Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp.

11 Citing cases

  1. Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp.

    39 N.J. 184 (N.J. 1963)   Cited 142 times
    Recognizing cause of action to invalidate stock option plan and enjoin issuance of options

    The trial court held that the release barred the suit since plaintiff concededly claimed fraud in its inducement rather than in its execution. Reliance was placed on Kearney v. National GrainYeast Corporation, 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941), in which it was held, under the pre-1948 practice, that only fraud in the execution of a release could avoid its effect in an action at law. Because of this conclusion the other motions were dismissed as moot.

  2. Van Houten Service, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.

    417 F. Supp. 523 (D.N.J. 1975)   Cited 17 times

    It is the general rule in this state that where a party affixes his signature to a written instrument, such as a release, a conclusive presumption arises that he or she read, understood and assented to its terms and will not be heard to complain that the effect of the act of signing was not comprehended. Peter W. Kero, Inc. v. Terminal Construction Corp., 6 N.J. 361, 368, 78 A.2d 814 (1951); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307, 19 A.2d 19, 21 (Ct.Err. App. 1941). There is an exception, however, where there is a showing of fraud, misrepresentation or over-reaching by the releasee, or a showing that the releasor was suffering from an incapacity affecting his ability to understand the meaning of the release or on any other equitable ground. Raroha v. Earle Finance Corp., Inc., 47 N.J. 229, 234, 220 A.2d 107 (1966); Wojcik v. Pollock, 97 N.J.Super. 319, 324, 235 A.2d 58 (L.Div. 1967).

  3. Peter W. Kero, Inc. v. Terminal Construction Corp.

    6 N.J. 361 (N.J. 1951)   Cited 70 times
    Recognizing "the general rule that where a party affixes his signature to a written instrument, ... a conclusive presumption arises that he read, understood and assented to its terms"

    A notable exception to this rule, however, is when the signature is obtained by fraud or imposition in the execution of the instrument. Christie v.Lalor, 116 N.J.L. 23, 25 ( Sup. Ct. 1935); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1940). It is well settled that where a party is induced to sign a release by reason of a misrepresentation intended to deceive him as to its purport or content, the signer has a right to set up such fraud or imposition in avoidance of such release when there is an attempt to use it against him by the release, even though the signer might have discovered the fraud perpetrated upon him by reading the paper and was negligent in omitting to do so. McDonald v. Central R.R. Co., 89 N.J.L. 251 ( E. A. 1916); Fagan v. Central Railroad Co., 94 N.J.L. 454, 459 ( E. A. 1920); Mannion v. Hudson Manhattan R.R. Co., 125 N.J.L. 606 ( Sup. Ct. 1941); affirmed, 127 N.J.L. 230 ( E. A. 1941); McKenna v.Montclair Police, etc., Commission, 121 N.J.L. 206 ( Sup. Ct. 1938); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., supra; cf. DunstonLithograph Co. v. Borgo, 84 N.J.L. 623 ( E. A. 1913); Diamond Rubber Co., Inc., v. Feldstein, 112 N.J.L. 514, 517 ( E. A. 1934).

  4. Silbros, Inc., v. Solomon

    52 A.2d 534 (N.J. 1947)   Cited 17 times
    In Silbros Inc., v. Solomon, 139 N.J. Eq. 528, 52 A.2d 534, the only question before the court was the enforcibility of a covenant not to compete against a former employee.

    This doctrine arises from the well-settled principle that affixing a signature to a contract creates a conclusive presumption, except as against fraud, that the signer read, understood, and assented to its terms." Accordant decisions: Dunston Litho. Co. v. Borgo, 84 N.J. Law 623;87 Atl. Rep. 334; Champlin v. Davis, 94 N.J. Law 523; 110 Atl. Rep. 921;Diamond Rubber Co. v. Feldstein, 112 N.J. Law 514;171 Atl. Rep. 815; Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp.,126 N.J. Law 307; 19 Atl. Rep. 2d 19; Fortunel v. Martin, 114 N.J. Eq. 235;168 Atl. Rep. 393; Equitable Life, c., v. Gutowski,119 N.J. Eq. 181; 181 Atl. Rep. 636; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Lodzinski, 121 N.J. Eq. 183; 188 Atl. Rep. 681; reversed on other grounds, 122 N.J. Eq. 404; 194 Atl. Rep. 79. Other defensive points of a legalistic nature introduced for consideration on behalf of the defendant Solomon are not meritorious.

  5. Reinhardt v. Wilbur

    30 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1954)   Cited 16 times

    "To avoid the consequences of a release pleaded by a defendant in an action at law, plaintiff must base his attack upon the fraud or deceit of the party who procured its execution and not upon plaintiff's failure to comprehend the significance or effect of his act in signing it. * * * In the absence of fraud in the execution, the binding signature of the plaintiff has been considered conclusive." Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307, 312 ( E. A. 1940). Peter W. Kero, Inc., v. Terminal Construction Corp., 6 N.J. 361 (1951).

  6. Landriani v. Lake Mohawk Country Club

    26 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 1953)   Cited 24 times
    Involving a misrepresentation that the purchase of a lakefront cottage would make the purchaser eligible for membership in a country club

    And that the damage was the natural result of the wrongful act. Kearney v. National, etc., Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941). A companion rule leads to a non-suit if the plaintiff fails to prove damages.

  7. Perigot v. Steiker

    18 N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 1952)   Cited 3 times

    It is the well settled principle that affixing a signature to a contract creates a conclusive presumption, except as against fraud, that the signer read, understood, and assented to its terms. Fivey v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 67 N.J.L. 627 ( E. A. 1902); Dunston Litho. Co. v. Borgo, 84 N.J.L. 623 ( E. A. 1913); Champlin v. Davis, 94 N.J.L. 523 ( E. A. 1920); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Feldstein, 112 N.J.L. 514 ( E. A. 1934); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941); Fortunel v. Martin, 114 N.J. Eq. 235 ( E. A. 1933); Equitable Life, c., v. Gutowski, 119 N.J. Eq. 181 ( Ch. 1935); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Lodzinski, 121 N.J. Eq. 183 ( Ch. 1936), reversed on other grounds, 122 N.J. Eq. 404 ( E. A. 1937); Silbros, Inc., v. Solomon, 139 N.J. Eq. 528 ( Ch. 1947). The plaintiff did not disavow knowledge of the stated limitation of the validity of the terms of the purchase order but testified that Rawlings who signed as salesman orally represented to him that he was manager.

  8. Petaccia v. Gallian

    16 N.J. Super. 427 (App. Div. 1951)

    Even if he did not read the contract, plaintiff is concluded by its terms. Fivey v. Penn. R.R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 627 ( E. A. 1902); Champlin v. Davis, 94 N.J.L. 523 ( E. A. 1920); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941). The facts are clearly enough disclosed by the proofs.

  9. Silvestri v. South Orange Storage Corp.

    14 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div. 1951)   Cited 17 times
    In Silvestri v. South Orange Storage Corp. 14 N.J. Super. 205, 210 (App.Div. 1951), the court found that a "bailment relation" existed where consumer Silvestri contracted with defendant storage company to store her refrigerator.

    " Fivey v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 67 N.J.L. 627 ( E. A. 1902). Accordant decisions: Dunston Litho. Co. v. Borgo, 84 N.J.L. 623 ( E. A. 1913); Champlin v. Davis, 94 N.J.L. 523 ( E. A. 1920); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Feldstein, 112 N.J.L. 514 ( E. A. 1934); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941); Fortunel v. Martin, 114 N.J. Eq. 235 ( E. A. 1933); Equitable Life, c., v. Gutowski, 119 N.J. Eq. 181 ( Ch. 1935); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Lodzinski, 121 N.J. Eq. 183 ( Ch. 1936), reversed on other grounds, 122 N.J. Eq. 404 ( E. A. 1937); Silbros, Inc., v. Solomon, 139 N.J. Eq. 528 ( Ch. 1947). The judgment is accordingly reversed.

  10. Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines, Inc.

    12 N.J. Super. 490 (App. Div. 1951)   Cited 16 times
    In Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines, Inc., 12 N.J.Super. 490, 79 A.2d 880 (App.Div. 1951), the appellate court again reversed the trial court, when it granted defendant's motion for summary judgment in a case of alleged fraud in the inducement.

    At law a person's signature on a release was considered binding unless it was "obtained by fraud or imposition practiced upon him with the intention of deceiving him as to the purport of the paper signed." Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307, 312 ( E. A. 1941); Mannion v. Hudson Manhattan R.R. Co., 125 N.J.L. 606, 607 ( Sup. Ct. 1941), affirmed 127 N.J.L. 230 ( E. A. 1941). The failure of the signer to comprehend the effect of his act was said to be insufficient in the absence of fraudulent representation or similar misconduct by the person being released.