The trial court held that the release barred the suit since plaintiff concededly claimed fraud in its inducement rather than in its execution. Reliance was placed on Kearney v. National GrainYeast Corporation, 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941), in which it was held, under the pre-1948 practice, that only fraud in the execution of a release could avoid its effect in an action at law. Because of this conclusion the other motions were dismissed as moot.
It is the general rule in this state that where a party affixes his signature to a written instrument, such as a release, a conclusive presumption arises that he or she read, understood and assented to its terms and will not be heard to complain that the effect of the act of signing was not comprehended. Peter W. Kero, Inc. v. Terminal Construction Corp., 6 N.J. 361, 368, 78 A.2d 814 (1951); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307, 19 A.2d 19, 21 (Ct.Err. App. 1941). There is an exception, however, where there is a showing of fraud, misrepresentation or over-reaching by the releasee, or a showing that the releasor was suffering from an incapacity affecting his ability to understand the meaning of the release or on any other equitable ground. Raroha v. Earle Finance Corp., Inc., 47 N.J. 229, 234, 220 A.2d 107 (1966); Wojcik v. Pollock, 97 N.J.Super. 319, 324, 235 A.2d 58 (L.Div. 1967).
A notable exception to this rule, however, is when the signature is obtained by fraud or imposition in the execution of the instrument. Christie v.Lalor, 116 N.J.L. 23, 25 ( Sup. Ct. 1935); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1940). It is well settled that where a party is induced to sign a release by reason of a misrepresentation intended to deceive him as to its purport or content, the signer has a right to set up such fraud or imposition in avoidance of such release when there is an attempt to use it against him by the release, even though the signer might have discovered the fraud perpetrated upon him by reading the paper and was negligent in omitting to do so. McDonald v. Central R.R. Co., 89 N.J.L. 251 ( E. A. 1916); Fagan v. Central Railroad Co., 94 N.J.L. 454, 459 ( E. A. 1920); Mannion v. Hudson Manhattan R.R. Co., 125 N.J.L. 606 ( Sup. Ct. 1941); affirmed, 127 N.J.L. 230 ( E. A. 1941); McKenna v.Montclair Police, etc., Commission, 121 N.J.L. 206 ( Sup. Ct. 1938); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., supra; cf. DunstonLithograph Co. v. Borgo, 84 N.J.L. 623 ( E. A. 1913); Diamond Rubber Co., Inc., v. Feldstein, 112 N.J.L. 514, 517 ( E. A. 1934).
This doctrine arises from the well-settled principle that affixing a signature to a contract creates a conclusive presumption, except as against fraud, that the signer read, understood, and assented to its terms." Accordant decisions: Dunston Litho. Co. v. Borgo, 84 N.J. Law 623;87 Atl. Rep. 334; Champlin v. Davis, 94 N.J. Law 523; 110 Atl. Rep. 921;Diamond Rubber Co. v. Feldstein, 112 N.J. Law 514;171 Atl. Rep. 815; Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp.,126 N.J. Law 307; 19 Atl. Rep. 2d 19; Fortunel v. Martin, 114 N.J. Eq. 235;168 Atl. Rep. 393; Equitable Life, c., v. Gutowski,119 N.J. Eq. 181; 181 Atl. Rep. 636; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Lodzinski, 121 N.J. Eq. 183; 188 Atl. Rep. 681; reversed on other grounds, 122 N.J. Eq. 404; 194 Atl. Rep. 79. Other defensive points of a legalistic nature introduced for consideration on behalf of the defendant Solomon are not meritorious.
"To avoid the consequences of a release pleaded by a defendant in an action at law, plaintiff must base his attack upon the fraud or deceit of the party who procured its execution and not upon plaintiff's failure to comprehend the significance or effect of his act in signing it. * * * In the absence of fraud in the execution, the binding signature of the plaintiff has been considered conclusive." Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307, 312 ( E. A. 1940). Peter W. Kero, Inc., v. Terminal Construction Corp., 6 N.J. 361 (1951).
And that the damage was the natural result of the wrongful act. Kearney v. National, etc., Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941). A companion rule leads to a non-suit if the plaintiff fails to prove damages.
It is the well settled principle that affixing a signature to a contract creates a conclusive presumption, except as against fraud, that the signer read, understood, and assented to its terms. Fivey v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 67 N.J.L. 627 ( E. A. 1902); Dunston Litho. Co. v. Borgo, 84 N.J.L. 623 ( E. A. 1913); Champlin v. Davis, 94 N.J.L. 523 ( E. A. 1920); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Feldstein, 112 N.J.L. 514 ( E. A. 1934); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941); Fortunel v. Martin, 114 N.J. Eq. 235 ( E. A. 1933); Equitable Life, c., v. Gutowski, 119 N.J. Eq. 181 ( Ch. 1935); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Lodzinski, 121 N.J. Eq. 183 ( Ch. 1936), reversed on other grounds, 122 N.J. Eq. 404 ( E. A. 1937); Silbros, Inc., v. Solomon, 139 N.J. Eq. 528 ( Ch. 1947). The plaintiff did not disavow knowledge of the stated limitation of the validity of the terms of the purchase order but testified that Rawlings who signed as salesman orally represented to him that he was manager.
Even if he did not read the contract, plaintiff is concluded by its terms. Fivey v. Penn. R.R. Co., 67 N.J.L. 627 ( E. A. 1902); Champlin v. Davis, 94 N.J.L. 523 ( E. A. 1920); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941). The facts are clearly enough disclosed by the proofs.
" Fivey v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 67 N.J.L. 627 ( E. A. 1902). Accordant decisions: Dunston Litho. Co. v. Borgo, 84 N.J.L. 623 ( E. A. 1913); Champlin v. Davis, 94 N.J.L. 523 ( E. A. 1920); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Feldstein, 112 N.J.L. 514 ( E. A. 1934); Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307 ( E. A. 1941); Fortunel v. Martin, 114 N.J. Eq. 235 ( E. A. 1933); Equitable Life, c., v. Gutowski, 119 N.J. Eq. 181 ( Ch. 1935); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Lodzinski, 121 N.J. Eq. 183 ( Ch. 1936), reversed on other grounds, 122 N.J. Eq. 404 ( E. A. 1937); Silbros, Inc., v. Solomon, 139 N.J. Eq. 528 ( Ch. 1947). The judgment is accordingly reversed.
At law a person's signature on a release was considered binding unless it was "obtained by fraud or imposition practiced upon him with the intention of deceiving him as to the purport of the paper signed." Kearney v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 126 N.J.L. 307, 312 ( E. A. 1941); Mannion v. Hudson Manhattan R.R. Co., 125 N.J.L. 606, 607 ( Sup. Ct. 1941), affirmed 127 N.J.L. 230 ( E. A. 1941). The failure of the signer to comprehend the effect of his act was said to be insufficient in the absence of fraudulent representation or similar misconduct by the person being released.