Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-7660.
March 31, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before this Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants on September 2, 2003 (Doc. No. 11) and the Response and Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff on September 22, 2003 (Doc. No. 21, 22).
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
As created by Lehigh and Northampton counties, the Lehigh Northampton Airport Authority ("LNAA") develops and operates airport facilities to assist in "achieving the short-term and long-term needs of the traveling public, air cargo shippers, general aviation community and the economic development of the Lehigh Valley in accordance with applicable standards established by the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the Pennsylvania Bureau of Aviation." D.'s Mot. at 2. LNAA's sources of revenue include fees paid by airlines, airport building rental payments, parking lot fees, federal and state grants. Id. The airport is governed under the laws of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by an appointed Board of Governors representing both counties. Id. LNAA's Board holds regular meetings announced and open to the public. George Doughty, the Executive Director, ("Mr. Doughty") oversees the daily operation of the airport and reports directly to the Board; that daily operation is divided among various departments each with a director or Superintendent who in turn, reports to Mr. Doughty; among the departments at the time this dispute arose were Finance Administration, Planning Engineering, Public Safety, and Maintenance. Id. Michael Burris, Director of Finance Administration ("Mr. Burris") served as Plaintiff's immediate supervisor. In accordance with federal, state and local laws, the LNAA Policy and Procedure Manuals described, in detail, its non-discrimination, harassment, ethics, and nepotism policies.
Jamie E. Kelly ("Plaintiff") worked for LNAA from July 24, 2001 until her termination on July 24, 2002. Mr. Doughty hired Plaintiff as the Personnel Manger in the Department of Finance and Administration as a result of her extensive knowledge and experience. D.'s Mot. at n. 1; Dep. of Mr. Doughty at 52. She reported to her immediate supervisor, Mr. Burris, and signed the requisite employee acknowledgment form that affirmed her understanding of the LNAA Policy and Procedure Manuals, particularly the non-discrimination, harassment, ethics, and nepotism policies. Plaintiff claims that this policy was not made available to her but that she located it and signed it independently. Dep. of Ms. Kelly at 18-19. It was clearly understood that violation of said policies could result in disciplinary action proportionate to the nature of the transgression. D.'s Mot. at 6.
According to LNAA, during her 30 hours weekly as the Personnel Manager, Plaintiff provided human resources support for union and non-union workforce, advised management staff on employee relations issues, recruited, selected and hired new employees, disciplined personnel, communicated LNAA policies and government regulations to management, labor representatives, and employees, maintained employee files, administered salary, monitored compliance with applicable federal regulations, administered employee benefits programs, developed and maintained cost-cutting programming. D's Mot. at Ex. B F. According to Plaintiff, her hiring responsibilities consisted only of posting job vacancies internally and in area newspapers upon request by a manager or director, scheduling interviews, conducting employment checks, and processing applications, orientation, and payroll. Kelly Affidavit at ¶ 3. During her tenure in the position, Plaintiff performed her job well, obtaining a good employee evaluation in December 2000. D's Mot. at Ex. K. Despite this, in his deposition, Mr. Doughty mentioned a concern raised by Mr. Burris that Plaintiff ignored the "chain of command," often working without providing detailed reports.Id. Overall, however, the record is replete with positive commentary from her supervisory staff.
In conjunction with Bruce Frack, Maintenance Superintendent, Larry Weiss, Assistant Maintenance Superintendant, and Tom Itterly, Custodial Supervisor, Plaintiff proposed the creation of two new maintenance positions to resolve issues of high custodial staff turnover. Id. at Ex. F; Dep. of Ms. Kelly at 80-86. She encouraged her friend and tenant, Mr. Lindner, to apply. Mr. Itterly approved scheduling his interview and ultimately recommended him for hire, despite his awareness of Plaintiff's pre-existing friendship with Mr. Lindner. Id. at 111-112, 125-127. Plaintiff then conducted all pre-employment screening and administrative processing of his application; he later became a full-time employee. Id. Once on staff, Mr. Lindner represented himself as Plaintiff's fiancee, alarming Mr. Burris.Id. After reviewing the personnel file, Mr. Burris confirmed his suspicion because Mr. Lindner's address placed him in same town where Plaintiff lived and he used her as a personal reference. Id. Plaintiff never informed her direct supervisors of this pre-existing relationship despite what Mr. Burris characterized as a prior willingness to share personal matters with them. Id.
Concerns that Plaintiff violated the LNAA policy against hiring domestic partners and the ethics policy disfavoring the appearance of a conflict of interest led Mr. Burris to meet with Mr. Doughty to discuss Plaintiff's actions. Id. at Ex. B. Both agreed that the appearance of impropriety and apparent disobedience of LNAA policies warranted further action. Id. At a private meeting with Mr. Burris, Plaintiff admitted that though she and Mr. Lindner were close friends, Mr. Lindner mischaracterized the nature of their relationship. Dep. of Ms. Kelly at 108-112. She claimed that he was a tenant of hers, but provided no lease for verification when it was requested of her. In fact, she informed Mr. Burris that she was married to Jan Reed by common law, a relationship she had not previously mentioned. D.'s Mot. at Ex. B. Mr. Burris said, "I thought Jan was a female and I had no idea you were married." Dep. of Ms. Kelly at 108. Upon request by Mr. Burris for verification of marriage, Plaintiff provided only a copy of her insurance benefits received through Jan Reed's employer. Dep. of Ms. Kelly at 113-115. Mr. Doughty met with Plaintiff on July 24, 2001 behind closed doors for approximately one hour during which she surrendered no additional details of her personal life and accepted responsibility for no wrongdoing. D.'s Mot. at Ex. B, F. This was deemed inadequate to allay Mr. Burris and Mr. Doughty's fears; Plaintiff was terminated that same day.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. No. 1) against George Doughty and Lehigh Northampton Airport Authority (together "Defendants") on September 30, 2003. Defendants filed an Answer on December 16, 2002 (Doc. No. 6). Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 2, 2003 (Doc. No. 11). In their Motion, Defendants argue that they discharged Plaintiff for her failure to follow LNAA policy and her lack of judgment whereas in her Response, Plaintiff submits that her termination was a consequence only of her gender in violation of Title VII and the PHRA. D.'s Mot. at Ex. B, C, D 2; Pl.'s Resp. at 18.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). In reviewing the record, "a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor." Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the record discloses no genuine issues as to any material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). There is a genuine issue for trial "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Such affirmative evidence — regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial — must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance." Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Title VII Claim
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). While the text of the statute generally makes reference to "specific employment decisions with immediate consequences, the scope of its prohibition [against discrimination in the workplace] is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination" and "covers more than terms and conditions in the narrow contractual sense." National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115-16 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (observing that "[t]he phrase `terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment."). A plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of Title VII through proof that harassment, unwelcome sexual conduct, or comments have unreasonably interfered with his or her job performance or led to the creation of an intimidating, hostile, or abusive work environment. See Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Weston v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425-26 (3d Cir. 2001); Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 1996).
1. Plaintiff May Establish a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
Plaintiff, a member of a protected class with ample qualifications, faced disciplinary action at least in part because of her gender. The parties' burdens in establishing and defending claims under the ADEA and Title VII are determined by the procedure set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Showalter v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 190 F.3d 231, 234 (3rd Cir. 1999). Traditionally, a plaintiff must first produce evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder as to all of the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. A plaintiff must initially establish that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position sought; and (3) nonmembers of the protected class were treated more favorably.Rossi v. New Jersey, 2002 WL 1478614, *2 (3rd Cir. 2002). Under the "mixed motive" standard articulated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1987), an employer may face liability upon a causation showing — that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating, although not a determinative, factor in the adverse employment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (1987) (plurality opinion). This standard is less exacting than the causation test in the usual "pretext" case, where consideration of a protected trait must be shown to be a determinative factor in the adverse action. Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 207 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2000). Once a plaintiff demonstrates that the adverse decision is the result of mixed motives, the burden shifts to the employer to persuade the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision even if the protected trait had not been considered. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion). Defendants argue that even when read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence does not state a prima facie case of discrimination because she fails to demonstrate that any LNAA employee in a non-protected class otherwise similarly situated received more favorable treatment. D.'s Mot. at 16. Plaintiff argues that under the "mixedmotive" standard of causation Defendants employed at least one illegitimate factor in reaching the decision to terminate her. Pl.'s Resp. at 18. At her deposition, Plaintiff testified to a number of other instances where members of the same family were hired to work for LNAA, some in the same department, without facing disciplinary action. Dep. of Ms. Kelly at 34-36. She further testified to a conversation with Mr. Doughty during which they agreed that in order to find qualified individuals in a difficult market, they could consider applications of friends and family of LNAA employees provided one would not directly supervise another.Id. at 40-41.
A comment made by Mr. Burris may indicate that Plaintiff's gender served as a potential motive behind her termination. Pl.'s Resp. at 17. With respect to her termination, Plaintiff testified that Mr. Burris commenced their initial conversation by saying, "What I'm about to discuss with you I wouldn't have to discuss with you if you were a man." Id. at 108. After Plaintiff informed him of the nature of her friendship with Mr. Lindner, Plaintiff claims Mr. Burris requested permission to inspect their living arrangements for confirmation; she refused. Id. at 113. When informed that Plaintiff had a common law marriage with Jan Reed, Mr. Burris stated that he suspected Mr. Reed was a female.Id. Plaintiff also claims to have alerted Mr. Burris to her suspicions of discriminatory treatment. Id. at 114. When viewed in their totality, these facts suggest that Plaintiff's gender may have played a motivating role in the LNAA's decision to terminate her. Although the record does not conclusively establish that Plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class was a determinative factor, under this "mixed motive" analysis, sufficient question of fact remains such that the Court will not eliminate discrimination as a contributing factor to Plaintiff's termination.
2. Defendant's Non-Discriminatory Reason May be Pretextual
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, "`[t]he burden of production (but not the burden of persuasion) shifts to the defendant, who must then offer evidence that is sufficient, if believed, to support a finding that the defendant had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse employment decision].'" Showalter, 190 F.3d at 235 (quoting Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3rd Cir. 1997);see also Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 278 (3rd. Cir. 1998). An employer need not prove, however, that the proffered reasons actually motivated the decision. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3rd Cir. 1994). Similarly, under thePrice Waterhouse analysis, the employer must demonstrate that it would have reached the same conclusion without consideration of Plaintiff's gender. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45. Defendants argue that the articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination, namely that "plaintiff was terminated for bad judgment, secrecy, and her refusal to acknowledge the Executive Director's authority to make personnel decisions" precludes Plaintiff from recovery. D.'s Mot. at 18-20. However, in his deposition, when asked to point to the LNAA policy provision Plaintiff violated, Mr. Burris could not point to specific language indicating an infraction. Dep. of Mr. Burris at 91-93. Similarly, Mr. Doughty could point to no written policy that required a Personnel Manager to disclose preexisting personal relationships, but only referred to the judgment expected of such a manager to avoid such situations. Dep. of Mr. Doughty at 60. Rather, Mr. Doughty testified that the decision to terminate arose from Plaintiff's unwillingness to accept responsibility for using poor judgment combined with the realization that their work relationship was unsalvageable. Id. at 65. Ultimately, Mr. Doughty concluded that "the overriding issue was honesty." Id. at 68. Yet, Plaintiff did notify and obtain approval from Mr. Itterly, a manager in the department to which Mr. Lintner would report. D.'s Mot. at Ex. L. Furthermore, Plaintiff's job description requires disclosure to management staff only of "employee related issues;" it does not require a detailed accounting of each applicant's hiring process. Dep. of Ms. Kelly at 23; D's Mot. at Ex. I. Though in the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants refer extensively to the LNAA policies, the factual record does not support a finding that the Defendants had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason within those policies to justify the decision to terminate Plaintiff.
Even if the Court accepts Defendant's proffered reason, the evidence submitted by Plaintiff may establish a reasonable inference of pretext. A plaintiff may survive summary judgment by submitting evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action. Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. Pretext is not demonstrated by showing simply that the employer was mistaken. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826 (1993). Instead, the Court examines the record for "evidence of inconsistencies or anomalies that could support an inference that the employer did not act for its stated reasons."Sempier v. Johnson Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir. 1995)citing Josey v. John R. Hollinsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993). Though Defendants initially accused Plaintiff of violating the anti-nepotism and ethics policies, they were unable to point to specific violations at their respective depositions. Despite providing evidence that she and Lindner were not intimately involved and verifying her relationship with Jan Reed as requested, Plaintiff still faced termination on the basis of her alleged inability to honor the "chain of command" D.'s Mot. at Ex. K. Defendants point to secrecy, lack of honesty, poor judgment, failure to disclose private details of Plaintiff's personal life while commending the quality of her work and without substantiating these rather inconsistent accusations. Upon review of these inconsistences, a reasonable fact finder could infer that LNAA did not act for its stated reason. As such, Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim survives the Motion for Summary Judgment.
B. Title VII Sexual Harrassment Claim
Plaintiff cannot establish the element necessary to sustain a sexual harassment claim under Title VII due to hostile work environment. In order to establish a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must prove five elements: "(1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of gender; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same gender in the same position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability." Shramban v. Aetna, 262 F. Supp.2d 531, 535 (E.D.Pa. 2003) (quoting Kunin v. Sears Roebuck Co., 175 F.3d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1999)). In determining whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances, including the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998). The conduct "must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment." Id. Plaintiff testified to conversations had with Mr. Burris during which he complained about and sought her advice regarding other female employees. Id. at 77-81. Defendants argue that though Plaintiff claims she felt harassed during the questioning about her relationship with Jan Reed and offended when asked to produce documentation evidencing a landlord/tenant relationship with Mr. Lindner, that is insufficient to establish a sexual harassment claim. D.'s Mot. at 22. Defendants point to Plaintiff's own deposition testimony where she admits that she saw neither Burris nor Doughty behave inappropriately during the course of her employment with LNAA.Id. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that would rise to the level required to establish pervasive, regular, harassing treatment that detrimentally affected her over time.
C. Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff cannot establish that by including her attorney in an interoffice electronic message to Mr. Burris and Mr. Doughty, she engaged in a protected activity that sparked their decision to terminate her. Pl.'s Resp. at 36. To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination under Title VII, the employee must satisfy a tripartite test: (i) the employee engaged in protected activity under Title VII; (ii) the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (iii) a nexus or causal link exists between the protected employee activity and the adverse employer action.See, e.g., Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989). Protected employee activity under Title VII is construed broadly to include when an employee has filed a formal EEO charge, as well as when an employee has "testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff did not file a formal charge, or engage in any investigation, proceeding or the like so as to have engaged in a protected activity; articulating an informal complaint and copying her attorney fails to satisfy this prong.
Even if Plaintiff had engaged in protected activity, she cannot establish a causal link between that activity and her termination. On the contrary, the record suggests that LNAA intended to proceed as planned without regard for Plaintiff's conduct. A "tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); accord Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 152-53 (3d Cir. 1999). Temporal proximity alone will generally "be insufficient to establish the necessary casual connection when the temporal relationship is not `unusually suggestive.'"Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280 (citing Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir. 1997); see Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001); see, e.g., Weston, 251 F.3d at 431 ("With one exception, we have never held that timing alone can be sufficient to establish causation."); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997) (evidence of a nineteen month gap, without more, was too distant to create a genuine issue of fact); but see Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708 (holding that the employee demonstrated a casual link where the adverse action occurred just two days after the protected conduct.). Defendant argues that Plaintiff never opposed any allegedly unlawful practices by LNAA and that no causal link exists between her contact with the attorney and her termination. D.'s Mot. at 24. Merely labeling Mr. Burris' comments as discriminatory or copying her attorney to any written or electronic correspondence does not amount to a protected activity under Title VII. Plaintiff points to Mr. Doughty's response to the e-mail which reads, "I noted the cc's. Continue as we discussed, but I think we are done." Pl's Resp. at Ex. G. Mr. Doughty's response, even if viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, suggests quite the opposite of retaliation; it indicates that LNAA intended to proceed as they planned regardless of her communication with counsel. Therefore, Count III of Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
Absent "unusually suggestive" temporal proximity, the plaintiff can infer a retaliatory motive using circumstantial evidence to establish a "pattern of antagonism" or "retaliatory animus" in the intervening time period between the protected activity and the adverse action. Farrell, 206 F.3d at 281. However, proving a "pattern of antagonism" or "retaliatory animus" does not operate as the exclusive method for establishing causation, "as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference." Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Farrell, 206 F.3d at 281 ("we have been willing to exp lore the record in search of evidence, and our caselaw has set forth no limits on what we have been willing to consider.").
E. Section 1983 Claim
Even if viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, LNAA's conduct does not amount to state action in order to support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for deprivation of the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws," under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights. Rather, it provides a remedy where rights created by federal law have been violated. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985)). To establish a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was deprived of a federal right; and (2) the person who deprived her of that right was acting under color of state law. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has stated that the flow of funds does not implicate the state in private activity; "[t]he Government may subsidize private entities without assuming constitutional responsibility for their actions." Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment Inc., 289 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir. 2002) citing San Francisco Arts Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544 (1987). The suggestion that Mr. Doughty's actions were under color of state law is unsupported by the factual record. That the LNAA receives some amount of federal funding does not in itself establish the link between Mr. Doughty's actions and the state. As such, Plaintiff's claim under § 1983 fails and Count V of Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.
F. PHRA Claims
The analysis required to adjudicate Plaintiff's claim under the PHRA is identical to a Title VII inquiry. Goosby v. Johnson Johnson Medical Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Jones v. School District of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999)). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims under the PHRA will not be separately addressed. Ryan v. General Machine Products, 277 F. Supp.2d 585, 590 (E.D.Pa. 2003). Because Plaintiff's claim for retaliation under Title VII is unsupported, Count IV of Plaintiff's Complaint is likewise dismissed. But, because there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint, Count II remains viable.
F. Punitive Damages
A claim for punitive damages is unwarranted because the factual record does not suggest that Defendants' conduct rises to the level of evil motive or intent. A jury may "assess punitive damages in a civil rights action when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430-431 (3d Cir. 2000) citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). To qualify for a punitive award, the intent standard inSmith requires, at a minimum, recklessness in its subjective form. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999) citing Smith, 461 U.S. at 37 (referring to a "subjective consciousness" of a risk of injury or illegality and a "`criminal indifference to civil obligations'"). Defendants argue that with regard to Plaintiff's federally protected rights, nothing in the record indicates that Defendants acted with malice or reckless indifference so as to warrant the availability of punitive damages. D.'s Mot. at 25. Plaintiff argues that barring an affirmative showing of ignorance, Defendants' awareness that their conduct violated federal law is sufficient to warrant punitive damages. Pl.'s Resp. at 41 (citing Lafate v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 123 F. Supp.2d 773, 784 (D. Del. 2000) (citing to Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 2000)). InAlexander, however, the Third Circuit found punitive damages appropriate where the defendant persistently refused to offer African Americans an opportunity to view apartments and misrepresented the availability of those apartments. Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 431 (3d Cir. 2000). See Miller v. Apartments Homes, 646 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1981) (punitive damages appropriate where defendant acts with reckless disregard as to whether he is violating a federally protected right, or consciously and deliberately disregards consequences of actions);see also Woods-Drake v. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982) ("wilful and gross" violation of the Fair Housing Act supported punitive damages where landlord evicted tenants for having African-American guests; on remand, trial court directed to assess punitive damages). Nothing in the factual record in this case rises to such a blatant disregard for the federal rights of members of a protected class so as to indicate a clear awareness on Defendants' part. After a thorough review of the record, this Court concludes that punitive damages are inappropriate in this case.
IV. Conclusion
For all these reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. An appropriate order follows.