Opinion
5:23-CV-00571-BO
02-22-2024
Francis Keister, Plaintiff, v. Wake County District Attorney's Office, et al., Defendants.
ORDER & MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
Robert T. Numbers, II, United States Magistrate Judge
Francis Keister, proceeding pro se, would like to sue various individuals and entities for alleged constitutional violations. See Proposed Compl. at 1, D.E. 1-3. He also seeks to proceed without paying the standard filing fee for civil actions. IFP Mot., D.E. 2. The court will waive the filing fee because Keister lacks the resources to pay it. But because his Proposed Complaint lacks important factual details, the undersigned recommends that the court should dismiss his Proposed Complaint without prejudice.
I. IFP Motion
Keister asks the court to allow him to proceed with this action without paying the required filing fee and other costs associated with litigation (colloquially known as proceeding in forma pauperis or IFP). The court may grant his request if he submits an affidavit describing his assets and the court finds that he cannot pay the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In assessing a request to proceed IFP, the court should consider whether the plaintiff can pay the costs associated with litigation “and still be able to provide himself and his dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court has reviewed Keister's application and finds that he lacks the resources to pay the costs associated with this litigation. The court thus grants his motion (D.E. 2) and allows him to proceed IFP.
II. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
After determining that Keister is entitled to IFP status, the court must analyze the viability of his claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court reviews a complaint to eliminate claims that unnecessarily impede judicial efficiency and the administration of justice. The court must dismiss any portion of the complaint it determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous because of either legal or factual shortcomings. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Legally frivolous claims are based on an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory' and include ‘claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.'” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). A complaint is factually frivolous when its factual allegations are “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Keister's pro se status relaxes, but does not eliminate, the requirement that his Proposed Complaint contain facially plausible claims. The court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, but it “cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts” that set forth a cognizable claim. Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (E.D. N.C. 2011).
Courts may also consider whether they have subject matter jurisdiction when conducting the § 1915 screening. Unlike their state counterparts, federal courts have jurisdiction only over a limited set of cases and controversies. They are “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998).
In most civil cases, a court obtains subject matter jurisdiction in one of two ways. First, under “federal question jurisdiction,” a federal court will have jurisdiction to resolve a claim if it arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Second, a federal court may have authority to hear a case through what is known as diversity jurisdiction. This type of jurisdiction exists if the amount at issue exceeds $75,000 and the parties to the case are citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. When a party is a natural person, the court will consider them a citizen of a particular state if they are “both a citizen of the United States and a domiciliary of that State.” Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 937 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008). And to establish someone's domicile requires a showing of “physical presence, coupled with an intent to make the State a home.” Id. There must also be complete diversity between the parties, meaning that the plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
III. Factual Allegations
The Proposed Complaint contends that Keister was a passenger on a Greyhound bus traveling from Washington, D.C. to Nashville, Tennessee in September 2022. D.E. 1 at 2. The bus eventually stopped in Raleigh, North Carolina. Id. at 4.
At this stop, Keister had an “interaction” with the bus driver. Id. Three police officers arrived at the terminal and asked Keister what had happened. Id. Keister stated that “one of the Drivers at the Bus Station had pick (sic) me out immediately the Bus arrived at the Bus Station.” Id.
After officers spoke with the woman who called them, they asked Keister to leave the bus station. Id. Keister objected, saying that he was a passenger waiting a bus to depart for Nashville. Id. at 4-5. The officers escorted Keister out of the bus station and then left. Id. at 5.
Keister later reentered the bus station at the scheduled departure time for his bus to Nashville. Id. But the bus driver did not let him on the bus and it left without him. Id.
The next day, Keister called Greyhound Customer Service, who allegedly told him his booking number remained valid. Id. at 5-6. Keister also claims they advised him to return to the bus station and speak with the manager, which he did. Id. at 6. But the manager directed Keister to speak to the woman who had called the police the day before. Id. Once the manager left the woman called the police. Id.
Two police officers, Officer Windesky and Officer Evitta, responded to the bus station. Id. They told told Keister he was not allowed in the bus station and that they were going to detain him for trespassing. Id. Keister protested that he was a passenger, implying he had a right to be there. Id. Officers handcuffed him, searched him and his belongings, and placed him in Officer Windesky's patrol vehicle. Id. at 7. A third officer, Officer Alonso, later arrived and transported Keister to the Wake County Jail. Id. at 7.
Keister appeared before a magistrate who set a $500.00 bond, which he could not post. Id. He then claims that he spent days in jail. Id.
Two weeks later, while waiting for a hearing, a Sheriff's deputy informed him that the case was dismissed. Id. at 9. Law enforcement discharged Keister from custody. Id. at 8
Keister claims improper search, wrongful arrest, detention, and prosecution, as well as libel, slander, and defamation. He asserts violations of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. He names as Defendants Wake County District Attorney Lorrin Freeman and her Office, the City of Raleigh, Raleigh Police Department, its officers Evetta, Windesky, and Alonso, and Greyhound and its Jane Doe employee. Keister seeks monetary damages for lost wages, diminished reputation and humiliation, and an inability to find suitable living quarters. And Keister asks for injunctive relief through sealing his records.
Alternatively identified as Officer Lywickes.
IV. Discussion
Keister filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates civil liability for any person acting under the color of state law who deprives a plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. A State is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity when it is sued in federal court by one of its own citizens. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh Amendment thus “bars all claims by private citizens against state governments and their agencies, except where Congress has validly abrogated that immunity or the state has waived it.” Passaro v. Virginia, 935 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2019).
The Wake County District Attorney's Office is an arm of the State of North Carolina. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-60 (“The State shall be divided into prosecutorial districts ....There shall be a district attorney for each prosecutorial district[.]”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-61 (empowering district attorneys to “prosecute in a timely manner in the name of the State all criminal actions”); Felix v. Doughtie, No. 2:21-CV-7-FL, 2021 WL 2345252, at *10 (E.D. N.C. June 8, 2021). So the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the Office from Keister's suit.
Claims against Freeman, in her official capacity as District Attorney, fail for the same reason. North Carolina district attorneys are state officials. Id. The true party in interest in suits against them in their official capacity is North Carolina, which is immune. Id. The Eleventh Amendment thus bars Keister's claims against Freeman as District Attorney.
B. Prosecutorial Immunity
Keister's claims against Freeman also fail because she enjoys immunity in her role as District Attorney. “[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from damages liability when they act as advocates for the State.” Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2018). This immunity “safeguards the process, not the person” and extends “to actions ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'” Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 117 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)).
To determine whether a particular action is entitled to absolute immunity, courts “look to ‘the nature of the function performed,' without regard to ‘the identity of the actor who performed it,' ‘the harm that the conduct may have caused,' or even ‘the question whether it was lawful.'” Id. at 118 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). Courts must distinguish between “advocative functions,” which receive absolute immunity, and “investigative or administrative functions,” which do not. Id. A prosecutor's activities are advocative when she “professionally evaluates evidence assembled by the police, decides to seek an arrest warrant, prepares and files charging documents, participates in a probable cause hearing, and presents evidence at trial.” Id. (citations omitted). Actions are considered investigative or administrative occur when a prosecutor “gives legal advice to police during an investigation, investigates a case before a probable cause determination, and personally attests to the truth of averments in a statement of probable cause.” Id. (citations omitted).
Freeman entitled to prosecutorial immunity as the Wake County District Attorney. Charging Keister and participating in hearings are advocative functions. Thus, she enjoys absolute prosecutorial immunity against his claims. So the district court should dismiss all claims against Freeman.
Through unnamed members of the Wake County District Attorney's Office.
D. Failure to State a Claim
1. Raleigh Police Department
Keister's claims against the Raleigh Police Department are subject to dismissal. This Defendant is not a legal entity capable of being sued. See Wilson v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, No. 5:13-CV-178-BO, 2014 WL 555663, at *1-2 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 11, 2014) (municipal police departments are not subject to suit under § 1983). So Keister's claims against the Raleigh Police Department should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. City of Raleigh
Municipal liability under § 1983 may exist “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury” complained of by plaintiff. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). An official policy may arise from written ordinances and regulations. Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). It can stem from affirmative decisions of policymaking individuals. Id. (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)). And it may result from the omissions of policymakers manifesting “deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens.” Id. (citing Canton v. City of Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989)). An official custom may exist if “a practice is ‘so persistent and widespread' and ‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.'” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
There is no respondeat superior liability for § 1983 claims. So a municipality is not liable solely because it employs an alleged tortfeasor. Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691)
Keister identifies no official policy, procedure, or custom of the City that has resulted in the harm that he alleges. Instead, he asserts injury, in general terms, based on the isolated conduct of individual officers at the time of the incident. Keister thus fails to state a viable § 1983 claim against the City. See Bowie v. Henderson Police Dep't, No. 5:12-CV-514-FL, 2012 WL 5392116, at *3-4 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 5, 2012) (dismissing on frivolity review a plaintiff's § 1983 claim for failing to allege any facts showing an official policy or custom of abuse, or failure to train, and finding mere allegations of isolated police misconduct were insufficient to state a claim).
Keister has failed to state a claim against the City. So the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss any claims against the City of Raleigh.
3. Wake County District Attorney's Office
As noted above, the Wake County District Attorney's Office is an arm of the State of North Carolina. A State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). So the Wake County District Attorney's Office does not qualify as a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. Keister's claims against the Wake County District Attorney's Office are thus subject to dismissal on this basis.
4. Wake County District Attorney Freeman
Keister's claims against the Wake County District Attorney in her personal capacity fail. A complaint must allege “an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation” because “liability will only lie where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights.” Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”).
Keister's Proposed Complaint offers no allegations detailing Freeman's actions. There is no factual support for a claim that Freeman had any personal involvement in the alleged acts of which he complains. Presumably Keister attaches Freeman's responsibility to her supervisory role to infer that persons in her office pursued the charge against him. Yet as noted above, § 1983 imposes no supervisory liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (in § 1983 suits, mere knowledge is insufficient to establish personal participation, so “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the constitution.”).
The district court should thus dismiss Keister's claims against Freeman.
5. Greyhound Bus and Jane Doe
The Proposed Complaint attempts to bring claims against Greyhound Bus Lines and its employee Jane Doe. D.E. 1. But this private entity, and its employee, are not state actors under § 1983.
A person acts under color of state law when he “exercise[s] power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'” Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting West, 487 U.S. at 49). “[T]he conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the State.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[M]erely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful” does not qualify as state action. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). Private conduct will not constitute state action “unless the state has so dominated such activity as to convert it to state action.” Philips, 572 F.3d at 181.
The Court of Appeals has identified several contexts in which private action may be found to constitute state action. Andrews v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993). Such circumstances include:
(1) when the state has coerced the private actor to commit an act that would be unconstitutional if done by the state; (2) when the state has sought to evade a clear constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor; (3) when the state has delegated a traditionally and exclusively public function to a private actor; or (4) when the state has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right of a private citizen.Id. Conduct falling outside of one of these four categories is private conduct, not state action. Id.
The Proposed Complaint makes no allegations that Greyhound or Doe acted within the limited scenarios that transform private conduct into state action. There is no suggestion that these Defendants were anything other than private parties engaged in private activity.
So Keister's § 1983 claim against Greyhound and Doe fail. The undersigned thus recommends that the court dismiss his claims against them.
6. Raleigh Police Officers
Keister's Proposed Complaint alleges that three officers with the Raleigh Police Department-Alonso, Evetta, and Windesky-violated his rights by arresting him. He contends that there was no basis for the arrest and detention or fiing charges against him. But Keister's claims lack facial plausibility and should be dismissed.
Section 1983 actions premised on false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”). To prevail, a plaintiff must prove “the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012).
a. Unlawful Arrest
The Fourth Amendment protects members of the public from unreasonable seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend IV. When a plaintiff alleges that a law enforcement officer violated their Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully arresting them, that plaintiff must establish that their arrest was not supported by probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007).
The Fourth Amendment applies to state actors through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
In considering whether probable cause supported a particular arrest, a court must “examine the events leading up to the arrest and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2018) (quotations omitted). Meeting the probable cause standard “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Id. at 57 (quotation omitted). This “is not a high bar.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Keister states that he was asked to leave the bus station and escorted out of the bus terminal by officers. D.E. 1 at 4-5. When he returned the next day, and the police were called again. Id. at 6. A woman told the officers that Keister was not allowed there. Id. Officers told Keister he was trespassing. Windesky and Evetta handcuffed him. Id. After being placed in a patrol car, Alonso transferred him to Wake County Jail. Id. at 7.
At the time of the arrest, North Carolina law provided: “A person commits the offense of second degree trespass if, without authorization, he enters or remains on premises of another after he has been notified not to enter or remain there by the owner, by a person in charge of the premises, by a lawful occupant, or by another authorized person.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-159.13(a)(1).A violation of this section is a Class 3 misdemeanor, carrying a maximum penalty of 20 days in jail and a $200 fine. Id. § 15A-1340.23.
December 2023 amendments altered some wording but made no substantive changes to the statute.
The Proposed Complaint alleges facts to support an objectively reasonable police officer to believe Keister had committed a crime. Officers spoke with a Greyhound employee who informed them Keister was not allowed in the bus station. Police had escorted him out of the terminal a day earlier. He disputed their claim that he was trespassing.
Keister's allegations demonstrate that he returned to the Greyhound premises after an authorized individual said he could not be there. The facts satisfy the elements of a trespass offense, and officers had probable cause to arrest him for that charge. See North Carolina v. Burwell, 256 N.C.App. 722, 733-34, 808 S.E.2d 583, 593 (N.C. App. 2017) (officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for second-degree trespass where defendant remained at premises without authorization after being notified not to enter or remain there).
So the Proposed Complaint fails to state a claim for false arrest.
b. Malicious Prosecution
A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is properly understood as a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the common law tort. Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2000). To state a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant caused a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process, unsupported by probable cause, and the criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiffs' favor. Evans, 703 F.3d at 647. A plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction to demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 1335 (2022).
On the last element, the Proposed Complaint alleges the charges were dropped. A dismissal, as alleged, arguably satisfies the favorable termination element.
But Keister has not alleged that he was seized without probable cause. A malicious prosecution claims requires Keister to show that there was no probable cause for his arrest. Caraway v. City of Pineville, 639 F.Supp.3d 560, 579 (W.D. N.C. 2022). As discussed above, officers had probable cause to arrest Keister for trespass. So he cannot satisfy this element of a malicious prosecution claim. See McKinney v. Richland Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 431 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir. 2005) (an arrest based on probable cause cannot constitute a constitutional violation).
So the Proposed Complaint's allegations of malicious prosecution are subject to dismissal.
Keister's failure to sufficiently allege the elements of malicious prosecution are similarly fatal to extent he attempts to bring such a claim against Freeman, or an assistant district attorney. Additionally, they would enjoy prosecutorial immunity as discussed above because the sparse allegations can only be read to identify advocative functions, not administrative ones.
c. False Imprisonment
Keister's Proposed Complaint appears to object to his two-week detention. Yet it is unclear whether he objects to the fact that he was detained following his arrest, or the manner of his detention, as it appear to reference solitary confinement.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017) (citation omitted). “False imprisonment consists of detention without legal process,” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (2007). The elements of a claim for false imprisonment mirror those of false arrest. Id. at 387-88 (false arrest and false imprisonment are overlapping claims).
So the Proposed Complaint again must allege that the Defendants caused a seizure of Keister, pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. Evans,703 F.3d at 647. As noted above, officers had probable cause to arrest Keister. His detention followed a lawful arrest. So Keister cannot state a claim for false imprisonment.
The court should thus dismiss this claim.
D. Defamation, Libel, and Slander
Keister also alleges defamation which is essentially a state-law tort claim. Cannon v. Peck, 36 F.4th 547, 559 (4th Cir. 2022); Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 521 (4th Cir. 1999). In North Carolina, “to make out a prima facie case for defamation, [the] ‘plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant made false, defamatory statements of or concerning the plaintiff, which were published to a third person, causing injury to the plaintiff's reputation.'” Griffin v. Holden, 636 S.E.2d 298, 302 (N.C. App. 2006) (quotation omitted). A defamatory communication is one that “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977) (August 2023 Update); Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993).
North Carolina has two distinct forms of defamation: libel and slander. “In general, libel is written while slander is oral.” Tallent v. Blake, 57 N.C.App. 249, 251, 291 S.E.2d 336, 338 (N.C. App. 1982).
Keister complains that his arrest and detention damaged his reputation and good standing in the community, and he has been unable to find work or housing. But he does not plausibly allege that any Defendant made a false statement about him. Nor does his Proposed Complaint identify one that violated his rights. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (“vague and conclusory” allegations did not satisfy the Federal Rules' notice pleading requirements). In sum, his claims are insufficient to satisfy the notice pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (statement must give statement defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”) (alteration omitted).
So the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss Keister's state-law claims.
Alternatively, the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over these claims. A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims arising from the same case or controversy as claims grounded in federal question jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. See id. § 1367(c). A district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims where all the federal question claims have been dismissed. 18 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(4).
If all federal claims are dismissed, in the interest of judicial economy, fairness, and comity, the court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Keister's state claims asserting defamation, libel, and slander. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cheever, No. 5:15-CT-3050-FL, 2017 WL 2539764, at *4 (E.D. N.C. June 12, 2017).
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the court grants Keister's motion to proceed IFP. D.E. 2. It denies as moot his motion for action on his IFP application (D.E 13) and motions for an extension of time to pay the filing fee (D.E. 17, 18). And the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss his Complaint (D.E. 1) without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R) on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.