We have held that redemption statutes must be construed liberally in favor of the landowner. Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576 (1941). Bearing in mind what we have discussed above, especially our discussion on long-recognized principles of statutory construction, forfeiture, and redemption, let us now examine closely the provisions of Section 7-38-66(C).
See Cooley Taxation, 4th Ed., Sec. 1574. See also Fernandez Co. v. Montoya, 42 N.M. 524, 82 P.2d 289, 118 A.L.R. 573; Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 134 A.L.R. 1290; Gammill v. Mann, 41 N.M. 552, 72 P.2d 12. The facts upon which the defendant claimed his right to redeem are as follows:
A tax payer has the right to rely upon the representations and acts of the chancery clerk when redeeming land from tax sale or sales and a request in good faith to be permitted to pay all taxes due on certain property includes an offer to redeem from all unmatured tax sales shown by the records in that office. 61 C.J. 1290 Sec. 1794; Kershner v. Sganzini (N.M.) 113 P.2d 576; Jones v. Sturzenberg (Cal.) 210 P. 835; Bubb v. Thompkins, 47 Pa. 359; McLain v. Meletio, 166 Miss. 1, 147 So. 878. Where the property of a land owner has been sold for taxes for two consecutive years to individuals and before the maturity of either sale such owner offers to pay the taxes on such property and pays the sum required by the officer entrusted and charged with the duty of informing the public the amount necessary to redeem and it develops, after the time for redemption was passed, that the officer failed to include one of the tax sales in the redemption, the chancery clerk is without authority to convey the property to the tax purchaser, whether the failure to collect the redemption money for the other sale was arbitrary or unintentional. Noble v. Bullis, 23 Iowa 559, 92 Am. Dec. 442; Shuptrine v. Wohl Holding Corp. (Fla.) 3 So.2d 524; Coker v. Kelly, 197 Miss. 131, 19 So.2d 519; Beauchamp v. McLaughlin, 200 Miss. 83, 25 So.2d 771; McNatt v. Hyman (Miss.)
Miller v. Casey, 176 Mich. 221, 142 N.W. 589; Alywin v. Morley, 41 Mont. 191, 108 P. 778; Wilcoxon v. Wilcoxon, 199 Ill. 244, 65 N.E. 229. In Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 581, 134 A.L.R. 1290, this court considered a very similar tax case. A tax sale was held in 1936 for the 1935 taxes.
We come now to consider the New Mexico cases. In Kershner et al. v. Sganzini et al., 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 579, 134 A.L.R. 1290, which was a suit to quiet title, the question was whether a tax sale was valid. We said in that case:
We assume, but do not decide, that this statute is inapplicable to the case at bar because a question arises as to whether payment of redemption money is the payment of taxes. In Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 134 A.L.R. 1290, it was suggested that under some circumstances we had made no distinction between paying delinquent taxes and redeeming from outstanding tax sale certificates. However, as above stated, we do not here base our decision upon a view that redemption sale certificates in the hands of others than the State, is payment of taxes.
Now it is proposed to open with the key of estoppel the door to this bulwark of protection so long afforded the wives of this state against efforts by any husband so disposed to rob them of it. It is my candid judgment if the majority opinion remains the law, another decade will see the questioned statute so whittled away by cases relying on estoppel as to rob it of any effectiveness for all practical purposes. Witness what has happened to the delinquent tax law since this Court in Scudder v. Hart, 45 N.M. 76, 110 P.2d 536, and Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 134 A.L.R. 1290, extended by interpretation the fraud declared sufficient to defeat a tax title to embrace "constructive fraud." The flood of cases following demonstrates what can happen to a statute once the key of estoppel is turned in the door locked for its protection.
The case would not come within the rule laid down in Scudder v. Hart, 45 N.M. 76, 110 P.2d 536, where the taxpayer who tried to pay his taxes was misled by information given by the County Treasurer to the effect that no other or further taxes than those then being settled for were due, which was held to be constructive fraud. Upon the subject of tax sale and redemption right generally, see also: Foster v. Bennett, 44 N.M. 618, 107 P.2d 321; Hughes v. Raney, 45 N.M. 89, 110 P.2d 544; Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 134 A.L.R. 1290. Had it been pleaded that the Assessor had refused to accept an assessment or to permit appellant to render his lot for taxation, another question would be presented, perhaps.
Appellant concedes the general rule to be that the right of redemption from a tax sale is to be governed and determined by the law in force at the time of the sale, which, in this case, was the 1934 Tax Act. The appellant, however, contends that the 1934 Tax Act either in its unamended state or as amended by L. 1937, Ch. 215, gave him a preference right to repurchase the lands from the State Tax Commission which could not be taken from him by a subsequent legislative act. Appellant cites the recent case of Kershner et al. v. Sganzini et al., 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 134 A.L.R. 1290, in support of his proposition. Although, in the case of Kershner v. Sganzini, supra, we did point out that Section 30 of the 1934 Tax Act provides a preferential right of repurchase, we did not hold in that case that such preferential right could not be repealed by the Legislature.
Tabets had a right to rely on her representations. See Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576 (1941). As principal, the State was bound by the county treasurer's acceptance of Tabets' payment.