Applying the so-called "dual purpose trips" doctrine, the Uland court held that the employee's death was within the course of his employment for worker's compensation purposes because he would not have made the trip to attend the football game but for the related business meeting. Id.; see also Keller v. H.P. Wasson Co., 153 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind.Ct.App. 1958) ("There is an exception to the general rule, in that, an employee, while he is performing, or is on his way home from performing, or is on his way from his home to perform some special service or errand, or some duty incidental to the nature of his employment in the interest of, or under the direction of his employer, sustaining an accidental injury, is considered to have suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment."). King attempts to distinguish Lockwood from the instant case by noting that in Lockwood, the employee was injured while turning into a shopping center, whereas Carl was involved in his accident while exiting a drugstore en route back to his employer's complex, albeit the residential portion of that complex.
In Stanley v. Riggs Equipment Co., (1961) 133 Ind. App. 86, 178 N.E.2d 766, reh. denied (1962), the Appellate Court affirmed the Industrial Board's decision to deny compensation where a heavy equipment operator sustained fatal injuries in an automobile accident on a public highway in front of the employer's premises while operating his own vehicle. In Keller v. H.P. Wasson Co., (1958) 129 Ind. App. 59, 153 N.E.2d 386, the Appellate Court sustained the finding of the full Industrial Board that the injuries to an employee which occurred when she was driving a fellow employee home from work during a transportation strike were not the result of an accident out of and in the course of her employment. In DeCanales v. Dyer Construction Co., (1970) 147 Ind. App. 537, 262 N.E.2d 543, trans. denied, a construction laborer had ceased performing his assigned duties and, while waiting for his ride, relieved himself a considerable distance away from his job site and across some railroad tracks which were not a necessary means of ingress and egress to and from his job site. While on the tracks, the employee was struck and killed by a passing train.
"Said full Industrial Board of Indiana, by a majority of its members, now finds for the defendant and against the plaintiff on plaintiff's application Form 9 for the adjustment of claim for compensation, filed on the 16th day of May, 1962." Generally, accidents occurring on the way to employment are not compensable because such accidents do not arise out of and in the course of employment as required by the Workmen's 1. Compensation Act, ยง 40-1202, Burns' 1965 Repl. Boyd v. Chase (1929), 89 Ind. App. 374, 166 N.E. 611. Emmons v. Wilkerson (1950), 120 Ind. App. 100, 89 N.E.2d 296. Keller v. H.P. Wasson Co. (1958), 129 Ind. App. 59, 153 N.E.2d 386. The meaning of the words "out of" and "in the course of" the employment has been defined by this court in the case, Tom Joyce 7 Up Company v. Layman (1942), 112 Ind. App. 369, at 373, 44 N.E.2d 998.
While it is urged by the appellee that the facts and circumstances of this case clearly bring the case within other exceptions to the "going and coming" rule, in the light of what we have said before it is not necessary to discuss these other exceptions. The appellant relies upon the case of Emmons v. Wilkerson, supra and the case of Keller v. H.P. Wasson Co. (1958), 129 Ind. App. 59, 153 N.E.2d 386, in support of its 6, 7. contention that the award of the Board was contrary to law. In both of these cases, which involved travel to and from work and wherein compensation was denied, the court affirmed a ruling by the Board adverse to the claimant and commented heavily upon the proposition that it is for the Industrial Board to determine the facts and such determination can not be reversed by a court of appeals only upon a conclusive showing to the contrary.