ORDER

FREDERICK MARTONE, District Judge

The court has before it defendant's motion to dismiss (doc. 20), plaintiff's response (doc. 21), and defendant's reply (doc. 23). We also have before us plaintiff's third motion for an oral hearing (doc. 17), defendant's response (doc. 19), and plaintiff's reply (doc. 22), and defendant's motions to strike (docs. 15, 24).

On March 16, 2006, we granted defendant's motion to dismiss Count 4 of the complaint and also granted defendant's motion for a more definite statement (doc. 16). In our order, we noted specific deficiencies in plaintiff's original complaint, ordered plaintiff to file an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and encouraged plaintiff to seek the advice of counsel. On April 11, 2006, plaintiff filed an amended complaint that is largely unchanged from the original (doc. 18). Defendant now moves to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.

Count 1 asserts a claim of "contrived and vicious termination of plaintiff." We interpret this claim as one for wrongful termination. Under A.R.S. § 12-541, a cause of action for wrongful termination, or "breach of an oral or written employment contract including contract actions based on employee handbooks or policy manuals" must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues. In our March 16, 2006 order, we noted the potential statute of limitations problem, but plaintiff failed to address the issue. Plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that he was terminated from employment on or about October 23, 2003, but he did not file this action until October 5, 2005. Because this claim was not filed within the time limit set forth in A.R.S. § 12-451, it is barred by the statute of limitations.

In Count 2, plaintiff alleges a claim under the "whistleblowers act." However, a wrongful termination claim under Arizona law, including a claim for whistleblower retaliation, must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues. See A.R.S. §§ 12-541(4), 23-1501(3)(c)(ii). Because this action was filed well after the one-year period, Count 2 is also barred by the statute of limitations.

Count 3 of plaintiff's amended complaint is difficult to decipher. The claim is described as "Denial to plaintiff of using due medical benefits. . . . Not allowing the plaintiff to utilize his medical benefits during employment as sick time." Amended Complaint at 4. Plaintiff cites no statute or caselaw to describe the nature of this allegation. Although Count 3 of his original complaint was styled as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family Medical Leave Act, reference to those statutes in the amended Count 3 have been eliminated. Because it is impossible to glean any cognizable legal theory, we dismiss Count 3 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Although we dismissed Count 4 in plaintiff's original complaint because it failed to state a cognizable legal theory, plaintiff asserts new allegations in Count 4 of his amended complaint. Here, plaintiff's alleges "criminal charges" that defendant "practice[d] medicine without a license." However, we are unaware of any private right of action upon which plaintiff can base such a claim.

Amended Count 4 also charges defendant with "ignoring and denying a very sick individual['s] . . . request . . . for an opportunity to seek a medical test . . . [which] is a gross violation of the ADA, the FMLA." Amended Complaint at 6. Even if we liberally construe this claim as asserting a violation under the ADA, it would nevertheless fail because plaintiff has not alleged that he exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. We noted in our earlier order that any claim under the ADA will face this exhaustion impediment, yet plaintiff failed to address this issue. Order at 3. Further, although plaintiff refers to a "violation of the FMLA," he fails to set forth a cognizable factual or legal basis for that claim. Accordingly, Count 4 is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Count 5 of the amended complaint alleges "breach of contract, and fraudulent taking of funds from Plaintiff's pay check without offering contractual and paid benefits." To the extent Count 5 asserts a claim for breach of an employment contract, either written or oral, including an employee handbook or policy manual, plaintiff was required to file his claim within one year after the cause of action accrued. See A.R.S. § 12-541(3). Plaintiff did not file this claim, however, until almost two years after his termination and alleged denial of benefits. Therefore, plaintiff's breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations. To the extent this count raises an issue of fraud, we informed plaintiff in our earlier order that this claim was "wholly lacking in the particularity required by Rule 9(b)," and gave plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. Order at 2. However, Count 5 in the amended complaint is unchanged. Accordingly, we dismiss Count 5 pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6).

Count 6 alleges a claim for "[d]istribution of privileged and private [and derogatory] personal information to third parties," which prevented him "from obtaining any potential employment after leaving Honeywell." In our previous order, we noted that this count appears to assert a defamation claim, however, we noted that plaintiff failed to describe the nature of the "derogatory information" or to allege that it was false, a necessary element in a defamation claim. Order at 2. Despite this court's order for a more definite statement, amended Count 6 is unchanged and fails to assert the necessary elements of a defamation or any other cognizable legal claim. Therefore, Court 6 is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Finally, Count 7 appears to allege a claim for fraud, based on allegations that defendant submitted "a fraudulent offer of settlement . . . and attempted to get [plaintiff] to sign a document with the intention of getting [him] to give up [his] civil rights . . . while [he] was extremely sick . . . and neither had the ability to read the documents nor was given an opportunity to have another read them." Amended Complaint at 9. This claim is wholly lacking in the particularity required by Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. There is no indication of the nature of any misrepresentation, how it might have been material, whether plaintiff relied on it, or how plaintiff was damaged as a result thereof. This claim is dismissed pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6).

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING defendant's motion to dismiss (doc. 20). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING plaintiff's motion for an oral hearing (doc. 17) and DENYING defendant's motions to strike as moot (docs. 15 and 24).

We again suggest to plaintiff that he seek the assistance of a lawyer.