These sentences were to run concurrently. 7. After preliminary motions, Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853 (1960), and 170 Neb. 348, 102 N.W.2d 620 (1960), Kennedy prosecuted error to the State Supreme Court. He asserted five points. The fifth was that the trial court erred in finding that he was an habitual criminal and in sentencing him accordingly.
Black's Law Dictionary 539 (9th ed. 2009). Our court has previously held that a conviction does not become final until a sentence is pronounced. See, e.g., State v. Vela, 272 Neb. 287, 721 N.W.2d 631 (2006); Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853 (1960). Accordingly, the disposition of a criminal case cannot come before sentencing.
The judgment terminated the proceedings in the district court, and its judgment could be fully executed without any further action by the district court. However, the State claims, citing Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853 (1960), that the district court's order was not a final, appealable order because it did not include a sentence. The State claims that because the district court vacated the payment of attorney fees and remanded the restitution issue without affirming the $50 fine, the district court's order did not include a sentence.
We have previously said that before a criminal matter may be appealed to this court, there must be a final judgment. No judgment will be regarded as final unless a sentence is pronounced. Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853 (1960); State v. Shaw, 202 Neb. 766, 277 N.W.2d 106 (1979). The defendant in this case did not challenge the constitutionality of 83-1,105(3).
We have previously said that before a criminal matter may be appealed to this court, it must be a final judgment. No judgment will be regarded as final unless a sentence is pronounced. Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853. It is therefore clear that by delaying the imposition of a sentence indefinitely, a defendant is denied the right of appeal from the original charge. Such denial offends basic notions of due process and equal protection of the law and cannot be permitted.
These governing rules have been followed by this and courts of other jurisdictions, apparently without challenge, ever since such procedures were first laid down. If the sentencing occurs after the motion for new trial has been overruled, then the time for computing the appeal runs from the date of the sentencing. See Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853. In specific response to the defendant's argument that he may not know whether he wishes to appeal until after sentencing, we acknowledge this may be true.
He filed his notice of appeal herein on November 10, 1975. To give this court jurisdiction of a direct appeal in a criminal case, notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the District Court within 1 month after the overruling of a motion for a new trial or sentencing, whichever is later. 25-1912, R.R.S. 1943; Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853. In the present case, the defendant filed his notice of appeal within 1 month of the overruling of the motion for a new trial that he filed.
Moreover, in his motion for new trial, appellant alleged only that there is new authority for the proposition that there is no inherent power to impose conditions of probation and that the power is a statutory power only. In view of the state of the record, therefore, it is clear that we may only consider on this appeal assignment of error No. (1). State v. Haile, 185 Neb. 421, 176 N.W.2d 232 (1970); Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853 (1960); State v. Seger, 191 Neb. 760, 217 N.W.2d 828 (1974); State v. Griger, 190 Neb. 405, 208 N.W.2d 672 (1973); Mitchell v. State, 159 Neb. 638, 68 N.W.2d 184 (1955); State v. Schwade, 177 Neb. 844, 131 N.W.2d 421 (1964). It is clear, of course, that a sentencing court in prescribing probation may impose any conditions of probation that it is authorized by statute to impose.
We have stated before that in a criminal case the final order made by the court below must include a sentence and that the defendant may appeal from the overruling of the motion for new trial or the imposition of sentence, whichever is the later. Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853. In State v. Taylor, 179 Neb. 42, 136 N.W.2d 179, we said: "This court has held repeatedly that an order is final only when no further action is required to dispose of the cause pending and that when the cause is retained for a new trial or further action to dispose of it, the order is interlocutory and not final."
" We have repeatedly held that such errors must be pointed out to the trial court in a motion for new trial and a ruling obtained thereon. Kennedy v. State, 170 Neb. 193, 101 N.W.2d 853 (1960). We have consistently held that alleged error not asserted in a motion for new trial will not be considered on appeal. State v. Stanosheck, 186 Neb. 17, 180 N.W.2d 226 (1970); State v. Haile, 185 Neb. 421, 176 N.W.2d 232 (1970).