Opinion
FFBTCV146046497S
02-10-2016
William Bradley Kellogg v. Fayerweather Yacht Club, Inc
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
George N. Thim, Judge Trial Referee.
Plaintiff William Bradley Kellogg wants this court to issue a mandatory injunction compelling defendant Fayerweather Yacht Club (" FYC") to reinstate the plaintiff as a member of the club. The plaintiff resigned his membership after the Board of Governors notified him after a hearing that it intended to impose disciplinary sanctions for his having acted in a disruptive manner in the club barroom. The plaintiff claims the board did not have authority to impose sanctions and that its improper attempt to do so caused him to resign. Defendant FYC contends that the board had authority to act and that it properly did so by providing the plaintiff with a fair, meaningful hearing followed by sanctions that were reasonable in light of the seriousness of the plaintiff's conduct. For the reasons stated below, this court denies the relief requested by the plaintiff.
I
The facts on which this dispute is based are as follows. On the evening of June 27, 2014, Attorney William Bradley Kellogg tied his twenty-seven foot sailboat to the FYC dock and went into the club to have dinner. After he filled up his plate at the raw bar, he went into the barroom and sat at the bar. He had two glasses of beer and a glass of wine. He left the bar briefly to bring his empty dinner plate to the kitchen. He returned to the barroom, stood near the bar and asked Daniel Conroy, who is the club permittee and bar manager, for a cup of coffee. The club was crowded as fireworks were being set off that evening over Long Island Sound as part of the Barnum Festival celebration. The plaintiff was told by Mr. Conroy that he would have to get in line at the service bar as that was the rule for persons who were not seated at the bar. The plaintiff was offended by the admonishment and tone of voice used by Mr. Conroy. A short time later, the plaintiff went to the front door of the club to greet a guest whose arrival he had been anticipating. As the plaintiff and his guest walked from the front door toward the rear of the club, Mr. Conroy was walking toward the front door to check on a delivery of beer kegs. The plaintiff and Mr. Conroy bumped shoulders. From a review of a surveillance video, it appears the physical contact was minimal and accidental. Attorney Kellogg and Mr. Conroy exchanged words and pointed at each other. The plaintiff decided to leave.
The plaintiff returned to his sailboat with his guest. He put on his life jacket and line gloves. He began to untie the sailboat with the assistance of his guest, who was planning to drive to a nearby marina where they would again meet. The plaintiff started the boat engine. Suddenly, he was overcome with anger about his encounter with Mr. Conroy. The plaintiff ran along the dock still wearing his life vest and line gloves, ran up the dock gangplank, into the club house, and into the bar. He said he was furious. The bar was crowded. He challenged Mr. Conroy to a fight and asked him Conroy to go outside and fight. He told Conroy that he was going to " kick his ass" and was going to sue him. The encounter ended without a fight. The plaintiff left the club house.
The club commodore, Richard Parker, received a phone call that evening from Conroy. Commodore Parker went to FYC and asked Conroy to prepare a written statement. Commodore Parker subsequently notified the members of the Board of Governors of the incident, and arranged for an investigation and special meetings. The Board held three special meetings on this matter, June 29, July 1, and July 15 of 2014.
At the meeting held on June 29th, the Board members reviewed Conroy's statement and expressed concerns. Attorney Thomas Lee, who is a member of the board, advised the Board members that they would have to proceed in accordance with section 5 of Article VII of FYC's by-laws, get witness statements, and invite the plaintiff to a meeting.
The plaintiff attended the special meeting held on July 1, 2014. He admitted that he had threatened Conroy; he admitted telling Conroy that he was going to " kick his ass." The plaintiff told the Board " I snapped--I was extremely angry--It was out of character--I regret my behavior." Exhibit 11.
On July 2, and on 9, 2014, Commodore Parker sent the plaintiff notice of a special meeting to be held on July 15, 2015. (Exhibits 2, B and C.) This notice reads, in part, as follows:
The Board of Governors of FYC has reviewed a number of written reports of the activities of this incident, which are enclosed and attached hereto. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 5 of the By-laws of FYC, the Board of Governors will be holding a meeting . . . on Tuesday, July 15, at 7:00 p.m. The Board has found the charges against you to be founded, and you are asked to attend on July 15th to respond to the charges.
Due to the severity of the charges, the Board has determined that until such date and time of your appearance scheduled for July 15th at 7:00 p.m., your privileges, as a Member of FYC, are suspended, to include coming upon the property. You may, of course, come upon the property to attend this meeting, and we are requesting your attendance.
The plaintiff attended the meeting of July 15th. He had been given copies of witness statements and surveillance videos with the July 9th notice. At the beginning of the meeting, he was asked by Attorney Lee if he knew the purpose of the meeting and whether he accepted the authority of the Board to make decisions on the matter. The plaintiff responded in the affirmative. The plaintiff again admitted that the accusations were substantially correct but told the board that he felt that he had been provoked by Conroy; " I feel I was provoked, but no degree of provocation would justify my behavior that evening." Exhibit 11. The board members queried the plaintiff about his ability to control this type of behavior in the future.
The evidence that the Board considered, in addition to Conroy's statement and the plaintiff's admissions, consists of two surveillance videos, a recorded statement made by a witness, and four written statements by witnesses. The plaintiff did not question the use of the written statements. The four written statements read, in part, as follows:
I was in line at the service bar. At this time a member, whom I did not know, came up behind me and began cursing at Dan [Conroy]. His language was embarrassing and obscene to anyone within earshot. He challenged Dan with the usual threat that a drunk person makes, " Why don't we step outside!" Exhibit E.
I observed Dan Conroy, the Fayerweather Yacht Club Permittee on the upper deck by the stairs. A short, bald man was yelling and swearing at him. The man appeared to be threatening Dan. Exhibit F.
The older gentleman I believe would not get in line to order drinks and was going to the bar by the taps and we happened to be sitting to the left of them. Dan was asking him and others who were not sitting at the bar to get in line. Dan then processed (sic) to tell the man that he was cut off and asked to leave (sic) . . . He left and came back 10 or 15 min. later . . . with his life preserver and sailing gloves on and asks Dan to step outside to fight . . . He was loud and using foul language. Exhibit G.
I remember Dan [Conroy] asking Brad [Kellogg] to use the service line when not sifting at the bar, this was the third time . . . Brad became very upset, enraged really. I then overheard Brad wanting to know if Dan wanted to take this outside, then proceeded to tell Dan he was going to sue him. He left briefly and then came back in with his gloves and vest on splaying his arms and telling, provoking really Dan to take this outside. Dan told brad (sic) that he was done and to leave, again. Said if he did not leave the premises the police would be called. After more words from Brad he finally left. Exhibit H.
The Board deliberated, as reported by Attorney Lee, a considerable period of time. The Board decided that a six month suspension from membership was appropriate, followed by probation for two years, and a letter of apology to Conroy to be delivered within ten days of receipt of a letter notifying the plaintiff of this action. If the letter of apology was not sent, the plaintiff's membership would be terminated. As explained by the Board members who testified at the court trial of this matter, the suspension was necessary to guarantee the safety of the club members. The board felt a cooling down period was appropriate and that a demonstration of remorse was necessary to assure such an event would not happen again. The Board's letter notifying the plaintiff of this sanction was sent on July 16, 2014. (Exhibit 3.)
After the plaintiff received the Board's notice of sanctions, he communicated with FYC's attorney, Peter Ambrose, in an effort to obtain some other resolution of this matter that would have involved an element of confidentiality that the Board did not believe it could fulfill. On July 25, 2014, the plaintiff sent the following message by email and letter to Commodore Parker and the Board: " Effective immediately, I resign my membership at Fayerweather Yacht Club. I reserve all my claims, legal rights and remedies." Exhibit 4. The plaintiff also mailed a letter to Attorney Ambrose advising him as follows: " In a separate document, I have resigned as a Member of Fayerweather Yacht Club, under complete reservation of rights. It is my position that I have been constructively expelled in violation of the By-Laws, Rules and Regulations." Exhibit 5.
At the trial on this matter, Attorney Kellogg testified that he had decided not to write a letter of apology to Mr. Conroy because he felt that Conroy was way out of bounds, had humiliated the plaintiff, had treated the plaintiff in a disrespectful and nasty fashion, and had told the plaintiff during the encounter near the front door " I will have your membership." The plaintiff did not want to have a " record" of being sanctioned or expelled. Therefore, in order to avoid a record, he resigned.
II
" It is well established in both our jurisprudence and that of other states that generally courts should be reluctant to intervene in the affairs of private clubs." Davidson v. Black Rock Yacht Club, 90 Conn.App. 27, 33, 877 A.2d 849 (2005) (Citations and quotations omitted). Nevertheless, there are circumstances where courts should intervene. Private clubs such as FYC are regulated by General Statutes § 33-1056(a). This statute provides that " membership shall be governed by such rules of admission, retention, withdrawal and expulsion as the by-laws shall prescribe, provided all such by-laws shall be reasonable, germane to the purposes of the corporation, and equally enforced as to all members." This provision " adopts common law standards of fair play . . ." Sterner v. Saugatuck Harbor Yacht Club, Inc., 188 Conn. 531, 535, 450 A.2d 369 (1982). Applying this statute to facts of this case presents three issues for this court to resolve: (1) whether FYC's by-laws are reasonable, (2) whether the plaintiff was afforded a meaningful hearing, and (3) whether the sanction was reasonable.
The first issue is whether the by-laws are reasonable. The pertinent by-law is section 5 of Article VII. It reads as follows:
Section 5. Complaints or charges against any member of the Club must be in writing to the Board of Governors. The charges will be reviewed by the Board of Governors at the next meeting and they will determine the validity of the charges. If the Board of Governors finds the charges to be founded, the member who has been charged will be asked to attend the next Board of Governors meeting to respond to the charges. The Board of Governors shall have the power to act thereon.
The plaintiff points out that this by-law does not codify or describe the kind of conduct that will subject an FYC member to discipline nor does it codify or describe the nature of the sanctions that would be appropriate for particular transgressions. The plaintiff argues that these deficiencies leave the Board without any authority whatsoever to suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline a member. " If the proceedings under review were a state-sanctioned civil or criminal proceeding involving state action and directly implicated due process protections, the plaintiff's argument would be persuasive . . . There is no support for the proposition, however, that an expulsion procedure undertaken by a nonstock corporation must comport precisely with due process guarantees. What the plaintiff is entitled to, pursuant to Sterner, is a hearing that is " reasonable." The accused must have notice of the charges, notice of the time and place of the hearing, and a full and fair opportunity to be present and present a defense." Davenport v. Society of the Cincinnati In the State of Connecticut, 46 Conn.Supp. 411, 441, 754 A.2d 225 Hartford, Nov. 10, 1999; Lavine, J.). The FYC by-law provides these protections is not unreasonable per se .
B
The second issue is whether the plaintiff was afforded a meaningful hearing. Quite clearly, he was. The plaintiff was given, days before the hearing, copies of the witness statements and copies of the surveillance videos. He was given ample notice of the hearing and a full opportunity to call witnesses and present a defense. After he admitted his unruly conduct and placed himself at the mercy of Board, the Board duly considered the matter. The plaintiff has not proven the Board failed to accord him a meaningful hearing as required by General Statutes § 33-1056(a).
C
The third issue is whether the sanction was reasonable. On this question, the concurring opinion of Associate Justice Arthur H. Healey in the Sterner case should be considered. Justice Healey quoted the following from a Florida case:
We should be reluctant to intervene in the affairs of private clubs . . . The parameters expressed by the Florida courts merit attention where they state: " We agree that courts should leave to the members of a private social club or to the proper board to which the members have lawfully delegated that power, the right to determine whether the action of a member has been such that, in the opinion of such Board, it would interfere with the pleasant, friendly and congenial social relationship between members. In the absence of a clear allegation and convincing proof, if the case reaches that stage, of fraud or bad faith, the action of the members duly delegated board should not be reviewed by the courts." Sterner v. Saugatuck Harbor Yacht Club, Inc., 188 Conn. 531, 540, 450 A.2d 369 (1982) (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
The Board of Governors of FYC was faced with disorderly conduct that took place inside the club house while a large number of members and guests were present. The misconduct involved a threat of violence that was directed against a club employee. Clearly, the Board needed to impose a sanction. While the Board may have gone overboard in requiring an apology that in effect was a deal breaker, its sanction has not been shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence to be unreasonable.
III
This court, after balancing the equities, denies the relief requested by the plaintiff. Judgment enters if favor of the defendant.