2. The unrefuted and indisputable testimony offered by plaintiffs below demonstrated that this case is indistinguishable from Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-0869 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So.2d 242, and the trial court erred in not granting relief consistent with that decision. 3. The district court erred in not making the increase awarded by the PCF Oversight Board retroactive from October 1995, with interest and attorney fees.

See also Bijou v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 95-3074 (La. 9/5/96), 679 So.2d 893; Descant v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, 95-0751 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/5/95), 653 So.2d 819; Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-0869 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So.2d 242, writs denied, 97-0918 and 97-0936 (La. 5/16/97), 693 So.2d 800-801. This Court, in its decision in Kelty v. Brumfield, supra, interpreted the Supreme Court's phrase "well established principles of judicial review" to be a reference to the judicial review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, La.R.S. 49:964.

We recognize that courts do award such sums for the services of family members in the absence of hard evidence on the point. We expressed this in Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-0869, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So.2d 242, 247, citing Edwards v. St. Francis Med. Center, 623 So.2d 1387 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1993) by stating, "In order for a non-professional parent to make a claim for nursing services rendered, there must be a showing that there is a need for the services, the reasonableness of the fee must be established, and the extent and the duration must be proven." Our colleagues on the First Circuit in Tanner v.Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 589 So.2d 507, 515-16 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1992), citing Bordelon v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 494 So.2d 1283 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1986), explained the law as follows:

Thus, we consider whether the trial court erred in finding that the PCF administrative rules, adopted after Jamie's October 1993 cause of action for medical malpractice arose, are inapplicable to her reimbursement claim, i.e., whether application of the rule would infringe upon a vested right. As explained by the fourth circuit in Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-0869 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So.2d 242, (citing La.R.S. 49:954(B)), writ denied 97-0918 (La. 5/16/97), 693 So.2d 800, writ denied 97-0936 (La. 5/16/97), 693 So.2d 801, the adoption of the PCF administrative rule regarding reimbursement for custodial care for family members did not have retroactive effect. While the Kelty court noted that the plaintiffs in that case pursued their own custodial care costs for ten years prior to the enactment of the rule, the reference to the filing date for custodial care is a distinction of no moment.

Eddy v. Litton, 586 So.2d 670, 675 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1991). See also, Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-0869 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So.2d 242. The initial inquiry is whether the award for the particular injuries and their effects under the particular circumstances on the particular injured person is clear abuse of the much discretion of the trier of fact. Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So.2d 149 (1963).

However, the PCF conceded that this rule only provides guidelines when determining reimbursement rates. The Mannings urge this Court to follow our decision in Kelty v. Brumfield, 1996-0869 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97); 691 So.2d 242, in order to affirm the trial court's decision that they be compensated at the prevailing LPN rate. The Mannings assert that Kelty provides guidelines for courts to use to depart from the compensation requirements of 1917(B).

Accordingly, we find no merit to the PCFOB's argument that venue is only proper in East Baton Rouge Parish. We note that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-0869 (La.App. 4th Cir.3/12/97), 691 So.2d 242, writ denied, 97-0918, 97-0936 (La. 5/16/97), 693 So.2d 800, 801 and Medical Review Panel v. Smith, 1998-2603 (La.App. 4th Cir.6/9/99), 736 So.2d 1033 determined that the proper venue for review of decisions by the PCFOB regarding future medical care and related benefits is in East Baton Rouge Parish under the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, La. R.S. 49:964. In Medical Review Panel v. Smith, supra, the court determined that "continuing jurisdiction" granted by La. R.S. 40:1299.43(E) did not confer jurisdiction to review the PCFOB's disposition of claims for future medical expenses.

The jury is not afforded the same broad latitude of discretion in the fixing of special damages as it is in matters of general damages and the allocation of comparative fault. Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-0869 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97), 691 So.2d 242; Vines v. Wood, 34,555 (La.App. 2. Cir. 4/4/01), 785 So.2d 126. While the jury was clearly wrong and committed manifest error concerning the property damage award to Mr. Thonn, it was not the type of error that would interdict the entire fact finding process and warrant a de novo review of other findings made below.

Interest on future medical benefits is payable "from the date of the filing of the complaint or the date the expenses were incurred, whichever is later." Kelty v. Brumfield, 96-869, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97); 691 So.2d 242, 247-248, writ denied, 97-918 (La. 5/16/97); 693 So.2d 800. Since the $35,251.