless accompanied by the actual facts on which these assertions are based.

Putt v. Putt, 118 Pa. Super. 74, 180 A. 92. Our examination of the testimony convinces us that the decree cannot be granted on that ground. "It has been repeatedly stated that `it is impossible to lay down a general rule for the determination of what indignities render the condition of the injured party intolerable. It has been held by many courts (see 14 Cyc. 623) that they may consist of vulgarity, unmerited reproach, habitual contumely, studied neglect, intentional incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, malignant ridicule, and every other plain manifestation of settled hate and estrangement; but slight or irregular acts of misconduct are not sufficient'": Sharp v.Sharp, 106 Pa. Super. 33, at page 35, 161 A. 453, at page 454. See, also, Kett v. Kett, 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509; Putt v. Putt, supra; Hagan v. Hagan, 120 Pa. Super. 582, 182 A. 654; Sleight v. Sleight, supra; Upperman v. Upperman, 119 Pa. Super. 341, 181 A. 252. Although we are of the opinion that the evidence establishes such a course of conduct or continued treatment as to render libellant's condition intolerable and life burdensome, and that he is entitled to a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on that ground, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the testimony does not establish cruel and barbarous treatment.

We are of the same opinion as the master and the court below in concluding that in the main the evidence of the husband should be accepted, that the conduct of the wife consisted of "unmerited reproach, habitual contumely, studied neglect, intentional incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, and other plain manifestations of settled hate and estrangement." This constituted a course of conduct and not having been provoked by the husband constituted indignities as that phrase is used in the Divorce Act: Sharp v. Sharp, 106 Pa. Super. 33, 35, 161 A. 453; Kett v. Kett, 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509. After reading all of the testimony we are unable to see how it would be possible to come to a different conclusion. We do not labor under the delusion that the husband was a paragon in respect to his conduct, but place the responsibility for the violent disagreements on the shoulders of the wife.

Let a decree be entered accordingly." The husband appealed to this court from the decrees entered in each case and, after argument, the order and decree of the court of common pleas were, on March 13, 1935, affirmed ( 117 Pa. Super. 236, 177 A. 509) in the following language: "The decree of the court awarding a divorce to Grace Adele Kett is affirmed, and the order of the court dismissing the libel of Russell C. Kett is affirmed at costs of appellant."