Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-307-WHA [WO]
07-01-2016
KENDRICK COOK-BEY, #174 046, Plaintiff, v. CAMILLE LUCKIE, et al., Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed a pleading on June 28, 2016, which the court considers to contain a request for a preliminary injunction. Doc. 12. He seeks to enjoin Defendants from withholding, delaying, and/or rejecting his mail in violation of agency regulations. Doc. 12-2 at 1-5. Upon review, the court concludes the motion for preliminary injunction is due to be denied.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction "is within the sound discretion of the district court." Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). This court may grant a preliminary injunction only if Plaintiff demonstrates each of these prerequisites: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will occur absent issuance of the injunction; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the potential damage the requested injunction may cause the non-moving parties; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id.; McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1983). "In this Circuit, [a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites." McDonald's, 147 F.3d at 1306 (internal quotations omitted); All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp. Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a preliminary injunction is issued only when "drastic relief is necessary); Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (granting of preliminary injunction "is the exception rather than the rule," and movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party's failure to demonstrate a "substantial likelihood of success on the merits" may defeat the party's claim, regardless of the party's ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that "the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper"). "'The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.'" Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 1990)).
III. DISCUSSION
The court's review of Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief reflects he has not made the demanding showing required for this extraordinary form of relief. Even if Plaintiff could establish the propriety of his request for preliminary injunctive relief, his request is devoid of any allegation he will suffer specific and irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued. To establish irreparable injury Plaintiff must show he will suffer harm that "cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy" through the ordinary course of litigation. See Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm"); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (internal quotation omitted) (noting that the "possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, [also] weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm"). The third factor, balancing potential harm to the parties, also weighs more heavily in favor of Defendants. Regarding the fourth factor, it is impossible to determine precisely what Plaintiff's requested relief would entail, preventing the court from determining what burden the requested injunction would have on the Alabama Department of Corrections and whether issuing it would harm the public interest. Issuing a preliminary injunction in this case is not warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
1. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 12) be DENIED; and
2. This case be referred to the undersigned for additional proceedings.
It is further ORDERED that on or before July 15, 2016, the parties may file an objection to this Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall "waive the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions" except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).
DONE on this 1st day of July, 2016.
/s/ Gray M. Borden
UNITES STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE