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holding that "the district court properly dismissed Kerr's 15 U.S.C. § 1692d claim because his complaint alleged that Dubowsky's May 2001 call was `unwanted' but failed to allege facts that it was intended to `harass, oppress, or abuse'"
Summary of this case from Harvey v. Great Seneca Financial Corp.Opinion
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 36-3)
Debtor brought action alleging that attorney violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) while attempting to recover credit card debt debtor owed to issuing bank. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Philip M. Pro, J., entered judgment dismissing the action, and debtor appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) claims under the false or misleading representations and the validation of debt provisions of the FDCPA were time-barred, and (2) complaint failed to state claims for violations of the ceasing communication and the harassment or abuse provisions of the FDCPA.
Affirmed.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Philip M. Pro, District Judge, Presiding.
Before LEAVY, HAWKINS, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Thomas M. Kerr appeals pro se the district court's judgment dismissing his action
Page 657.
alleging that attorney Peter Dubowsky ("Dubowksy") violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, while attempting to recover credit card debt Kerr owed to Citibank. We review de novo both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815, 816 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Kerr's 15 U.S.C. § 1692e claim and properly granted summary judgment on Kerr's 15 U.S.C. § 1692g claims because he failed to file his suit within one year of Dubowsky's alleged violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); see also Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that when the alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692(b) is the filing of a lawsuit, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the lawsuit is filed).
The district court properly dismissed Kerr's 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) claim because Kerr's complaint did not allege that he disputed the debt in writing or requested Dubowsky to cease communications with him. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). The district court properly dismissed Kerr's 15 U.S.C. § 1692d claim because his complaint alleged that Dubowsky's May 2001 call was "unwanted" but failed to allege facts that it was intended to "harass, oppress, or abuse." See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.
We decline to consider Kerr's contention that he was denied discovery because he neither moved for additional time to conduct discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) nor demonstrated that the information he sought would have precluded summary judgment. See Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 751 (9th Cir.2001).
AFFIRMED.