Opinion
3:24-cv-1958-B (BT)
08-15-2024
ROMONA KENNARD, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE BUSH, ET AL., Defendants.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REBECCA RUTHERFORD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se plaintiff Romona Kennard filed a civil complaint, in which she alleges, in full:
Do [sic] to the collection of Amexbill Spain the brainwash and Spanish of the Mexican and the contact of ratio and the passionat [sic] of angry constitution of being a citizen and not able to work in the USA and violation of the Mexican the struggling [sic] of institution children. To the Amexbill bill [sic] is the equa [sic] right to stay in the U.S.A. Also I believe Japan Airline fight.ECF No. 3 at 1.
For the following reasons, the Court should dismiss Kennard's case with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as frivolous.
Legal Standards and Analysis
Kennard proceeds in forma pauperis (IFP). Thus, her complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, a district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it concludes the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The latter category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]” Id.at 33 (citations omitted).
Here, the Court has attempted to make sense of Kennard's allegations, but even under a most liberal construction, her complaint fails to allege any facts from which the Court could discern a plausible cause of action. Her pleading is indecipherable, consisting mostly of disjointed phrases or words. Such indecipherable allegations are frivolous and should be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B). See, e.g., Clervrain v. Johnson, 2022 WL 1671877, at *3 (M.D. La. May 10, 2022), rec. accepted 2022 WL 1672127 (M.D. La. May 25, 2022) (dismissing case as frivolous because the pro se plaintiff's allegations were unintelligible and did not meet the pleading requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Reed v. White Rock Hills Apt Townhomes, 2021 WL 6098479, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2021) (“Moreover, Reed has previously filed an equally nonsensical and indecipherable claim . . . in a different civil action that the Court recently dismissed as factually and legally frivolous.”), rec. accepted 2021 WL 6077250 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2021) (citation omitted); Anderson v. Sy, 486 Fed.Appx. 644 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The district court properly dismissed [the lawsuit] as frivolous because the complaint contains indecipherable facts and unsupported legal assertions”); Adams v. FBI S.F. Field Off. Supervisor & Agents, 2019 WL 5626261, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2019) (“A claim that is totally incomprehensible may be dismissed as frivolous as it is without an arguable basis in law.”)
Leave to Amend
Ordinarily, a Pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint before her case is dismissed, but leave is not required when she has already pleaded her “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As discussed, Kennard has failed to state or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be inferred. Based on the most deferential review of her complaint, it is unlikely that, given the opportunity, Kennard could allege cogent and viable legal claims. The Court therefore concludes that granting leave to amend would be futile, would cause needless delay, and is unwarranted.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss Kennard's lawsuit with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
SO RECOMMENDED.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).