As plaintiff correctly states, the purpose of the Act is to provide compensation benefits to an unemployed individual in order to relieve the economic distress caused by involuntary unemployment. Kelley v. Department of Labor, 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 962 (1987). However, contrary to plaintiff's assertions, we find that section 612 of the Act precludes him from receiving unemployment benefits.
The purpose of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act is to provide compensation benefits to an unemployed individual in order to relieve economic distress caused by involuntary unemployment. Kelley v. Department of Labor, 160 Ill. App.3d 958, 513 N.E.2d 988 (1987). The Act is to be liberally construed in favor of providing benefits.
We observe that the purpose of the Act is to provide compensation benefits to an unemployed individual to relieve the economic distress caused by involuntary unemployment. See Kelley v. Department of Labor, 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 962 (1987). However, given the circumstances in this case, where plaintiff was employed as a substitute teacher for the first academic year, and reasonably assured of such employment for the second academic year, he is not involuntarily unemployed so as to trigger the award of benefits under the general purpose.
( Adams v. Ward (1990), 206 Ill. App.3d 719, 723, 565 N.E.2d 53, 56.) For a finding to be considered against the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly evident. ( Kelley v. Department of Labor (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 958, 962, 513 N.E.2d 988, 989.) Upon reviewing the record in this matter, we cannot conclude that the decision of the Board of Review is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence when, from the record, an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. ( Kelley v. Department of Labor (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 958, 961-62, 513 N.E.2d 988.) Findings must be based on evidence introduced in the case, "and nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such." Gregory v. Bernardi (1984), 125 Ill. App.3d 376, 378, 465 N.E.2d 1052.
In order for a finding to be considered against the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly evident. Kelley v. Department of Labor (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 958, 962, 513 N.E.2d 988; Smith, 150 Ill. App.3d at 587. Here, the Board found plaintiff's conduct to be willful as evidenced by his statement "that he was not going to be picking up after a bunch of babies."
Factual findings will not be disturbed absent a finding that they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (See Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor (1985), 105 Ill.2d 501, 475 N.E.2d 879, superseded by statute as stated in Siler v. Department of Employment Security (1989), 192 Ill. App.3d 971, 549 N.E.2d 760; Kelley v. Department of Labor (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 958, 513 N.E.2d 988.) The same deference is not accorded with respect to legal questions such as the construction of a statute.
Our function with respect to the board's factual findings is to determine whether they were against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( Jackson v. Board of Review (1985), 105 Ill.2d 501, 513, 475 N.E.2d 879; Kelley v. Department of Labor (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 958, 961-62, 513 N.E.2d 988.) However, the same deference is not accorded with respect to legal questions such as the erroneous construction of a statute.
( Smith v. Department of Public Aid (1986), 150 Ill. App.3d 584, 586-87, 502 N.E.2d 42; Meyers v. Department of Public Aid (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 288, 291, 448 N.E.2d 1176.) For a finding to be against the manifest weight of the evidence an opposite conclusion must be clearly evident. ( Kelley v. Department of Labor (1987), 160 Ill. App.3d 958, 962, 513 N.E.2d 988; Smith v. Department of Public Aid, 150 Ill. App.3d at 587.) No such opposite conclusion is evident in the present case.