Opinion
Civil Action 22-1431
05-01-2024
PAUL KENDRICK, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTIONAL OFFICER GUSKIEWICZ and SERGEANT BURRIE, Defendants.
William S. Stickman District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF NO. 51
Maureen P. Kelly Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Correctional Officer Guskiewicz (“Guskiewicz”) and Sergeant Burrie (“Burrie”). ECF No. 51. For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment be denied.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Paul Kendrick (“Kendrick”) is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Kendrick's claims and the underlying facts at issue in this litigation are summarized in the Report and Recommendation issued relative to Kendrick's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 60. Thus, the Court summarizes the allegations and the additional evidence presented by the parties in support and in opposition to Defendants' pending Motion for Summary Judgment.
Kendrick asserts First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and state law negligence claims against Defendants for two incidents that he alleges occurred at SCI - Fayette in July 2022. ECF No. 47. Through his verified Amended Complaint, Kendrick alleges that on July 5, 2022, Defendant Guskiewicz taunted him, told him to kill himself, and threatened him with bodily harm. Id.; see also ECF No. 33. Kendrick filed a grievance related to this conduct the same day. He asserts that two weeks later, Guskiewicz loudly announced in front of other inmates that Kendrick “snitched” on him. Guskiewicz encouraged other inmates to “bang ... out” Kendrick to drive him crazy, and “make him kill his self.” ECF No. 47 ¶¶ 10-12. In return, Guskiewicz offered an extra tray of food. Several inmates responded by banging on cell doors and tables and throwing feces at Kendrick's cell door and at him through the ventilation system. Guskiewicz left the unit and did not intervene to protect Kendrick from any potential harm. Id. ¶ 12.
Kendrick alleges that because of Guskiewicz's conduct, he was “feeling suicidal” and began banging his head and pressing his emergency call button to report suicidal ideation. IT ¶¶ 14-16. Defendant Sergeant Burrie (“Burrie”) was in the control booth for Kendrick's cell block. Id. ¶ 17. Despite hearing Kendrick's requests for mental and medical assistance to treat his swollen forehead, Burrie failed to respond or assist Kendrick. Instead, Burrie instructed Kendrick to “write a request slip.” Id. ¶ 18. Kendrick alleges Burrie was deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs, exposed him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and was otherwise negligent for failing to report Kendrick's expressions of suicidal ideation “through the proper channels.”
In support of his allegations, Kendrick presents the Declaration of inmate Sampson Brinkley (“Brinkley”) who attests under penalty of perjury that Guskiewicz offered him an extra tray of food if Brinkley threw feces at Kendrick. ECF No. 61-1. Brinkley states that he heard Kendrick call for help, state that he was suicidal, and request mental health services. Brinkley asserts that Kendrick's requests were denied. Kendrick presents his own Declaration, attested to under penalty of perjury. ECF No. 62. Kendrick states that the incidents occurred as stated in the Amended Complaint, and that Defendant Burrie failed to contact medical and mental health providers to address his reports of suicidal ideation and self-harm. Id.
Defendants deny that either incident occurred. In support of their pending motion, Defendants present the Declaration of a Psychological Services Specialist (“PSS”) who was assigned to Kendrick's housing unit on the dates at issue. ECF No. 54-4. The PSS states that Kendrick's mental health records reflect that he was seen “by psychology and for PRT” on July 5, 2022, the day he alleges Guskiewicz told him to kill himself. Treatment notes indicate that Kendrick denied any current suicidal ideation concerns. Id. at 7. A “Mental Health/Intellectual Consultation for Disciplinary Disposition Form” was prepared that same day to determine whether Kendrick could be placed in segregated disciplinary housing to address misconduct. ECF No. 611 at 9. The report reflects that Kendrick has a a “serious personality disorder” and a “suicide attempt history,” but notes that he was not suffering from any functional impairment and that he orally denied any current suicidal ideation. Id.
Kendrick requested services from a PSS on July 13, 2022, and was seen at his cell. Id. at 3. He complained about the movement and activity restrictions placed on him as the result of his recent “staff assault.” Id. at 3-4; 7. Kendrick demanded that the PSS remove the restrictions. Id. at 4. When the PSS failed to do so, he “became argumentative,” but “did not voice any acute Mental Health concerns,” and “appeared to be stable.” Id.; ECF No. 54-5. He was seen the next day by a psychiatrist, and posed “no questions, problems, or concerns....” ECF No. 54-4 at 7. He also did not report any interaction with Guskiewicz. For his part, Guskiewicz states under penalty of perjury that he never told Kendrick to kill himself, never threatened Kendrick, never labeled him as a snitch, and never offered a tray to inmates as a reward to bang on their cell tables or to throw things at Kendrick. ECF No. 54-7.
Discovery is complete. Kendrick previously filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Undisputed Facts, and a Declaration. ECF Nos. 30-33. Defendants responded to Kendrick's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 50, and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment with supporting briefs and exhibits. ECF Nos. 51-54. Kendrick sought and was granted an extension of time to respond to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, the Court's earlier Report and Recommendation addressed only Kendrick's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 60, and recommended that the motion be denied based on disputed issues of material fact that required the weighing of witness credibility.
In support of the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants have filed a brief, concise statement of material facts and appendix. ECF Nos. 52-54. Kendrick has not filed a responsive concise statement as required by Local Civil Rule 56C. 1 .a, but he presents a “Statement of Disputed Factual Issues,” a declaration that minors the allegations in his Amended Complaint, and a brief in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 61-63.
The motion is ripe for consideration.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is properly entered “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see, e.g., Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,247-48 (1986). “[A] fact is ‘material' where its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist, 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Further, “[a] dispute is ‘genuine' if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Clews v. Cnty. of Schuylkill, 12 F.4th 353,358 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that the undisputed evidence is insufficient to support one or more essential elements of the non-moving party's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004).
“[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted). In making this assessment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matreale v. N.J. Dep't of Mil. & Veterans Affs., 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Rule 56 requires the entry of summary judgment because such a failure “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, thus he is entitled to liberal reading of his pleadings and documents filed in opposition to the pending motion. Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 440 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Higgs v. Att'y Gen, of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[t]he obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”)). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S, ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Dep't. of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991).
Even so, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the Court need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions unaccompanied by evidentiary support. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record...” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). In consideration of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
1. Eighth Amendment - Deliberate Indifference to Serious Mental Health or Medical Needs
“The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, prohibits the imposition of ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of decency.'” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Helling v, McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)). Thus, “prison authorities [may not] deny reasonable requests for medical treatment... [when] such denial exposes the inmate ‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.'” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 228 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (in turn quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976)).
When a plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment medical claim, he must show that “(1) he had a serious medical need, (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need; and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.” Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023).
A medical need is serious if it “has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or if it “is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Pace v. Fauver, 479 F.Supp. 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981)). Additionally, “if ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the eighth amendment.” Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,103 (1976)). It is not disputed that suicidal ideation is a serious medical need.
Whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent under the Eighth Amendment is determined under a subjective standard. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994). “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). Thus, the prison official must have known of the substantial risk of serious harm and must have disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.
Here, Defendants assert that summary judgment is appropriate because the record “fails to show that any Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiffs mental or medical needs.” ECF No. 52 at 8-9. For this proposition, Defendants rely on: (1) Guskiewicz's denial of Kendrick's allegations; (2) Kendrick's mental health records that do not contain a request for services during the period July 14, 2022 through August 7, 2022; (3) the fact that Kendrick did not attempt suicide on July 20, 2022; and (4) the lack of evidence that either Defendant knew of his suicidal tendencies. Id. at 9-10. None of the grounds raised by Defendants supports the entry of summary judgment.
First, Kendrick does not assert a medical or mental health deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Guskiewicz. ECF No. 47 ¶¶ 20-23. Thus, Guskiewicz's denial of Kendrick's allegations against him is not dispositive.
Second, the lack of a prison record that Kendrick requested mental health services can be construed by a reasonable jury to support Kendrick's claim that despite his report to Burrie that he was suicidal, Burrie prevented Kendrick from receiving mental health and medical services for a non-medical reason. Likewise, the lack of a record can be construed as Defendants urge - to support the inference that the incident alleged by Kendrick never occurred. In either event, the evidence is enough to raise a material issue of fact that requires a determination of witness credibility. Such determinations, like the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts, are jury functions that are not amenable to resolution at the summary judgment stage. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
Third, the fact that Kendrick did not complete a suicide attempt does not resolve whether Burrie was deliberately indifferent to Kendrick's allegedly serious mental health needs. As alleged in both the Kendrick and Brinkley declarations, Burrie heard Kendrick's requests for immediate treatment for suicidal ideation and for medical treatment for an alleged head injury, but he failed or refused to obtain care. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Kendrick, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Burrie intentionally refused to provide care, delayed care for non-medical reasons, or prevented Kendrick from receiving the care he needed. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192,197 (3d Cir. 1992).
Finally, Defendants' lack of knowledge of Kendrick's suicidal tendencies does not preclude Kendrick's deliberate indifference claim, which is based on Burrie's alleged inaction to Kendrick's report of suicidal ideation and self-harm on July 20, 2022.
Because Defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial, it is recommended that the Court deny the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Kendrick's Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.
2. Failure to Protect
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution imposes a duty on prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984). This includes the general duty to “protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other[s].” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). To survive summary judgment on a failure-to-protect claim, the plaintiff must adduce evidence suggesting that: (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk; and (3) the defendant's deliberate indifference caused the plaintiff to suffer harm. Bistrian v.
Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020). The standard for deliberate indifference is subjective. Thus, the prison official “must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120,125 (3d Cir. 2001).
Defendants assert that summary judgment is properly entered in favor of Defendants on Kendrick's failure to protect claim because: (1) “his only claim is that inmates were banging on their cell door and chanting that Plaintiff was a rat”; (2) “Plaintiffs only allegation is that inmates were attempting to throw feces at the Plaintiff, which is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim”; and, (3) “Plaintiff does not make any allegations that he was assaulted by inmates and thus fails to establish an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect.” ECF No. 52 at 12.
As to the first contention, Defendants' characterization of Kendrick's failure to protect claim ignores the allegation that Guskiewicz identified Kendrick as a snitch. ECF No. 47 ¶ 10. As this Court previously observed, “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that being identified as a snitch or complicit with prison authorities can expose an inmate to a substantial risk of harm.” ECF No. 60 at 7 (citing Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 368). “Thus, Guskiewicz's alleged misconduct, if proven, may be sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm of telling other inmates [Kendrick] was a snitch.” Id. That said, “there is authority for the proposition that being labeled a snitch for filing a grievance against a corrections officer ‘does not, without more, create a substantial risk of harm to the inmate.'” Id. at 8 (citing Jackson v. O'Brien, No. 18-0032, 2021 WL 3174687, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 27, 2021). Kendrick and Brinkley assert that the label of snitch was paired with a reward of “an extra tray” for throwing feces at Kendrick. ECF No. 61-1 at 8. This evidence supports an inference that “more” occurred to place Kendrick at substantial risk of harm for complaining about a corrections officer. ECF No. 47 ¶ 11; ECF No. 61-1 at 8. At this time, Kendrick's allegations are sufficiently supported by the record and thus present genuine material issues of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.
Defendants' second argument related to the harm allegedly suffered also fails to warrant the entry of summary judgment. Exposure to feces thrown at an inmate at a guard's behest is enough to support a failure to protect claim. In McMillian v. Wetzel, 790 Fed.Appx. 455, 459 (3d Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential), the entry of summary judgment for prison officials was reversed because the prisoner presented an affidavit to support his claim that he was attacked with feces at a guard's suggestion or request. The evidence supported the inmate's claim that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm and presented a material issue of fact that precluded summary judgment. Kendrick and Brinkley's Declarations, like Guskiewicz's adamant denials, are subject to credibility assessments. But if believed by a reasonable jury, the statements support Kendrick's claim that Guskeiwicz not only failed to protect him from a serious risk of harm, he created the risk of harm.
Defendants' final argument is that Kendrick fails to establish an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect because he does not allege that he was assaulted. ECF No. 52 at 12. However, “[t]hat the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel proposition. The Amendment... requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety.... It is ‘cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). Thus, construing the facts and inferences from the evidence in Kendrick's favor as the nonmoving party, Guskiewicz's identification of Kendrick as a snitch supports a failure to protect claim. The record also supports an inference that an assault occurred. Both Kendrick and Brinkley assert that Kendrick was exposed to feces and urine thrown at him through the ventilation system at Guskiewicz's urging. Whether this exposure occurred, and whether it posed a substantial risk of harm, are material issues of fact subject to an assessment of witness credibility. Such assessments are within the function of a jury and preclude the entry summary judgment.
3. Retaliation
To establish a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a prisoner must prove that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) there exists “a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” Mitchell v, Hom, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).
Defendants assert that summary judgment is properly entered as to Kendrick's First Amendment claim for retaliation because he fails to establish that any constitutionally protected activity led him to suffer adverse conditions or action. ECF No. 52 at 12-14. For this proposition, Defendants concede that Kendrick filed a grievance against Guskiewicz. However, Guskiewicz denies that he ever threatened him, told him to kill himself, or made promises to inmates for an extra tray if they taunted Kendrick. Thus, Defendants contend that Kendrick did not suffer any adverse action. Id. Defendants also assert that Kendrick continues to file grievances. Thus, . Guskiewicz's conduct has not deterred him from exercising his constitutional rights. Id. at 13.
Defendants do not address the Brinkley and Kendrick Declarations that support Kendrick's allegations that Guskiewicz identified Kendrick as a snitch and offered Brinkley “an additional tray if [he] threw feces” on Kendrick. ECF No. 61-1 ¶ 3. This evidence raises factual issues as to whether Guskiewicz's alleged misconduct, if proven, was in retaliation for the grievance filed against him by Kendrick. Thus, it is recommended that the Court deny the motion for summary judgment as to Kendrick's First Amendment retaliation claim.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Correctional Officer Guskiewicz and Sergeant Burrie, ECF No. 51, be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties may file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.