Kennedy v. Children's Service Soc. of Wisconsin

24 Citing cases

  1. Cox v. The Med. Coll. of Wis.

    651 F. Supp. 3d 965 (E.D. Wis. 2023)   Cited 5 times

    ECF No. 42 at 30. They cite Kennedy v. Children's Service Society, 17 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 1994). There, the plaintiffs sought to adopt a child but were hindered in doing so after Children's Services Society of Wisconsin ("CSS") backed out because it believed the plaintiffs were members of a cult.

  2. Menard, Inc. v. Dall. Airmotive, Inc.

    18-cv-844-wmc (W.D. Wis. Sep. 10, 2020)

    Still, as DAI hints at in its motion, at least in the context of an individual, "there is a presumption" under Wisconsin law "that the defamed person suffered general damages such as injury to reputation." Kennedy v. Children's Serv. Soc. of Wis., 17 F.3d 980, 984 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Williams v. Hicks Printing Co., 159 Wis. 90, 101-02, 150 N.W. 183, 188 (1914)); see also I Russel M. Ware, The Law of Damages in Wisconsin § 11.24 ("Plaintiffs may recover general damages as compensation for injury to feelings or reputation or because of anguish or humiliation -- harms of a type not easily estimable in monetary terms."). However, proof is required for an award of special damages, which covers "harm of a material, economic, or pecuniary nature."

  3. Zinna v. Cook

    428 F. App'x 838 (10th Cir. 2011)   Cited 5 times

    Finally, Mr. Zinna contends that it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant Cook, who had disappeared from the litigation by the time summary judgment proceedings were initiated and hence did not join in defendants' motions. Many courts have countenanced the sua sponte grant of summary judgment to a non-moving defendant, provided the basis for the ruling in favor of the moving defendants applies as well to the non-movant and the plaintiff was not prejudiced by being unaware of the need to make his case against all.See, e.g., Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 500 (3d Cir. 2006); Vazquez v. Lopez-Rosario, 134 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1998); Kennedy v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 17 F.3d 980, 983 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1994); cf. Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999) (invoking same principle to uphold grant of arbitration to defendant who had not joined in other defendant's motion to compel arbitration). Given the collective nature of his conspiracy case against all of the defendants, Mr. Zinna was clearly aware of the need to proffer all evidence in his possession suggesting any connection each and every defendant may have had to the others and to the alleged illegal interception of his email.

  4. U.S. v. Nat. Collegiate

    481 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2007)   Cited 21 times
    Rejecting an internal investigations privilege but noting that "there are privileges that can be used to keep information from government agencies"

    (The suit remains pending on other grounds.) The "common interest" privilege, see, e.g., Pate v. Service Merchandise Co., 959 S.W.2d 569, 576 (Tenn.App. 1996); Kennedy v. Children's Service Society, 17 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir.1994); Gumbhir v. Curators of University of Missouri, 157 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th Cir.1998); Catrone v. Thorough-bred Racing Associations of North America, Inc., 929 F.2d 881, 887-38 (1st Cir.1991); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 (1977), is probably also applicable, since Fulmer and the NCAA have a common interest in NCAA members' complying with the Association's rules. The existence of these privileges suggests that the Association's fears may be chimerical, and an additional reason for thinking that is the strong incentive of members to report their violations in order to take advantage of the partial amnesty that the Association gives self-reporting violators.

  5. Gordon v. Bonfigilio

    19-cv-860-bbc (W.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2021)

    To state a defamation claim in Wisconsin, plaintiff must allege that there was (1) a false statement; (2) communicated by speech, conduct, or in writing to a person other than the one defamed; which (3) was "unprivileged and tends to harm one's reputation so as to lower one in the estimation of the community." Kennedy v. Children's Service Society of Wisconsin, 17 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 1994); Torgerson v. Journal Sentinel, Inc., 210 Wis. 2d 524, 534, 563 N.W.2d 472, 477 (1997). Plaintiff alleges that defendants stated falsely in plaintiff's work evaluation that plaintiff was argumentative, and that they did so to justify terminating him from his prison job.

  6. Semons v. Wolf

    Case No. 19-CV-1595 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 13, 2020)

    To state a defamation claim in Wisconsin, Semons must allege that there was (1) a false statement; (2) communicated by speech, conduct, or in writing to a person other than the one defamed; which (3) was "unprivileged and tends to harm one's reputation so as to lower one in the estimation of the community." Kennedy v. Children's Serv. Soc. of Wisconsin, 17 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 1994).

  7. Petrunak v. Krofta

    No. 1:18-cv-03525-RLY-MJD (S.D. Ind. Sep. 17, 2019)

    Although Defendant McShane does not raise the Heck issue in his motion to dismiss, the Court may grant his motion on that grounds because the arguments of Defendants Krofta and Vicario on that issue apply equally to Defendant McShane; indeed, Plaintiff accuses the three of conspiring together. Cf. Rosser v. Chrysler Corp., 864 F.2d 1299, 1304 (7th Cir. 1988) (sua sponte granting a motion to dismiss as to nonmoving defendants permitted "where nonmoving defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where the claims against all the defendants are integrally related"); Kennedy v. Children's Serv. Soc. of Wisconsin, 17 F.3d 980, 983 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) ("If one defendant is granted a motion for summary judgment, the district court may sua sponte enter summary judgment in favor of nonmoving additional defendants 'if the motion raised by the first defendant is equally effective in barring the claim against the other defendants, and the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to argue in opposition to the motion.'" (quoting Colan v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 812 F.2d 357, 360 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987)).

  8. Harp v. Glock

    Case No. 18-C-1039 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 25, 2019)   Cited 3 times
    Denying summary judgment based on admissions served before the Rule 26(f) conference

    The Seventh Circuit has observed that "[t]his is a high standard, and Wisconsin courts have been reluctant to find conduct sufficiently extreme to meet this test." Kennedy v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 17 F.3d 980, 986 (7th Cir. 1994).

  9. Darvosh v. Lewis

    66 F. Supp. 3d 1130 (N.D. Ill. 2014)   Cited 14 times
    Reaching the same result in materially identical circumstances

    Upon granting a defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court “may sua sponte enter summary judgment in favor of nonmoving additional defendants ‘if the motion raised by the first defendant is equally effective in barring the claim against the other defendants, and the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to argue in opposition to the motion.’ ” Kennedy v. Children's Serv. Soc. of Wisc., 17 F.3d 980, 983 n. 1 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Colan v. Cutler–Hammer, Inc., 812 F.2d 357, 360 n. 2 (7th Cir.1987) ). Here, the reason underlying the Court's grant of summary judgment—that Plaintiff executed a settlement agreement barring him from bringing this suit—is not specific to the claims brought against the moving Defendants.

  10. Ebrahimidarvosh v. Lewis

    No. 13 C 04727 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2014)

    Upon granting a defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court "may sua sponte enter summary judgment in favor of nonmoving additional defendants 'if the motion raised by the first defendant is equally effective in barring the claim against the other defendants, and the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to argue in opposition to the motion.'" Kennedy v. Children's Serv. Soc. of Wise, 17 F.3d 980, 983 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Colan v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 812 F.2d 357, 360 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987)). Here, the reason underlying the Court's grant of summary judgment—that Plaintiff executed a settlement agreement barring him from bringing this suit—is not specific to the claims brought against the moving Defendants.