Kentucky Unemp. Ins. Com'n v. Henry Fischer Pack

10 Citing cases

  1. London v. Dept. of Employment

    161 W. Va. 575 (W. Va. 1978)   Cited 16 times
    In London v. Board of Review, 244 S.E.2d 331 (W.Va. 1978), the court explained that the standard of reasonableness as applied to a work search requirement varies with the nature of the work.

    See, Texas Employment Commission v. Holberg, supra, in which the quotation above was used to support a requirement that an unemployed Texan must personally make a reasonably diligent search for work. Also see, McCormick v. Henry Koerber, Inc., Fla.App., 252 So.2d 599 (1971); Florida Industrial Comm. v. Ciarlante, Fla., 84 So.2d 1 (1955); Claim of Sapp, Idaho, 266 P.2d 1027 (1954); Stricklin v. Annunzio, 413 Ill. 324, 109 N.E.2d 183 (1952); Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762 (1951); Kentucky Unemp. Ins. Com'n. v. Henry Fischer Pack. Co., Ky., 259 S.W.2d 436 (1953); Bingham v. American Screw Products Co., 398 Mich. 546, 248 N.W.2d 537 (1976); Capra v. Carpenter Paper Company, 258 Minn. 456, 104 N.W.2d 532 (1960); Mills v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission, 228 Miss. 789, 89 So.2d 727 (1956); Worsnop v. Bd. of Rev., Div. of Emp. Sec., 92 N.J. Super. 260, 223 A.2d 38 (1966); In re Thomas, 13 N.C. App. 513, 186 S.E.2d 623 (1972) (opinion of Judge Graham, concuring in part and dissenting in part); Hyman v. South Carolina Employment Security Commission, 234 S.C. 369, 108 S.E.2d 554 (1959); Redd v. Texas Employment Commission, Tex. Civ. App. 431 S.W.2d 16 (1968). But there are many problems of fair and equal treatment of unemployed persons that arise from a blanket requirement that all who seek the benefits of the act must be personally job-hunting.

  2. Ellis v. Employment Security Agency

    358 P.2d 396 (Idaho 1961)   Cited 9 times

    "`The availability requirement is said to be satisfied when an individual is willing, able, and ready to accept suitable work which he does not have good cause to refuse, that is, when he is genuinely attached to the labor market.' * * *" Hunter v. Miller, 148 Neb. 402, 27 N.W.2d 638, 640. See also Claim of Sapp, supra; Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762, 24 A.L.R.2d 1393; Leonard v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 148 Ohio St. 419, 75 N.E.2d 567; Kontner v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 148 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E.2d 611; Boyer v. Bd. of Review, 4 N.J. Super. 143, 66 A.2d 543; Shellhammer v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 162 Pa. Super. 327, 57 A.2d 439; Claim of Jackson, 68 Idaho 360, 195 P.2d 344; Stricklin v. Annunzio, 413 Ill. 324, 109 N.E.2d 183; Schettino v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 138 Conn. 253, 83 A.2d 217; Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm. v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., Ky., 259 S.W.2d 436. A claimant may render himself unavailable for work by imposing conditions and limitations as to employment, so as to bar his recovery of unemployment compensation, since a willingness to be employed conditionally does not necessarily meet the test of availability. 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 204, p. 304.

  3. Davis v. Hix

    140 W. Va. 398 (W. Va. 1954)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that "[u]nemployment compensation statutes, being remedial in nature, should be liberally construed to achieve the benign purposes intended to the full extent thereof"

    In Fleiszig v. Board of Review of Division of Unemployment Compensation of Department of Labor, 104 N.E.2d 818, 821, 412 Ill. 49, it was held that the phrase "available for work" in a statute requiring an unemployed person to be "available for work" in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits, is designed to test such person's continued and current attachment to labor force. To the same effect are Walton v. Wilhelm, (Ind.), 91 N.E.2d 373; Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Commission v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., (Ky.), 259 S.W.2d 436, 440; Schettino v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 83 A.2d 217, 220, 221, 138 Conn. 253. However, Code, 21A-6-6, provides that: "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions: (1) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute * * *."

  4. Claim of Sapp

    266 P.2d 1027 (Idaho 1954)   Cited 30 times

    Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762, 24 A.L.R.2d 1393; Leonard v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Ohio St. 419, 75 N.E.2d 567; Kontner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 148 Ohio St. 614, 76 N.E.2d 611; Boyer v. Board of Review, 4 N.J. Super. 143, 66 A.2d 543; Hunter v. Miller, 148 Neb. 402, 27 N.W.2d 638; Shellhammer v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 162 Pa. Super. 327, 57 A.2d 439; Dwyer v. Appeal Board, 321 Mich. 178, 32 N.W.2d 434. See also Claim of Jackson, 68 Idaho 360, 195 P.2d 344; Stricklin v. Annunzio, 413 Ill. 324, 109 N.E.2d 183; Walton v. Wilhelm, 120 Ind. App. 218, 91 N.E.2d 373; Schettino v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 138 Conn. 253, 83 A.2d 217; Kentucky Unemp. Ins. Comm. v. Henry Fischer Pack. Co., Ky., 259 S.W.2d 436; Maney v. Unemployment Comp. Act (Conn.), Vol. 2, CCH Unemp.Ins.Rep., Sec. 8336; Biscontini v. Board of Review (Ill.) Vol. 3, CCH Unemp.Ins.Rep., Sec. 8469; Waters v. Department of Labor (Ill.), Vol. 3, CCH Unemp. Ins. Rep., Sec. 8340; Reener v. Board of Review (Ill.), Vol. 3, CCH Unemp. Ins. Rep., Sec. 8368; Murphy v. Komaiko (Ill.), Vol. 3, CCH Unemp. Ins. Rep., Sec. 8462. See also 81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, § 203, p. 301.

  5. Hicks v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n

    NO. 2014-CA-001061-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015)

    Id. at 453 ("We can discover no act or conduct of Young from which it can be said he voluntarily discontinued his employment."). An even more analogous case is that of Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. 1953). In Henry Fischer, the employee, a butcher, suffered an epileptic seizure while at work.

  6. Warran v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n

    NO. 2013-CA-000861-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2014)

    Rather, the question to be considered is whether Warran voluntarily left his employment with Kentucky Building Systems without good cause attributable to his employment pursuant to KRS 341.370(1)(c). Warran's first argument is that he was discharged for reasons beyond his control, citing Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. 1953). He stated that he had presented medical documentation indicating that he could perform some, but not all, of the work his position entailed, but his employment was nevertheless terminated. KUIC argues that Fischer Packing is not applicable in the present case, as that Court was addressing a separate question; namely, whether the claimant was available for suitable work, not the cause of his separation, which is the question in the present case.

  7. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Blakeman

    419 S.W.3d 752 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    The present case is distinguishable from Murphy because there was no evidence that Blakeman was unskilled or incompetent at her job as a selector, but that she had a legitimate inability to pass the physical agility test for reasons beyond her control. This fact brings the case under the decision of the former Court of Appeals in Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Ky.1953), which held that an epileptic claimant who could no longer perform butchering duties for safety reasons “did not voluntarily leave his job but was discharged from it for reasons beyond his control.” In the present case, there is no evidence that Blakeman voluntarily quit.

  8. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Blakeman

    NO. 2012-CA-000915-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jun. 14, 2013)

    The present case is distinguishable from Murphy because there was no evidence that Blakeman was unskilled or incompetent at her job as a selector, but that she had a legitimate inability to pass the physical agility test for reasons beyond her control. This fact brings the case under the decision of the former Court of Appeals in Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Ky. 1953), which held that an epileptic claimant who could no longer perform butchering duties for safety reasons "did not voluntarily leave his job but was discharged from it for reasons beyond his control." In the present case, there is no evidence that Blakeman voluntarily quit.

  9. Medairos v. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n

    NO. 2012-CA-000162-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2013)   Cited 1 times
    In Medairos v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, No. 2012-CA-000162-MR, 2013 WL 645820, at *3 (Ky. App. Feb. 22, 2013), we considered the case of a truck driver, Medairos, who was terminated after he became an insulin-dependent diabetic.

    Since Young was forced from his employment because of forces beyond his control, the court held that he had not voluntarily left his employment and that he was, therefore, entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits. In Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. 1953), our highest court considered a dispute involving a factual scenario strikingly similar to the one before us. In Henry Fischer, the employee, a butcher, suffered an epileptic seizure while at work.

  10. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Bourbon Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

    NO. 2011-CA-001316-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sep. 28, 2012)

    The Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized that the statute "allows the commission considerable latitude in deciding whether or not any employment is suitable for a worker." Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. 1953). From the evidence presented, the Commission found that Tapp earned eighty thousand dollars ($80,000.