Based on the foregoing and because Pitch Landing demanded a jury trial in the Pitch Landing Case, we further hold the circuit court did not err by denying Pitch Landing's motion to consolidate. See Keels v. Pierce, 315 S.C. 339, 342, 433 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ct. App. 1993) ("An appellate court will not disturb a [circuit] court's ruling on a motion to consolidate absent an abuse of discretion."); Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 363 S.C. 460, 467, 611 S.E.2d 905, 908 (2005)
We hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because the consolidation promoted judicial economy and, based on the allegations in their complaints, there was a common question of law or fact as to whether FHC's polished floor was a dangerous condition. Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Keels v. Pierce, 315 S.C. 339, 342, 433 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ct. App. 1993) ("An appellate court will not disturb a [circuit] court's ruling on a motion to consolidate absent an abuse of discretion."); Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, 381 S.C. 417, 434, 673 S.E.2d 448, 457 (2009) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without evidentiary support."); Rule 42(a), SCRCP ("When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the action[, and] it may order all the actions consolidated . . . ."); Keels, 315 S.C. at 342, 433 S.E.2d at 904
" Id. However, "[t]he right of trial by jury is highly favored, and waivers of the right are always strictly construed and not lightly inferred or extended by implication." Keels v. Pierce , 315 S.C. 339, 342, 433 S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ct. App. 1993). "In the absence of an express agreement or consent, a waiver of the right to a jury trial will not be presumed.
Like any contract, an accord and satisfaction requires a meeting of the minds. Keels v. Pierce, 315 S.C. 339, 343, 433 S.E.2d 902, 905 (Ct.App. 1993). The debtor must intend and make unmistakably clear the payment tendered fully satisfies the creditor's demand and the creditor must accept payment with the intention that it will operate as a satisfaction.
If the jury renders an ambiguous verdict, the court must resubmit the case to the jury, not act as a substitute for the jury. Johnson, 315 S.C. at 417, n. 7, 433 S.E.2d 902, n. 7. B. Procedure for the Judge
This court must review a trial judge's decision to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages under an "abuse of discretion" standard. SeeKeels v. Pierce, 315 S.C. 339, 433 S.E.2d 902 (Ct.App. 1993) (appellate court will not disturb trial judge's ruling on motion to consolidate absent abuse of discretion); see alsoGiles v.Parker, 304 S.C. 69, 403 S.E.2d 130 (Ct.App. 1991) (bifurcation of trial was well within trial judge's discretion). Under Rule 42(b), SCRCP, the court
We agree with Sitton Buick. The trial judge committed reversible error in not submitting separate verdict forms to the jury in these consolidated actions. The actions, despite their consolidation, retained their separate identities. Keelsv. Pierce, ___ S.C. ___, 433 S.E.2d 902 (Ct.App. 1993); seealso note to Rule 42(a), SCRCP ("The parties and pleadings are not merged, and each action retains its own identity . . . ."). Sitton Buick was clearly prejudiced since there was no way for it to determine the amount of damages awarded by the jury in each case so as to be able to question whether the amount awarded in each case, particularly the son's, was excessive.