United National, 417 Pa.Super. at 620, 612 A.2d at 1374. Regarding its first argument, Appellant cited this Court's decision in Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 334 A.2d 585 (1975), in which we stated that a statute of limitations may not control an equity court's determination of the timeliness of an action, but may only provide guidance in determining, within the context of laches, whether a delay was appropriate. Id. at 685, 334 A.2d at 587.

Complaint, Ex. E, ¶ 13 (doc. no. 1) (emphasis added). Upon review of the clear and unambiguous language of the Agreement, the Court concludes that the language, "this agreement shall run and be binding upon the respective Contracting Parties," is an additional express statement and is the form of language that clearly expresses an intent to be bound. See, e.g., Kay v. Kay, 334 A.2d 585, 586 n. 1, 587 (Pa. 1974) (finding that the statement in a spousal support agreement that "HUSBAND agrees to be legally bound. . . . HUSBAND further agrees and legally binds himself. . . ." sufficiently stated the husband's intention to be legally bound under the UWOA); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 841, 845 n. 12 (Pa. 1957) (finding that an employment agreement which contained the statement "I intend to be legally bound hereby," is a statement of intent to be bound within the meaning of the UWOA and has the same effect in importing consideration as a seal on an agreement); Fasco, A.G. v. Modernage, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 161, 164 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (concluding that an agreement stating "[w]e the undersigned agreed to be severally liable for the obligation of [the defendant]," was a clear and formal expression of intention to be legally bound by the agreement, thereby satisfying the UWOA).

In Fedun v. Mike's Cafe, Inc., 204 Pa. Super. 356, 364-65, 204 A.2d 776, 780-81 (1964), aff'd, 419 Pa. 607, 213 A.2d 638 (1965), the court ruled that the words "[w]e . . . release you . . and will not hold you. . . ." did not constitute the additional express statement required by the Uniform Written Obligations Act. Cf. Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 683 n. 1, 334 A.2d 585, 586 n. 1 (1975) (no consideration necessary for agreement containing words "Husband agrees to be legally bound . . . husband further agrees and legally binds himself. . . ."); Thomas v. First National Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 183-84, 101 A.2d 910, 911 (1954) (no consideration necessary for agreement containing words "[t]he undersigned agrees to be legally bound hereby").

Conversely, of course, "[t]he criterion of laches is prejudice, and laches will not be imputed to a plaintiff where no injury results to the defendant by reason of the delay." Lincoln Bank v. C H Agency, Inc., 500 Pa. 294, 302, 456 A.2d 136, 140 (1982), quoting Heinly v. Keck, 192 Pa. Super. 537, 540, 161 A.2d 655, 657 (1960); see also Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 685, 334 A.2d 585, 587 (1975). Appellate review of a finding of laches is limited:

We will not disturb the finding that was made. Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 334 A.2d 585 (1975). On May 8, 1962, Mr. Garges and Elizabeth Moyer Garges were divorced. The court found that shortly after the divorce Mr. Garges showed his copy of the divorce decree to Mildred K. Moyer. He told her, "Now we're legally married," and she replied, "It's about time.

Even if there is no consideration — such is not the case here — an agreement may not be avoided for lack of consideration if the agreement contains a provision expressing the parties' intent to be legally bound thereby under the Uniform Written Obligations Act of May 13, 1927, P.L. 985, 33 P. S. § 6. In Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 334 A.2d 585 (1975), the Supreme Court addressed this very issue. There, wife brought an action against husband to enforce the terms of a separation agreement which the parties had entered into in contemplation of a divorce.

It is well-settled that "a party claiming the benefit of the doctrine of laches must demonstrate prejudice due to lapse of time" [between the time the plaintiff's cause of action arose and its efforts to enforce it]. Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 685, 334 A.2d 585, 587 (1975) (citations omitted). Thus, a laches defense has two elements: 1) a delay arising from the other party's lack of due diligence, and 2) resulting prejudice. Inre Francis Edward McGillick Foundation, 406 Pa. Super. 249, 264, 594 A.2d 322, 330 (1991) (appeal granted, 529 Pa. 649, 602 A.2d 860 (1992)) (citations omitted).

Trustees' final laches argument is that the trial court should have only considered the period 1983-1986. Trustees rely on Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 334 A.2d 585 (1975), for the proposition that relevant statutes of limitations may be used to provide guidance as to the reasonableness of delay. Next, Trustees assert that the contractual limitations statute [ 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525] is most analogous to a written trust agreement, and so should limit the inquiry to the period 1983-1986.

When an agreement is read aloud to both parties before its execution and a party testifies that he simply neglected to read the contract before signing, such testimony indicates carelessness and unilateral mistake, not fraud, and the parties will be legally bound by the written agreement. Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 334 A.2d 585 (1975). "It falls stale upon the ear to be told that a formal contract was not read, or was hurriedly prepared, or was signed in haste.

While laches generally "follows the statute of limitations," those statutes "are not controlling in equity, but only provide guidance in determining the reasonableness of any delay." United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. J.H. France Refractories Co. , 542 Pa. 432, 440, 668 A.2d 120 (1995) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Silver v. Korr , 392 Pa. 26, 30, 139 A.2d 552 (1958) and Kay v. Kay , 460 Pa. 680, 685, 334 A.2d 585 (1975) ). At the summary judgment stage, the Court may consider matters over which it may take judicial notice.